How European Cities Craft Immigrant Integration. Something to Learn

Edited by
Giovanna Zincone and Irene Ponzo
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Foreword
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“This is my home”. This simple sentence sums up the essence of belonging, the feeling of being integrated. A long and often challenging voyage brings us to a new exciting place, and then a longer and more difficult journey of integration begins. The current, tremendously negative perception of migrants in Europe suggests that this journey will be a lonely, individual path. With this book, the objective of FEPS and Italianieuropei is to help transform this path: travellers can reach their destination more easily and in a shorter time, if the road is cleared of obstacles and there are supporters along the way.

Historically, cities are the territory where citizenship was born and where democracy was shaped, invented and reinvented, even before nation states emerged. They are also a place of arrival and transit, of continuous social transformation. The first great waves of migration in the 19th century were not from country to country but from rural areas to cities, as described in Doug Saunders’ “Arrival City”, and this is still largely the case on an international scale today. Currently 75% of the European population lives in urban areas. An overwhelming majority of third country nationals settling in the European Union first arrive in major cities such as Paris, Rotterdam, Turin or Madrid. Traditional emigration countries like Spain and Italy became immigration countries and this immigration uses urban areas as its main entry point to Europe.

Cities are where integration happens. Cities are where progressive, pragmatic solutions need to be found every day to ad-

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dress practical issues raised by the increasing diversity of the European population. Scapegoating, migration hysteria, talking about massive fluxes and numbers instead of people are never a solution at local level. Mayors across Europe have no choice but to embrace the issue and improve the way their integration policies are designed. This is a question of ethics, of humanitarian and progressive policies, but also a very down-to-earth way of recognizing that social cohesion in a city cannot be achieved while ignoring the reality of its population.

The issue of undocumented migrants is here particularly revealing of how cities’ policies can diverge from national and European priorities. While these migrants are only seen at national level as illegal immigrants whose only future is detention, deportation or voluntary return, in many cities they are given the right to access city services (health, housing, education) despite national restrictions. Mayors and local administrations are very aware of the segregation and exclusion problems that would be generated if part of the local population was kept away from basic services and programs.

In a Europe where the right-wing is still in power in most countries, cities managed by progressives have been particularly vocal in their opposition, and have used their authority to counteract restrictive policies put into force by conservative governments, such as in Spain, Germany or Greece.

Debates at city level are sometimes heated, but do not have the luxury of populist abstraction or scaremongering, which all too often characterize national politics. The local administrations’ experiences described in this book have contributed to developing a range of instruments and services for their migrant communities, by acting as policymakers, service providers, buyers of goods and services, and employers.

Diversity can indeed be profitable and used as a branding argument. Well-accepted and promoted multiculturalism and multilingualism are seen more and more as an asset to attract and
retain international investors and ultra-qualified migrants. It has been also increasingly shown, especially in the north of Europe (Copenhagen, Oslo, Rotterdam, Cologne), that it is easier to promote an inclusive city identity involving all residents regardless of their cultural background, and promoting their diversity and the contribution to the life of the city, than to shape migrants into nationals while asking them to forget where they come from. Indeed, integration of third country nationals encounters a major obstacle in countries where no provision is made to allow them to take part in the democratic life of the city. Citizenship is a political and social concept related to interaction and a sense of belonging to a community. It also means being part of the community, accepting rights and duties, visibility in the public space and assuming co-responsibility. These issues are all the more obvious at city level, but the political participation of migrants in cities where they reside is sometimes hindered by adverse policy frameworks at national level. Nevertheless, many European cities have taken steps to offer formal or informal opportunities for participation, such as consultative bodies, or symbolic referendums.

While integration policies largely remain the competence of the member states, the European Union, through its DG Home Affairs, increasingly recognizes the importance of the local level and has engaged in a regular policy dialogue with European organizations representing the major cities in Europe. The Zaragoza Declaration of Ministers of Immigration (2010) considered cities as privileged areas for fostering dialogue and promoting social cohesion. The declaration takes into account innovative public policies developed by European cities without interference at national level. What cities are asking is very simple: having a say in how funds, such as the former European Integration Fund, now incorporated into the larger Asylum and Migration Fund, are distributed. Currently they are managed
mainly by national authorities, while cities can only benefit directly from a small part of the fund for community actions. In this context transnational exchange is key for the continuous improvement of integration practices. Networks and initiatives such as Intercultural Cities (Council of Europe), Integrating Cities (EUROCITIES) or ECCAR (European Coalition of Cities Against Racism) have emerged over the past few years to exchange best practices and engage in very practical projects of city-to-city support for migrant integration. These projects allow cities to improve particular aspects of their integration strategies, depending on their specific context and history of immigration. There is no one-size-fits-all integration strategy in Europe but a sum of experiences, failures and successes which can be transferred and adapted from one city to another, always taking into due account that policies cannot be simply imported as such, but need to be adjusted to different social, economic and cultural contexts. In addition, resources, both financial and human, are increasingly difficult to find, particularly in this period of economic crisis. Hence, there is an increasing burden on other actors as well, such as non-profit organizations, making their role increasingly important in the field.

All these considerations have convincingly led FEPS and Italianeuropei to the necessity of jointly engaging in a comparative analysis on immigrants’ integration in urban areas, and to summarize the inspiring findings in this book with the aim of providing policymakers across Europe with some learning on best practices and measures to avoid. We hope that this book will not only make for stimulating reading, but that it will also contribute to render the process of integration a positive and exciting experience for all those involved.
Introduction
“Travel-size Policies”: Taking Home No More Than We Need

Irene Ponzo

The exchange of knowledge and practices, particularly at European level, is now an essential prerequisite for policies which set out to work well. At national and international level, a multitude of guidelines and handbooks seek to summarize and inform policymakers about the lessons learned from measures considered as successful. For some time now, those research centres closest to and most interested in policymaking have sought to contribute to the development of knowledge-based policies, by comparing practices from different contexts and extracting empirical knowledge from them which can be used for defining concrete policies. This book fits into the panorama described above. However, before going on to present the cases illustrated in this volume and the suggestions which may be drawn from them, both positive (what to do) and negative (what to avoid), we feel it is necessary to also highlight the limits and risks of “ill-considered imports”. Indeed, we must not underestimate the complexity of policies, the many elements of which they are made up, and the complicated processes whereby they are produced, applied and adjusted, especially when transferred from one context to another.

Giovanni Picker’s article on Roma in this volume offers useful empirical material to distinguish the potential objects of policy transfer: ideas and attitudes, e.g. the rejection of the assumption that the Roma are different from “us” and “innately nomads”; policy goals, e.g. doing away with camps in favour of more ap-

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appropriate accommodation; the *policy instruments and administrative techniques*, e.g. housing solutions achieved through self-construction or self-renovation; *negative lessons*, e.g. segregation that may result from the protection of mistakenly assumed nomadism of the Roma people; *positive lessons*, e.g. the active involvement of this minority in the policymaking process to make up for the aforementioned wrong assumptions.

Each of these elements may be the object of transfer. Indeed, policy transfer does not always mean transferring an entire policy, it may concern just a few aspects. Transferring an entire policy is, in fact, a very ambitious goal. At times, it is more realistic and effective to leave out administrative or legislative solutions that are too “heavy”, too rooted in their original context to be transported elsewhere, and transfer only the smaller, more manageable elements such as the goals of a policy, an idea, or simply ways of considering a certain issue, for example, by attributing a strategic importance in integration processes to women or to second generations, to schools or to active citizens. Getting a policy to “travel light” may be a prudent choice. However, it should be remembered that the less elements are transferred, the more the results of this imported policy will differ from those observed in the original context.

The second warning to bear in mind is limiting ourselves to reproducing the “best practice”, ignoring the *process* through which it was created. For example, Heckmann and Köhler’s chapter describes how the intercultural garden project was transposed to the Langwasser quarter of Nuremberg from other German cities, focusing on the output and neglecting the processes, in particular communication and dialogue with the local community; the chapter shows that, rather than producing the expected improvement in community life, in the short term the project created alarm and conflict caused by fears that the garden would become a source of disturbance. In order to overcome the project’s state of impasse, the City Council had to draw
attention back to the processes through intensive mediation, regulation and communication work. Like in the business world, in the world of public policies what counts in replicating a product is know-how, i.e. how to make something, and not just what to make. So, when a policy-product is imported, it is crucial not to forget the instruction manual, complete with warnings and possible side effects.

These notes aside, it will be helpful to clarify what we are discussing and in particular, what difference there is between policy transfer and policy learning, which are often mistakenly used as synonyms. In actual fact, policy learning can take place without there being a transfer; indeed, learning can also be generated by previous policies and experiences, without any transfer from other contexts. Conversely, policy learning is just one of the possible mechanisms through which a policy transfer can take place, which implies a cognitive change in the way a certain question is tackled, after knowledge has been gained from other policy experiences.3

We can say that learning favours transfer, and vice versa, but the two processes are not deterministically related, and may occur separately. For example, in the European Union the judgements of the European Court of Justice and the legal acts of the Commission are a non-voluntary, coercive transfer which may even take place without learning, if these decisions are adopted by individual member states without this implying a new perspective on the question at hand, and on the ways in which it is dealt with.5 But learning may also be absent even when practices are voluntarily transferred. Recently, Caponio, Ricucci and Ponzo,6 using the empirical results of the CLIP (Cities for Local Integration Policies) research,7 have highlighted how certain measures, such as intercultural centres or consultative bodies for foreign citizens in the 1990s, and certain “labels”, such as that of “intercultural policies” in the 2000s, were imported by various European cities because they were considered “best
practices”, sometimes without thinking about what their real added value was, and what new conceptualizations of integration they implied. Only in a few cases was this transfer accompanied by a new way of considering and understanding the processes and mechanisms of immigrants’ integration, in other words by effective policy learning.

On the other hand, the transfer of policy knowledge is also not sufficient in itself to generate policy transfer. Stone analyses, for example, the case of transnational knowledge organizations such as think tanks, research institutes, consulting agencies, philanthropic foundations, university hubs, scientific associations, professional bodies, training institutes and so on. These organizations generally help knowledge and people to circulate and should have the capacity to scan the international environment and carry out a detailed evaluation of policies, to avoid an inappropriate or unsuccessful transfer. Indeed, they often do manage to transfer ideas and information, but it is unlikely that these translate into a cognitive reframing, in other words a new way of conceiving and dealing with issues by decision-makers; and much less into concrete policies and practices.

Policy transfer can indeed be obstructed by various factors: resistance by bureaucratic agencies; different institutional set-ups and legislative frameworks; ideological incompatibility or cultural distance; the lack of organizations with the characteristics needed to implement the policy in question; political interests and worry about loss of consensus and votes; a lack of financial resources; bureaucratic or technological inadequacy, and so on. In the same vein, examining a very similar process to policy transfer, namely policy convergence, and identifying the factors obstructing or favouring it, Zincone highlights how historical and institutional heritage tends to produce persistence, generating resistance to change and, therefore, to policy transfer. Alongside these structural limitations, the actors’ capacity for agency plays an important role: indeed, some actors have a greater de-
sire and ability to learn than others, due to their particular professional skills and competences, greater resources or time available, or for reasons of political sensibility, while others tend to slow or impede transfer processes. So what counts is also the individual people and the organizations for which they work. Furthermore, by borrowing the same analytical tools used by Zincone to look at policy convergence, we could say that change, in our case that produced by policy transfer, may be triggered both by actors and by events (failures, public opinion protests, transfer of policies from higher levels, etc.). The two kinds of factors are not wholly unrelated. Events may, indeed, force policymakers to act, but at times, policymakers may use events as opportunities to put forward their own ideas and enact a long-awaited, planned change. What is certain is that policymakers can never act in a void: in the lack of an event capable of opening “windows of opportunity”, they at least need a favourable context and circumstances, and not taking this into account may prove very risky.

In short, the failure of policy transfer processes is a very real possibility. Dolowitz and Marsh identify three aspects of failure in policy transfer, distinguished according to their possible causes, which we have to some extent introduced above: a) uninformed transfer, when borrowing actors have incomplete information about the crucial elements that make the policy a success; b) incomplete transfer, when those crucial elements are known about, but are not transferred adequately; c) inappropriate transfer, when not enough attention is paid to adaptation, and differences between original and borrowing contexts are disregarded. These risks can easily be underestimated, generating a waste of resources and poor productivity of the investment made in the policy transfer. However, mistakes must not just be a source of discouragement, because a lot can be learned from them. The negative lessons learned from another actor can, in fact, dissuade others from
taking measures which have proven unsuccessful elsewhere. Despite the widely acknowledged usefulness of learning from mistakes, this aspect is often overlooked in processes oriented towards policy learning. In this volume, we have sought to examine not just the strengths, but also the weaknesses of local integration policies, including obstacles and less positive results too. In schools in Barcelona, for example, the lack of tools allowing feedback to be given on the policies implemented limits the lessons that could be learned from this phase. The Paris case has shown that the uncertainty in financing for associations, rather than stimulating their activism and fundraising, has driven them to prudence and has led to the interruption of many activities aimed at young people, thus contributing to protests in the banlieues. Highlighting these policies’ weaknesses can not only help us to not repeat mistakes already made by others, but should be a prerequisite for triggering a transfer process. Paradoxically, knowing its weaknesses can establish greater confidence in the product – in this case a policy – being “purchased”; just as when somebody trying to sell a second-hand car comes clean about minor flaws caused by wear and tear, rather than pretending it is just like new.

Lastly, a final, essential element for effective policy learning concerns a question that is often taken for granted but which, for that very reason, risks creating confusion and misunderstandings: what is a public policy and who makes it? And, consequently, who is the subject of the studies included in this book? A policy may be defined as public not so much because it has been implemented by public actors, but because it relates to questions of public interest. Therefore, even a measure carried out entirely by a non-profit organization or a private foundation can be considered a public policy. This definition, which was established some time ago in political science, seems to be particularly useful for observing contemporary societies and, in particular, for looking at how European cities tackle and man-
age the question of integrating immigrants. Indeed, as we will see in the following chapters, this is a policy sector in which numerous stakeholders are mobilized, and in which even organized civil society plays a key role in providing answers and solutions. Therefore, in our analysis we have not examined institutional actors alone, but all those parties involved in the policymaking processes, regardless of their legal status: from elective bodies to public administrations and the judiciary; from political parties to advocacy groups; from private foundations to trade unions, NGOs, experts and so on. Moreover, actors are positioned on different levels – local, national, European – within a multi-level governance system in which processes are anything but hierarchical and linear: the actions of local actors may sometimes depend on the destination of funding provided by the highest levels of government rather than their own political orientation; or, vice versa, the policies made by higher levels do not trace out guidelines within which local measures can be developed, instead embracing and ratifying the solutions of the latter; or again, the non-profit sector may occupy a central role in defining the priorities and methods of action later adopted by public actors. In examining local policies for integration, the various authors focused – to different extents depending on the case – on the relationships between the subjects involved, as well as on their policy frames, on the means they used to carry out a particular policy (sanctions and regulations, financial resources, community resources and social capital, symbolic resources and so on), and on the ways through which they gathered said resources (sources of funding, communication strategies, consultation mechanisms, mobilization processes and so on). The book is divided into three parts: the first focuses on how culture may become an issue of conflict and segregation as consequence of ethnicization processes and on how policies can prevent or overcome these kinds of outcomes and cope with xenophobic movements which try to take advantage of this;
the second part deals with young people with a migrant background who currently represent one of the main challenges for local integration policies, as riots and protests over the past decade in European cities have clearly shown; the third part is about urban and housing policies given that the use of public space and access to social housing are key issues in both anti-migrant discourse and actual everyday integration dynamics. Given the small amount of funding available for field research in these last years, these chapters have been put together using previous studies founded on different research questions and premises. It would, therefore, certainly be worthwhile returning to this theme with specific studies. With this book, we have attempted to re-examine the empirical material available by using the analytical perspective illustrated in this introduction, going beyond a mere description of the policy products, and reflecting upon the know-how that would be necessary (although not sufficient in itself) to formulate policies with a greater chance of success.
NOTES


2 Dolowitz and Marsh define policy transfer as a process through which «knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in one political setting (past or present) is used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in another political setting». D. P. Dolowitz, D. Marsh, *Who Learns What from Whom: A Review of the Policy Transfer Literature*, in “Political Studies”, 2/1996, p. 344.


7 See www.eurofound.europa.eu/areas/populationandsociety/clip-about.htm.

8 D. Stone, *op. cit.*


12 G. Zincone, *Conclusion* cit.


Migration and Culture
The chapter analyses two neighbourhood conflicts which are outwardly interethnic conflicts, but can be explained as structural conflicts which have been ethnicized. The two neighbourhoods, Werderau and Langwasser, are in Nuremberg (Germany). Werderau is the case of a structural conflict between investors and long-time tenants, who feel that their housing rights and control over their environment (values and behaviour, lifestyles and sense of order) are under threat. Langwasser is the case of a structural conflict between the city’s planning authority, which intended to build an intercultural garden, and the residents’ fears of changes to their environment due to foreigners. These fears were reinforced and exploited through agitation by neo-Nazi groups.

This article analyses two neighbourhood conflicts in Nuremberg (Germany) which on the surface are interethnic conflicts or migrant-majority conflicts, but can be explained as structural conflicts about “property rights” which have been ethnicized. The concept of “property right” is understood as a person’s legitimate right to the control over a good. The names of the two neighbourhoods are Werderau and Langwasser. In the case of Werderau “property right” concerns the historically founded legitimate expectation of long-time renters for safe housing. In the

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case of Langwasser “property right” refers to people’s legitimate expectation to have a say in the shaping of the immediate environment around their homes. Nuremberg is a city with about 500,000 inhabitants, of whom about 39% have a migration background. As will be seen, Werderau and Langwasser are two very different neighbourhoods in two very different environments and could actually be regarded as belonging to two different cities. Werderau is the case of a structural conflict between investors and long-time renters, who feel that their housing rights and control over their environment and lifestyles are under threat. Langwasser is the case of a structural conflict between the city’s planning authority and the residents’ right to have control over their neighbourhood. The article explains how structural conflicts change into what appear to be interethnic and migrant-majority conflict. Ethnic conflict is understood as a conflict between a native majority and one ethnic group that has a migration background. Migrant-majority conflict is a conflict between migrants of different ethnic backgrounds and a native majority. As will be shown in the following pages, the conflict dynamic is similar for both kinds of conflict. By comparing two cases in two different neighbourhoods it will be possible to draw some “policy lessons” on how to avoid involuntarily causing or how to appease ex post migration-related urban conflicts. The basic theoretical hypothesis we work with is that there are no “genuine” interethnic or migrant-majority conflicts. Conflicts that take this form arise from a “structural conflict” of interests and are framed as ethnic conflict through a series of stages. According to Esser’s model we can outline the following stages of conflict development and apply it as an explanation for the Werderau and Langwasser conflicts. The stages are:

a) structural conflict;
b) framing of conflict, ethnicization;
c) mobilization and intensification of conflict;
d) spreading of conflict;
e) resolution of conflict.
The argument in the following sections is organized in such a way that we first give a description of events and actions, and then try to categorize and explain them.

The Werderau conflict with new migrant families

Werderau is a traditional working class area with about 4,700 inhabitants in the southern suburb of Nuremberg. In the past most of the area’s population worked for the nearby MAN factory producing engines and trucks. With the increasing integration and family reunion of guest workers in the late 1960s and 1970s migrant families, mostly of Turkish origin, moved to the area. They integrated fairly quickly and were identified as a regular part of the area’s population. Interethnic and intergroup relations were peaceful.

Since the turn of the millennium the composition of the population changed and interethnic relations started to become tense and conflictual. Neighbourhood conflicts developed between old inhabitants – including integrated Turkish families – and new Turkish families who bought houses and moved to the area more recently. Anti-Turkish sentiment and hatred grew, and various forms of protest against the new inhabitants developed. Old inhabitants complained about the new inhabitants due to them “not keeping to the rules”, not taking proper care of their garbage and being noisy, particularly the children. Old inhabitants accused the new Turkish families of threatening the “old order”. Some residents asked the city administration for help, but their requests were not answered. An anti-immigrant neo-Nazi group from outside the area interfered and increased the interethnic tensions. They distributed anti-immigrant leaflets and held meetings in the local pub. In municipal and federal
elections the nativist group won a much higher share of the vote than its average share in the city. Inhabitants complained they had been left alone by the city administration and became increasingly dissatisfied and frustrated.

A new mayor was elected in the 2002 municipal elections. As one consequence the city administration appointed a district coordinator for the area, who was able to slowly ease the tensions and end the open conflict. This was the beginning of a new phase of the conflict which will be demonstrated below.

The explanation of conflict In the following sections we will reconstruct the development of the conflict in more detail and attempt to explain the rise, different stages and the “resolution” of this neighbourhood conflict. We will combine description with theoretical analysis. The theoretical analysis is based on elements of intergroup relations theory and a reformulation of Esser’s theory of interethnic conflict.

We start by clarifying the very notion of the concept of conflict: what is a conflict? In the tradition of intergroup relations research, conflict can be defined as strife between two (or more) groups for the control of goods that each urgently desires, but which can be attained by one group only at the expense of the other(s). Goods may be material assets and rights, but also values, beliefs, norms and lifestyles.

The Werderau conflict took the form of an interethnic conflict between long-established residents, mainly Germans, and newly established residents, mainly migrants of Turkish origin. We will follow Esser’s theoretical model in trying to explain the conflict.

Development of a structural conflict over housing rights and lifestyles The recent Werderau neighbourhood conflict is related to the area’s characteristics, which emerged when it was founded shortly before the First World War. In 1911 a non-profit
association was formed and work began on building houses for the new settlement. The MAN company and a house building cooperative of MAN workers were the shareholders in the association. Employment in the factory was a prerequisite for renting a house; thus, the Werderau population consisted of MAN workers and their families. Situated outside the city, the quarter had an almost rural character and a village-like appearance. Each house had a garden. Voluntary working class associations contributed to a rich communal life. The MAN workers’ council played a central role in local community life. Werderau was a Gemeinschaft.

In 1941 the workers’ housing cooperative was dissolved and the MAN corporation remained as the sole proprietor of the settlement and the houses. In the 1950s additional houses were built, some without gardens. New MAN workers moved in and enlarged the population. The MAN workers’ council played a strong role in allotting houses to workers and in the general living conditions in the quarter.

The 1960s saw the addition of a large multi-storey building to the single houses structure, with individual apartments. With the recruitment of guest workers by MAN a number of them moved to the quarter and became part of the Werderau population. The idyllic character of the neighbourhood was somewhat disturbed in the 1970s, when a motorway was built close by. Whereas this environmental issue was somewhat appeased by the construction of noise-abatement walls, a very different kind of issue developed in 1990, which would become a major cause for the Werderau conflict: the Werderau building society which owned the houses abolished its non-profit status. One of the consequences was that people other than MAN employees were allowed to rent Werderau houses. The other consequence was that severe fears arose among residents that the MAN controlled building company would sell the houses to outside investors and that their housing rights and low rents were under threat.
Those fears became a reality when MAN sold the housing stock to the real estate company Telos in 1998. With the new owners the MAN workers’ council’s influence on housing and living conditions in Werderau ended. Telos aimed at reselling the housing area as a whole or as individual properties and started forcing some tenants to move out and reselling their houses. New tenants and new homeowners moved into Werderau, mainly migrants of Turkish origin. In 2001 Telos went bankrupt and a series of ownership changes among various investors occurred, in which more houses were sold to single households. New inhabitants came to Werderau, again mostly of Turkish origin.

On an explanatory level the events described form a structural conflict: the conflict consists of the opposing interests of investors and of long-term inhabitants. The long-term inhabitants want to keep their housing rights (lifelong right to residence, low rent, some control over who moves into the neighbourhood), the various new owners want to pursue their interests as investors, i.e. sell houses to new owners. This is the material side of the structural conflict. In addition, there is a cultural dimension to the structural conflict. The new inhabitants have a different way of life, the old inhabitants feel that their new neighbours are “not keeping to the rules” (noise, garbage, children’s behaviour) and that they threaten the “old order” which can no longer be enforced.

Framing and ethnicization: new Turkish residents are perceived as a threat The next step in the explanation is about the framing of the conflict, that is to say the definition of the situation, which is a decisive factor in the way in which people can be mobilized over the conflict. The main ways in which structural conflicts can be defined are along class lines, or between ethnic or religious groups. The framing of a situation has important implications: «Framing of a situation is a process in which individuals change their perspective from an individual rational orientation to
a collective-emotional orientation. This may take the form of an ethnic identification or of religious or other Gemeinschaft-like framing of the situation with feelings of collective solidarity».

The framing of the structural conflicts in Werderau took place along ethnic lines. The incoming Turkish residents were perceived as threatening the established residential status of old Werderau inhabitants and as undermining the old order in the quarter. Thus, the structural conflict was ethnicized.

**Conflict mobilization and intervention by neo-Nazis**

Ethnicization implies that the conflict is defined as group conflict: “us” and “them”, Germans and Turks. Ethnicization brings into play existing stereotypes about the groups that have nothing to do with the structural conflict, but contribute to intensifying the conflict. Ethnic framing has a strong emotional component and increasingly drives people on both sides to take part in the conflict. The mobilization and intensification of conflict was mirrored in the sharp increase in media reports about Werderau. The quarter was increasingly portrayed as a “problem area”. Mobilization can be further increased by outside intervention. This is what happened in Werderau in 2002. The ethnicization of the conflict was further stimulated by nativist right-wing forces from the neo-Nazi party NPD (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands) and a regional group called Ausländerstop. They claimed to be supporting the old inhabitants’ interests and blamed migrants for the ongoing changes which were driving people out as tenants, allowing houses to be sold to mostly Turkish families and threatening the “old order” of the quarter. As local and other elections showed, to some extent they were successful, since many inhabitants felt abandoned by the Nuremberg city council, which did not seem to care about what was happening in the quarter. This has to be understood by considering that Werderau was used to being taken care of by the MAN company and the workers’ council in the past.
Conflict resolution: social housing and conflict mediation

In 2002 a new mayor was elected and the Social Democrats became the leading political force in Nuremberg. The new administration installed a so-called district coordinator who worked as a conflict manager in the quarter. The district coordinator initiated a round table of citizens and voluntary associations and the conflict groups started communicating with one another. The round table met regularly and a process of mutual trust building got underway. The cultural conflict, which had not been violent anyway, started de-escalating. After two years, the conflict manager was able to withdraw from the quarter. In the same year a youth centre run by a Protestant church organization was opened, which partly took over some of the functions of the conflict manager.

After several changes in the ownership of the Werderau housing association the majority of the remaining property – houses that had not been sold to outside families – was bought by the nonprofit city housing company WBG in 2008. Thus, for most of the residents, the structural conflict that was behind the interethnic tensions in the quarter ended, since WBG is obliged to follow a socially responsible housing policy.

As a result of the many changes in the quarter in the last decade, the old working class Gemeinschaft-like village no longer exists. There are divisions between old and new residents, Germans and residents of Turkish origin, and between old and new Turkish inhabitants. But disputes between the groups have eased and they have learned to communicate and cooperate with one another. The city continues to support stakeholders in their community work.

The Langwasser conflict

The intercultural garden conflict in Nuremberg-Langwasser is a case of unintended consequences of social action, where a pro-
ject that was meant to promote migrant integration actually led to a migrant-majority neighbourhood conflict.

Intercultural gardens are a type of project through which intergroup relations are improved by creating group contact through mutually rewarding activities, namely gardening. Since similar projects have been successful in other cities, the Nuremberg city authorities decided to establish their own such project. They chose a site in the Langwasser part of the city, which has a substantial proportion of inhabitants with a migration background, particularly Aussiedler (ethnic Germans) from the former Soviet Union. But the project was intended to bring migrants of various origins, not just Aussiedler, together with native Germans through collective gardening.

City community workers formed a founding committee for the garden, consisting of neighbourhood associations and individuals. A district coordinator working as a community social worker held a meeting to inform the neighbourhood about the nearby intercultural garden project. There was poor attendance at the meeting and for several months this was the only official information activity about the project from its planners.

A right-wing group – the so-called “Initiative Ausländerstop” – tried to profit from the conflict and intervened in several ways. After forming an association for the establishment of the garden, ten people hesitantly started preparing the garden, despite constant private and public protests from neighbours and the anti-immigrant group. After city community workers provided better information about the project and the media changed sides, many people recognized that they had been misused for anti-immigrant purposes and started seeing the project in a different light. They did not want to be seen as right-wing extremists. This was helped by the gardeners’ very careful, responsible behaviour, which belied the critics’ argument that the garden would cause various kinds of disturbances. The campaign against the garden slowly lost its mo-
mentum and normal gardening began, with a first Thanksgiving in autumn 2011.

The description and explanation of the Langwasser conflict will follow the theoretical foundations as presented in the Werderau case. Therefore, we assume that there is a structural conflict at the beginning, that a framing process takes place which helps to mobilize, intensify and spread the conflict, and that there is subsequently a resolution to the conflict.

The structural conflict: planning sovereignty vs. neighbourhood rights

The quality of a city’s integration policy has become a major indicator of its overall political competence and is, moreover, a factor in the city’s appeal for foreign migrants. Since intercultural gardens had been reported to be a successful method for improving intergroup relations between migrants and the majority, Nuremberg’s integration policy wanted such a garden as well.

The plan was to build it in Langwasser, a city district with lots of green space and a high proportion of inhabitants with a migration background. In 2009 community workers initiated a committee for the project in cooperation with local civic associations. The committee found a site which seemed appropriate for the gardening project. The site was part of a park-like area, but close to multi-storey apartment buildings. Community workers and members of the garden committee held a meeting announcing plans for the project. The meeting, however, was poorly attended; during the meeting some residents of the neighbourhood around the site expressed fears about the project and disagreed with it.

The fears were about feelings that the garden would be too close to their houses, that gardeners would make noise, produce waste and dirt, that safety in the neighbourhood would decrease and that the value of their properties would decrease as well. In the meantime information and rumours about the garden project were spreading through the district. Residents drew similarities
between the city’s proceedings in the garden project and the city’s recent planning and construction of a nearby sports park that was built without properly informing the site’s neighbours. People felt “steamrollered” by the city’s actions. The media took sides with the residents’ complaints. The structural conflict that developed was between the residents’ interests in keeping their environment intact and unchanged and being able to control it. They felt they had a kind of legitimate “property right” for the control of the environment around their homes. This conflicted with the city’s planning sovereignty to choose a site for constructing a project at a location which seemed appropriate for that purpose. The conflict was kindled by residents’ recent frustrating experiences with the construction of the sports park.

**Framing of the conflict: majority vs. migrants** In this context, a neighbour of the planned garden site with right-wing affiliations started a campaign among residents of Langwasser and those living near the project site to get them to sign a statement against the intercultural garden. As a result the intercultural garden increasingly was seen by residents as a project for migrants; few people realised that the project was intended for people with a migration history and for native residents to meet and get to know one another better. This perception was further reinforced by anti-immigrant right-wing activists from outside Langwasser, who intervened, put up banners against the garden and distributed leaflets against the project. The different activities succeeded in defining the conflict as a migrant-majority conflict. The potential gardeners were portrayed as migrant intruders into the peaceful environment of the local residents, who did not respect the “property rights” of the local community.

**Mobilization and counter-mobilization** The framing of the conflict as a migrant-majority conflict strongly emotionalized
and politicized the case and drew more people into it. The person who started the signature campaign decided to file a lawsuit against the project and drew a lot of support from Langwasser residents and project neighbours. In this situation the district coordinator held a second public meeting to inform residents about the planned garden and to counteract the many rumours about the project. The district coordinator appealed to the media not to give the anti-immigrant groups publicity and support for their propaganda.

The media became increasingly critical of the right-wing campaign and reported more favourably about the project. A counter-mobilization set in with political parties and district organizations lending support to the garden project. People did not want to be identified as right-wing sympathizers and did not want neo-Nazis to profit from the situation and the conflict. To assuage the residents’ fears the intercultural garden committee developed a set of rules to protect neighbours from possible disturbances. The rules were about opening hours, parties, hygiene, parking and other provisions all meant to avoid any problems for the neighbours of the garden.

Because of the politicization and unwanted publicity only a rather small number of families applied to have a lot in the garden; all in all, twelve families signed up.

**Conflict resolution: counter mobilization wins** Conflicts can be resolved in different ways: by compromise between the parties; mediation; mutual exhaustion of the parties; or by one side winning over the other. Langwasser is a case of one side winning over the other.

Two critical events were mainly responsible for this development: during a council hearing in the city hall attended by many residents from Langwasser, these residents started realizing that they were being misused by right-wing anti-immigrant neo-Nazi groups. Media reports about the hearing helped change
the perception of the garden conflict in the neighbourhood as well as in the city, and people started disengaging from the campaign against the project. The other critical event was a court ruling about the lawsuit against the garden. The court clearly rejected the lawsuit as unjustified, which took away much of the legitimation of the campaign and weakened the movement against the garden. In the meantime, a garden association had formally been established and a few months later work began on building the garden. Tension eased and in 2012 the garden association had 22 members with 18 active gardeners from 9 different countries. The gardeners are very careful about keeping the garden clean and giving no reason for complaints by the neighbouring residents.

Conclusions

Werderau is the case of a structural conflict between investors and long-time tenants, who felt that their housing rights were under threat. Since it was families with a Turkish background who bought houses sold by the investors it was rather easy to ethnicize and emotionalize the conflict and blame it on this particular group. A second dimension of “property rights” – control over one’s environment – was cultural, and created discord between old and new residents with very different values and behaviour, lifestyles and senses of order. The material side of the conflict could have been avoided or solved earlier by political intervention and having the city’s non-profit housing company take over the old MAN housing stock. Earlier mediation by a community worker might have avoided the ethnicization of the cultural conflict and the anti-immigrant group’s outside intervention. Two major policy consequences emerge from the Werderau conflict. First, the conflict was allowed to snowball because the municipality took too long to intervene in the interethnic neighbourhood conflicts via a mediating social worker. The lesson for
policy makers is to intervene promptly. Second, conflicts on the housing market could have been avoided, if ownership of the non-profit association had been transferred to the municipal public housing company.

In Langwasser the structural conflict between the city’s planning sovereignty and the residents’ “property rights” concerning the control of the neighbourhood of their houses evolved into a migrant-majority conflict due to a lack of pre-emptive communication with the residents by the city. This way, irrational fears developed, which were reinforced and exploited by anti-immigrant agitation by neo-Nazi groups. Counter mobilization against the anti-immigrant forces and careful actions taken by the project weakened the campaign against the garden.

Three major policy recommendations emerge from the Langwasser conflict. First, presuming that intercultural gardens are a successful integration project in themselves proved to be a very superficial policy transfer by the municipality. Conditions for importing best practices have to be carefully studied and taken into account. Second, citizen participation in neighbourhood projects is crucial to their success, and migrant integration projects are no exception. Third, the media play a crucial role in the success (or otherwise) of integration projects. Municipalities should have a strategy for communicating integration policies.
NOTES

1 Migration background is defined as a person either having migrated her/himself or being the direct descendant of at least one parent who has migrated. Statistischer Monatsbericht für Dezember 2010, in “Statistik Nürnberg Fürth”, M396, 27 January 2011, available on www.nuernberg.de/imperia/md/statistik/dokumente/veroeffentlichungen/berichte/monatsberichte/2010/statistikaktuell_2010_12.pdf.

2 Research for this article was carried out as part of the European Integration Fund project Concordia Discors: Understanding Conflict and Integration Outcomes of Inter-group Relations in Selected Neighbourhoods of Five European cities (see www.concordiadiscors.eu). The project was coordinated by the Forum Internazionale ed Europeo di Ricerche sull’Immigrazione (FIERI) of Turin.


7 M. Sherif, C. W. Sherif, op. cit.

8 H. Esser, op. cit., p. 420.
Giovanni Picker
Policy Logic and the Spatial Segregation of Roma in Europe. The Cases of Florence and Cluj-Napoca

This chapter examines the relations between housing policies for Roma and the segregation of Roma in European cities. Based on ethnographic research carried out between 2008 and 2011, it looks comparatively at two local policies; the first is the planning and construction of a peripheral “nomad camp” in Florence (Italy), the second is the relocation of 56 families to a polluted area on the outskirts of Cluj-Napoca (Romania). After discussing strategies, objectives, motivations and underpinning principles of each policy, four recommendations to policymakers and practitioners are put forward.

Introduction

About 6 million Roma are estimated to live within the borders of the European Union, and about twice as many in Europe as a whole. They constitute the largest, the youngest and the most vulnerable European minority. In a 2012 study, the European Union Fundamental Rights Agency and the United Nations Development Programme reported that about 90% of Roma in Europe live in households with an income below the poverty line. The study made clear that one of the key disadvantages affecting Roma is the precariousness of their housing conditions, and – strictly related to that – spatial segregation.

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The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines segregation as «the separation or isolation of a race, class, or ethnic group by enforced or voluntary residence in a restricted area, by barriers to social intercourse, by separate educational facilities, or by other discriminatory means». Hence, segregation can be either enforced or voluntary. In the case of Roma, recent research by the European Union Fundamental Rights Agency shows that segregation is not voluntary but only enforced by: government policy, economic pressure, local government or private action. European governments’ policies can play a key role not only in granting all citizens equal rights and access to housing, but also – particularly in times of economic downturn – in enacting spatial segregation. Similarly, local governments in Europe often opt for policies addressing Roma which, instead of encouraging social inclusion and mixité sociale, achieve quite the opposite.

Drawing on ethnographic research carried out in 2007-2008 in Florence (Italy) and in 2008 and 2011 in Cluj-Napoca (Romania), this chapter aims to shed light on the segregating outcomes of local housing policies addressing Roma, and puts forward a few policy recommendations for more inclusive and sustainable policy outcomes. In particular, the empirical analysis will focus on the issues analysed during my fieldwork, namely the “policy logic”, i.e. the strategies, objectives, motivations and underpinning principles of local housing policies for Roma.

The chapter is organized into three sections. The first section provides an overview of the UN, European and national policy frameworks concerning housing and the Roma. The second section focuses on the cases of Florence (Italy) and Cluj-Napoca (Romania), in which specific housing policies addressing Roma have had outstanding segregating effects. On the basis of the existing policy framework and of the two case-studies, in the third section four policy recommendations are put forward.
The UN and European policy frameworks

Housing is one of the social rights granted by the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In the decades following the Declaration, international law has defined the right to housing in greater detail. One of the main steps in this definition process was “General Comment 4”, adopted by the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 1991. This outlined, through the seven criteria for adequate housing, that the right to housing includes more than mere access to a shelter: namely, security of tenure; adequate services, materials, infrastructure; affordability; habitability; accessibility; location, and cultural adequacy.

The first Roma-focused UN document was “General Recommendation No. 27: Discrimination against Roma”, adopted in 2000 by the Officer of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. Articles 30 and 31 of the Recommendation, under the heading “Measures to improve living conditions”, respectively invite governments:

«To develop and implement policies and projects aimed at avoiding segregation of Roma communities in housing; to involve Roma communities and associations as partners together with other persons in housing project construction, rehabilitation and maintenance» (article 30; emphasis added).

«To act firmly against any discriminatory practices affecting Roma, mainly by local authorities and private owners, with regard to taking up residence and access to housing; to act firmly against local measures denying residence to and unlawful expulsion of Roma, and to refrain from placing Roma in camps outside populated areas that are isolated and without access to health care and other facilities» (article 31; emphasis added).

Article 30 introduced the important idea of involving Roma communities and associations in the implementation of housing
measures, and article 31 underlined, once again, the role of local authorities in carrying out discriminatory practices.

Since the 1960s the European Union has produced various policy texts to improve the social conditions of Roma, including housing. On a more general level, one of the most crucial issues that the EU has been encouraging is the recognition of Roma as a national minority. Although diversified according to each national system, including Roma among the recognized national minorities would create the structural conditions for combatting discrimination; this would include: the promotion of Romani cultural traits including Romani language in private and public educational curricula and in the public sphere; a wide range of public cultural activities under the patronage of the state concerning Romani history and language; the promotion and protection of Romani NGOs.

Minority status is probably the most notable difference between Romania and Italy, i.e. the two countries under scrutiny in this chapter. While in Romania Roma have been recognized as a national minority since the adoption of the 1991 Constitution, in Italy they lack this status.

**Florence. Peripheral camps as policy tool**

One of the major consequences of the lack of minority status is the extreme difficulty of producing a realistic estimation of the number of Roma in Italy. According to a very general estimate they account for 200,000 people, i.e. 0.3% of the national population. From 1945 to the end of the 2000s, the Italian government did not directly draft and/or implement systematized and coherent policies explicitly addressing Roma. The only measure which the Italian government carried out in that period was a 1965 agreement with the national non-Romani NGO, Opera Nomadi. The agreement established Opera Nomadi as the only national-level institution in charge of the education of Romani children.
Policies addressing Roma in Italy have principally been drafted at regional level. From the early 1980s to the early 1990s, 12 out of 21 regions passed as many regional laws addressing Roma and Sinti (hereafter R&S). All of these regional laws are similar to each other, and one of the priorities that they establish is to provide proper housing for R&S, often called nomads in the text of the laws. In 1988 the Region of Tuscany passed the first law addressing R&S (law 17/1988), entitled “Interventi per la tutela dell’etnia rom” (Interventions for the Protection of Roma Ethnicity). Article 1 stated the goal of the law: «The Region dictates the norms aiming at the preservation (salvaguardia) of the Roma cultural patrimony, at avoiding impediments to the right to nomadism (nomadismo) and at granting the right to halt within the regional territory; it also aims to avoid impediments to the fruition of social and health services».

In view of this goal, the only housing tool that the law envisages is the camp, and two types of camps are mentioned: camps for R&S who intend to halt and stay more than thirty days (halting camps for “sedentary” people, campo sosta per sedentarizzati), and camps for R&S who only intend to halt for a period of less than thirty days (halt-transit camps, campo sosta transito). From both the text of the law and the debates in the Regional Council that preceded the vote on the bill it is possible to infer that Tuscan policymakers defined Roma not as subjects whose political, social and economic rights should be protected, but only as entities belonging to one single “nomadic culture”, which was considered in need of protection. This culture-oriented approach presents two problematic aspects. Firstly, it is a blunt misrecognition, because the vast majority of Yugoslav Roma who arrived in Florence had never followed a nomadic lifestyle; secondly, the «right to halt within the regional territory» cannot be viewed as a “real right”, because it is not protected by either the Constitution, or by a state law. At the
end of this section the implications of both these problematic aspects for envisaging new reforms will be discussed.

One piece of evidence for this culture-oriented approach is a statement by the president of the Fourth Regional Commission, which proposed and discussed the bill before voting on it: «This law is a product of our culture, and it could not be otherwise. Thus, we stem from this in order to reflect something we discussed today, because the fact that it is a product of our culture does not mean that it should overwhelm other cultures, which are currently in our Region».8

Without a national framework protecting Roma cultural rights, the definition of Roma as a different "culture" – and, more generally, a culture-oriented approach – seems to have had a very specific impact on both socio-political dynamics involving R&S, and on the subsequent regional laws addressing R&S. As a result of the law, in spring 1988 the first camp, called Olmatello, was built on the extreme outskirts of Florence, which is Tuscany’s regional capital and has a population of 370,000 inhabitants. The camp initially hosted Yugoslav Romani families in precarious socioeconomic conditions, and until 1991 their living conditions were relatively bearable. However, with the passing of time, and the outbreak of the Bosnian war (1992), several new Yugoslav Romani families joined the camp, and the city administration decided to intervene. In winter 1993 the Olmatello camp was fenced in with a concrete wall; an infirmary and a prefabricated building for toilets were set up, and electricity was installed. A security lodge was also installed at the entrance of the camp.

Due to the increasingly precarious conditions of Olmatello, in 1995 the Regional Council decided to draft another regional law for R&S amending the previous one. The 73/1995 law, which is entitled “Interventions for the Roma and Sinti peoples”, did not embrace the camp as the only housing solution for Roma. However, the aim of the law was very similar to that of the previous
one, namely, to «preserve the Roma cultural patrimony and the R&S identity, in order to facilitate communication between cultures, to grant the right to a nomadic life, to the religious practice, and to halt and stay within the regional territory. Moreover the right to enjoy the access to social, health and school services is granted» (article 1; emphasis added).

As can be noted, this law introduces a major new aim, namely «to facilitate communication between cultures». While this accent on communication appears to be a novelty, it does not seem to break with the first law’s culture-oriented approach. On the contrary, considering the ever increasing instability of material and social conditions under which immigrant Roma were arriving and organizing their housing, an emphasis on culture in such a key policy document as the regional law, appears rather astonishing. I will come back to the emphasis put on “culture” in the last part of this section; let me now briefly account for the continuity in approach to housing for Roma, between the 1988 law and 2007 (namely the year in which I carried out ethnographic research among civil servants dealing with Roma in Florence).

In spring 2007, while interviewing a civil servant in charge of Olmatello, she told me: «Once I was struck by what a Roma living in the camp told me: “If I don’t get a job I will go away”, and he left for Germany. I would never be able to leave like that, from one day to the next. This is the point: maybe they have this travelling sense in their blood, which makes it easy for them to travel».

Opinions about Roma being intrinsically different from “us”, and innately “nomads” were widespread among the civil servants with whom I met regularly. And indeed this notion of Roma as nomadic is blatantly false. It is estimated that less than 5% of Roma living in Italy leads what could be defined as a “nomadic” way of life. Certainly, it would be wrong to consider the majority of Roma coming from Kosovo in the 1980s or 1990s to be
nomads. However, as mentioned previously, nomadism was the main pillar on which the first regional law for Roma was based, and the culture-oriented approach adopted in the first law persisted in the second one (i.e. law 76/1995).

Over time, Roma in Florence started organizing themselves into associations, the first of which was founded in 1992 and called CIDAMEN. In the late 1990s a group of Roma became involved in consultation with an important local housing think tank, Fondazione Michelucci, and as a result of these consultations, a new regional law was proposed. From these evolutions, in 2000 a third regional law (2/2000) was passed amending the previous one. Although this law perpetuates the idiom of “culture” and “right to nomadism”, it introduces two new developments with regard to housing: the rehabilitation of old public and/or private buildings for social uses (article 4), and the use of social housing, as provided for in the immigration law. Within the framework of these two legislative innovations, NGO Arci and regional authorities carried out the so-called “Progetto Toscana” (Tuscany Project), which resulted in 110 Romani persons within the regional territory gaining socioeconomic independence. This socio-legal framework also made it possible for municipal authorities to shut down the Olmatello camp in summer 2012, allowing the 140 people who were still living there to move to different public and private housing solutions.

As discussed in this section, the culture-oriented approach was the principle trend from the late 1980s to the mid/late-2000s in representations of Roma by Tuscan policymakers. It was this approach which influenced policy decisions and measures concerning housing, ultimately making it possible for a peripheral “Roma camp” to stay in place for twenty-four years. This approach indicates a major paradox that can be found in all twelve regional laws addressing Roma in Italy: the protection of culture, “Roma culture”, without state guarantees. Indeed, the right to nomadism and to halting within the regional territory that all
laws recognize is nothing more than an informal right, because it is protected neither by the Constitution nor by state laws. The alleged “cultural right” to nomadism referred to in all regional laws for Roma proves that simply officially recognizing Roma as a national minority would grant them real cultural rights, meaning entitlements which would be properly protected by a court, including the right to decide what constitutes “Roma culture” and what – like nomadism – ceased long ago to form part of the Roma’s experiences.

Although the Olmatello camp was shut down, spatial segregation in Florence persists. Poderaccio is an informal, non-fenced peripheral settlement in which Yugoslav Romani families found shelter in the late 1990s. In 2004 it was renamed “Poderaccio village” after the local council replaced shacks with small wooden houses, and today it hosts about five hundred Romani persons.

**Cluj-Napoca. Modular housing near a rubbish dump as policy tool**

According to the 2011 census, there are 619,000 Roma in Romania, i.e. about 3.2% of the national population. Other estimates, such as the one made by the UNDP, report a figure of 1,500,000 people, since it is believed that many Roma fear stigma and prejudice in disclosing their ethnic belonging. One of the fundamental consequences that the recognition of Roma as national minority has on policymaking is the fact that no policy – besides those covered by minority status, such as teaching Romani language in schools and providing consultation to political and administrative authorities – can be explicitly addressing Roma unless it comes under ethnic discrimination.

I will now present the findings of my ethnographic research, conducted intermittently from spring 2008 to summer 2011 in Cluj-Napoca (310,000 inhabitants, of which less than 1% is
Roma), the capital of Transylvania, on the city administration’s attitudes vis-à-vis local Roma. Here I will focus on the only municipal measure which has directly targeted local Roma over the last decade. In mid-December 2010, the city administration relocated 270 Romani people, i.e. 56 families, living in Coastei Street, in the centre, to a polluted industrial area called Pata Rât, near the municipal rubbish dump on the extreme outskirts of the city. 22 families had been squatting, while 18 were residing there legally; 16 families who were also occupying the site illegally were given cardboard and pieces of wood to build their own makeshift shelters by the dump. Prior to making an empirical analysis, it seems necessary to point out that Cluj-Napoca is one of Romania’s most crucial hubs for foreign investment, and one of the country’s most dynamic cities, with about 100,000 students attending the prestigious local university. An increasing phenomenon in all fast-growing post-socialist cities is that western companies and corporations need large portions of land to set up their headquarters and offices. This makes the value of land in the region very high, especially in the city centre, and Cluj is no exception.9

The official reason for evicting the legally residing families too was that they were living in unhealthy conditions and that their neighbours had made repeated complaints (see municipal directive 127/2010). On 10 May 2011, following protests by the relocated Romani families and various activist groups, the mayor of Cluj, Sorin Apostu, declared: «The evacuation from Coastei Street has been carried out, due to the fact that the tenants’ way of life had sparked many controversies regarding the inhabitants of the area, including the children among them, as well as regarding the very meaning that our city has in Romania and abroad».10

Interested in understanding the underpinning worldviews, official and unofficial motivations, as well as the material outcomes of the relocation policy, in 2011 I carried out semi-structured in-
When I interviewed with the civil servants who were in charge of the relocation measure. The civil servant who coordinated the entire relocation depicted the situation in a way that was shared by all the interviewees:

«The problem of Roma citizens in Coastei Street is an old one. First there were four flats, which were owned by the municipality and rented out to some families – these included Romanian and Romani families. We relocated 40 families, of whom 18 were in *relocatune tacita* [meaning they had already regularly paid to the municipality part of the rent in advance for a certain period of time] while 22 were abusively occupying the municipal property. (...) But you should consider that those flats were unhygienic and inadequate for a decent life in Cluj-Napoca municipality, with regard to general public health laws. It was a potential risk for public health. Moreover, with the passing of time, their number swelled and they started developing major prejudices vis-à-vis other Clujeans. (...) What happened? We granted them some land, we built modular housing units, and when this housing was completed, we asked the Roma living in Coastei to apply for this new housing».

All in all, 270 people were relocated, but the 40 families selected, who received modular housing units, amounted to 201 people. The remaining 69 individuals (16 families) did not receive modular units. They were given pieces of wood and metal in order to build their own housing facilities close to the modular houses.

Later during the interview, I told her that I had seen the unhealthy conditions at the rubbish dump, and asked her if she thought that the relocated Romani families had benefitted from the relocation, and she replied: «You should also look at who the people targeted by this policy are. I wonder, what is their mentality? That’s because a public policy can be very good, but if it’s not applicable, meaning that the people for whom it is designed to be implemented see reality in a completely different way... then everything becomes complicated».
An accent on Roma’s alleged “mentality” emerged not only in the interviews I conducted in 2011, but also in those with civil servants in 2008. More generally, the opinions about Roma shared by local civil servants attribute the ultimate cause of the Roma’s social marginality to the Roma’s alleged mentality. Mentality here means the radically backward, uncivilized and unchangeable state in which Roma supposedly live. As the director of the technical office told me while we were talking about the relocation: «Every year we go to Cantonului Street [another Roma settlement close to the dump] to clean up. In Coastei Street we cleaned up only after the relocation, because we knew people would have moved. We try to civilize them, but we can’t manage it». According to a study carried out in November 2012 among the relocated families, «the average living space among the relocated families is 4.01 square meters, and each available bathroom is shared by at least 17 people; there is no plumbing in any of the modular homes and no hot water; the average income has fallen by 30%, and 28% of all working adults who were working before the relocation are now out of work»; finally, the damage which the relocation caused to these persons’ health proved to be outstanding.

In this section I showed that what seemed to be a necessary and sustainable solution for the local authorities, due partially to unlawfulness and partially to the questionable hygienic conditions in which some of those 56 Romani families were living, ended up having serious segregating outcomes. In particular, I indicated that the policymakers who took the decision to relocate those families expressed specific representations of the policy recipients as being “different” (as the first interview excerpt confirms) and “uncivilized” (as the second excerpt confirms). This means that the policy logic was influenced by those representations and, given the outcomes of exclusion, those representations have very likely played a major role in policymaking.
Conclusions. Recommendations on housing policymaking for Roma

Both housing policies for Roma which I have examined in this chapter, i.e. the construction and persistence of Olmatello camp in Florence and the relocation in Cluj-Napoca of 56 Romani families to modular houses near a rubbish dump, enacted spatial segregation. In doing so, they failed the criteria for adequate housing set by the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 1991. Given the fact that 90% of Romani families in Europe live below the poverty line, on the basis of both the UN and European frameworks, and the two case studies, it seems advisable to look for innovative and more sustainable housing policies addressing Roma. To this end, I would like to put forward four recommendations for policymakers and practitioners.

First recommendation: if ethnic/cultural difference plays a role in housing policies for Roma, let Roma decide what role

Both case studies presented here and many others across Europe show that when it comes to policies for Romani families, cultural specificity plays a role in the policymaking process; and that cultural specificity has been arbitrarily imposed on the Roma, without any consultation with them on their own identity, habits, lifestyle and desired alternative housing conditions. In all member states there are active Romani NGOs, associations, and even national and local agencies, such as the Romanian National Agency for Roma (ANR). It is advisable that policymakers working on Roma-related policies create the conditions, through egalitarian dialogues with Romani collectives, in order to let them play a leading role in decision-making processes. As seen in the case of Florence, it was not until the late 1990s that local authorities became influenced by Romani NGOs, and it was precisely such influence that allowed more effective and appropriate housing solutions. While prior to consulting the Roma, re-
Regional authorities imposed peripheral camps in the name of an alleged – and largely invented – “nomadism”, consulting with Roma brought about a radical, positive shift in housing solutions (although it did not diametrically shift perceptions of nomadism). However, Florence is an isolated case in Italy; only three Regions have amended their laws for Roma thus shifting partially from camp policy to more differentiated housing solutions. Therefore, at national level, it is highly advisable to follow the EU recommendation to officially recognize Roma as a national minority. Only this measure would institutionalize the role of Romani NGOs as consultants to policymakers, both at regional and at national level, thus paving the way for making joint decisions the rule. In Romania, in practical terms this means ceasing to take decisions without engaging in egalitarian consultations with local/national Romani NGOs, first and foremost the National Agency for Roma’s representatives.

Both official recognition as a national minority (e.g. in Italy) and the practical enforcement of existing minority status in decision-making processes (e.g. in Romania) would have positive consequences in terms of citizenship rights. As shown in the two case studies, approaching Romani people as being nothing but bearers of a different “culture” (Italy) or as “uncivilized” (Romania) is likely to translate into policies with exclusionary outcomes. In contrast, viewing Roma as citizens of the state with their own cultural rights, which they themselves identify and define, would create the concrete conditions for Roma to be addressed by policies which, by recognizing citizenship rights and not by leaning on arbitrary and unofficial cultural definitions, could produce effective and sustainable inclusionary outcomes.

Second recommendation: learning from past experiences; things can be done differently Each type of policy measure concerning Romani families’ housing has precedents. As shown in the case of Tuscany and Florence, camps for Roma in Italy have seri-
ously jeopardized their chances of gaining an equal status in urban and regional society. Planning to push Roma into fenced or non-fenced peripheral areas, as for instance the Rome municipality is currently doing by implementing the so-called “Piano nomadi” (Nomads Plan), directly leads to spatial segregation. Only by revising its own policy did the Tuscany Region change its strategy from a camp policy to differentiated housing solutions for Roma.

Over the past five years relocation policies targeting Romani families have been steadily implemented in Romanian cities both large and small. Today, this seems a failure, if seen in terms of the standards of equality and non-discrimination that the European Union is inviting member states to meet on a permanent basis.

Third recommendation: planning integrated social policies Meeting the United Nations’ seven fundamental criteria for adequate housing means considering the whole social context in which policy recipients (Roma families) live, namely employment, education, and health. Indeed, spatial segregation, as seen in the Romanian case study, has serious consequences in terms of job loss and deterioration of living standards. This practically means considering the needs and situations of each family case by case, such as the location of their place of work, their schools and their general practitioner; the conditions and costs of public transport, and the adequacy of the area. Indeed, without shops, welfare services, workplaces, leisure and meeting places, etc. at a reasonable distance – as in both case studies presented here – family life can easily become unsustainable.

The Italian policy discussed in this chapter did indeed integrate work and housing. However, according to the culture-based approach that was adopted, the only jobs that the policy envisaged, such as craftsmanship and manual work, were informed by the policymakers’ own flawed, erroneous image of “nomadic people”. Moreover, none of the nomad camps planned by the Italian Regions was at a reasonable distance from supermarkets or
markets. In the Romanian case, the relocation policy was extremely compartmental, attributing no relevance whatsoever to reasonable distance from supermarkets, schools and workplaces, and not even to the health of policy recipients, given that the new housing is located close to a landfill and a rubbish dump.

Fourth recommendation: using all available EU funds for housing policies for Roma In both Florence and Cluj-Napoca none of the local policymakers I spoke to was aware of the large amount of EU initiatives for the social inclusion of Roma. As a result, the financial resources that they thought were available did not include several European Union funds for social inclusion and development. Over the past year all member states have adopted a National Strategy for Roma Social Inclusion. In its invitation to draft the Strategy, the European Commission has stressed that «up to €26.5 billion of EU funding is allocated to support Member States’ efforts in the field of social inclusion, including to support efforts to help the Roma» and that this money will come from several EU sectors, including the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development; the European Regional Development Fund; the EU technical assistance to member states, and the European Progress Microfinance Facility.

Moreover, two further (non-financial) resources are recommended: the European Economic and Social Committee, which would provide a platform of possible intermediate agencies for implementing the Strategy; and the European Platform against Poverty and Social Exclusion, a relatively new innovation-based approach for social inclusion policies. Using all available financial and non-financial resources would enlarge the spectrum of housing possibilities and enrich the overall process of sustainable, mature and efficient policymaking for Roma in an age of economic downturn and social insecurity, in which 90% of them currently live in radically deprived socioeconomic conditions.
NOTES


4 See, *inter alia*, Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe Resolution 125 (1981) with which member states are invited «to recognise Romanies and other nomad groups such as the Samis as ethnic minorities and, consequently, to grant them the same status and advantages as other minorities may enjoy; in particular concerning the respect and support of their own culture and language» (article 14, II), available on www.wcd.coe.int/com.intranet.InstraServlet?command=com.intranet.CmdBlobGet&InstranetImage=331990&SecMode=1&DocId=673530&Usage=2; and the Resolution of the European Parliament of 9 February 1994: «whereas the linguistic diversity of the European Union is a key element in the Union’s cultural wealth», after stating the necessity to protect and promote minority languages, «(...) in relation to non-territorial autochthonous languages (e.g. the Roma and Sinti languages and Yiddish) calls on all relevant bodies to apply *mutatis mutandis* the recommendations set out in this resolution», available on www.ciemen.org/mercator/UE23-GB.HTM.


6 In 2008 the government declared a “state of emergency” in relation to nomad camps, in which notoriously only Roma live. This included also a census which was carried out by collecting biometric

7 Non-Romani NGO means that the NGO was not founded nor is it managed by Romani people.

8 Consiglio Regionale della Toscana, *Consultazione della IV commissione sulla proposta di legge n. 175: Interventi per la tutela dell’etnia rom* (typescript), 1987, p. 28.


12 European Roma Rights Centre, *Taken from the City. Romanian Roma Evicted to a Rubbish Dump*, European Roma Rights Centre, Budapest 2012, pp. 6 et passim.


14 Publications about best practices of policies for Roma in Europe are burgeoning. For the case of Italy, see T. Vitale, *Politiche possibili. Abitare la città con i rom e i sinti*, Carocci, Rome 2009.

Migration and Generations
The present chapter looks at policies for the educational reception of immigrant adolescents in Barcelona and Rotterdam. Educational reception programmes are geared to incorporate newly arrived immigrant youngsters into the educational system of the host country and crucially determine the first steps of the integration trajectory of newcomer students. The chapter describes educational reception programmes in both cities, with emphasis on the implementation of such programmes by high schools, and on the extent to which reception teachers interpret, selectively apply, or even contradict institutional norms. The discussion is based on interviews with policymakers at different levels of government, analysis of policy documents, and ethnographic observation in five schools.

Newcomer immigrant adolescents as a policy issue

Meet Maral, a 15 year-old girl from Pakistan. She has a British education, and speaks English perfectly. She is good, say her teachers, gifted. But she moved to Barcelona when she was in the 4th year, the final year of compulsory secondary education. “Older” students like her (15 years old or more) pose the worse problem, say teachers, because they have only one year left to learn both the language and the curriculum in order to complete their compulsory schooling and obtain a certificate. And

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that is almost impossible, even for highly talented students. As the law does not allow 16 year-old students to stay any longer in compulsory secondary education, teachers feel trapped in a dilemma. What to do? «You know that if you don't pass her, her academic career in Spain is over». One teacher summarized his strategy thus: «What you do is try by any means to ensure she passes her junior secondary education, with homework, private lessons, etc. And once she passes, you must give her parents this advice: take her to the British school! Don’t let her continue in Catalan because she is going to fail».

Newcomer immigrant adolescents, those youngsters who migrate after having carried out part of their schooling in their home country, constitute a challenge for policymakers in receiving countries. They are a “nuisance” for policymakers, as they demand more intensive attention and often longer schooling, hence becoming costly for the public administration. Newcomer students also pose strong challenges to schools' ability to cope with diversity, as well as dilemmas for teachers’ professional ethics. Youngsters who arrive after primary education, between 12 and 16 years of age take longer to learn a second language than younger children. But more importantly, adolescents who migrate at some point during their junior secondary education face a dual task in school: learning the host language and mastering the curriculum in order to obtain a certificate. This becomes particularly difficult for those who arrive in the final years of junior secondary education, as most educational systems establish working methods that limit teachers' possibilities to respond to these challenges (such as age limits for completing compulsory education). Some, like Maral, are lucky as they possess the economic, social or cultural capital to bypass difficulties and complete their studies successfully. The majority, however, are less fortunate.

In Europe, the history of educational reception can be traced to the end of the guest-worker era in the mid-1970s. With the clo-
sure of the borders following the oil crisis, Northern European countries were confronted with the consequences of guest-workers’ family reunification. Schools in the working-class neighbourhoods of large cities were overwhelmed with immigrant children who did not speak the host language and had been socialized in very different school traditions. In response to these challenges Northern European countries formulated policies for initial reception at schools. Back in the 1950s, Germany put into place a federal programme for teaching language and culture of origin to foreign students. Besides this, the reception approach has varied considerably between different Länder: for instance, in Bavaria, bilingual classes (Nationalklasse) are organized by grouping together pupils who share the same native language, while in Berlin foreign-born students are immediately included in regular classes alongside German students with support from special assistants.\(^1\) France developed its classes d’initiation and classes d’adaptation in the early 1970s to teach French to immigrant children in order to improve their integration in the school system. In the mid-1970s the Netherlands launched internationale schakelklassen in large cities, to teach Dutch to guest-workers’ children prior to including them in regular classes. In the United Kingdom, newcomer children were initially received in specialist teaching programmes separate from mainstream education – EAL (English as an Additional Language) programmes, later renamed ESL (English as a Second Language) – though since the mid-1980s newcomers have been directly introduced into ordinary classes, with ESL teachers present in classrooms to offer teaching support.\(^2\)

Some decades later, following a migratory boom with resulting pressure on public policies, Southern European countries have also organized reception measures as diverse as the various approaches developed by their Northern colleagues. Three types of reception can be distinguished: “integrated”, “parallel” and “mixed” reception.\(^3\) In some places like Italy, foreign
students are directly included in ordinary classes together with the native-born students, with certain special assistance always provided ("immersion" or "integrated reception"). A second strategy commonly followed is to provide temporary, full-time reception courses prior to starting ordinary education ("parallel reception"), as in the case of Greece. There, before attending ordinary schools, newly arrived students are enrolled in two-year special courses during which they are separated full-time from their native-born peers. Finally, other places have launched a mixed approach to reception, like the Spanish regions of Catalonia, Andalusia, Madrid or Murcia. There, newly arrived immigrant students must follow temporary reception courses, in which they receive reception training only during a limited number of hours per week.

All of this shows that the reception of newcomer youngsters has been a political issue in Europe for decades, an issue that continues to be very topical for school practitioners, even in countries with longer traditions of immigration and school reception. The reception of newcomer students continues to be an issue in spite of the application of reception policies, as the outcomes are far from positive and large numbers of newcomer students drop out before completing their studies or end up on the lowest educational pathways. These outcomes may partly have to do with the process of implementing reception policies. Implementation has been defined by some as the "black box" of policies, because what happens in the process of executing a policy often changes the policy goals envisaged by policymakers.

This chapter describes educational reception programmes in Barcelona and Rotterdam, with emphasis on the implementation of such programmes by high schools, thus comparing policies and practices. The analysis attempts to answer two questions: what are reception policies and reception practices like in schools in Rotterdam and Barcelona? To what extent is there a gap between policies and practices? The analysis is
based on interviews with policymakers at different levels of government, analysis of policy documents, and ethnographic observation (and interviews) of reception practitioners in five high schools. Implementation agents such as teachers and schools are the fundamental link between policies and policy outcomes, as they are the practical enforcers of formal rules and they may interpret, selectively apply, or even contradict institutional norms. Research on implementation provides policymakers with rich insights about which aspects of policies are the most difficult to implement, which clash with practitioners' professional ethics and which practical alternatives to policies are being generated by practitioners on the ground.

The chapter is organized as follows. In the following sections the two local cases of Rotterdam and Barcelona are presented, first describing the main regulations and features of educational reception in each local case, and then engaging in a discussion of the ways in which schools and practitioners actually receive newcomer students. Finally, the concluding section discusses the gap between reception policies and practices. It offers a list of seven interrelated factors that crucially influence educational reception in local settings, creating the conditions for different types of practices. The final remarks set out to provide policymakers with elements for reflection, as choices in each of these seven areas have proved to be crucial in the cases of Rotterdam and Barcelona.

**Rotterdam**

**The making of educational reception programmes** In Rotterdam, ethnic minority students accounted for 40.5% of the total student population in secondary education in 2003-2004 (14,112 students). Newcomer “1.5 generation” students, those who were born abroad and migrated to the Netherlands between the ages of 12 and 16, are only a small proportion of the former: there
were 808 newcomers in that academic year, of which around 200 actually attended reception programmes.\textsuperscript{5}

In order to respond to the challenge of newcomer students in secondary education, the Netherlands launched \textit{internationale schakelklassen} in large cities as far back as the mid-1970s, as described above. Rotterdam has adopted a clear-cut model of parallel reception: the “ISK” programme (Internationale Schakelklassen), which teaches newcomer students in separate classrooms for an average of two years. The ISK programme was built following a bottom-up process in which urban schools with high concentrations of newcomer students took the initiative. Those schools organized separate classes into which guest-workers’ children were placed full-time to learn Dutch before joining the ordinary curriculum. These initial measures were launched using schools’ own resources, but soon afterwards the schools involved started lobbying to obtain public support. A national organization (Landelijke Commissie Voortgezet Onderwijs aan Anderstaligen, LCVOA) was created to coordinate and represent schools affected by the issue and since 1977 schools with reception classrooms have been subsidized with national funds. In 1980 a policy note was approved, which politically sanctioned the parallel model of reception initiated by schools. The form and content that the official programme of reception eventually adopted was a direct translation of the measures that schools had pioneered prior to the existence of public policy on the issue. Such a pattern of policymaking suited the interests of national policymakers back in the 1970s, when they were still reluctant to acknowledge immigration issues as a policy problem for the Netherlands. This probably helped keep the issue low-profile, allowing schools to maintain their own pragmatic in-house choices regardless of broader ideological or political connotations. Subsequent policy developments in Rotterdam followed the same bottom-up pattern and reinforced early (policy) choices. In 1993 schools’ quest for further stand-
ardization of the reception policy led to the creation of an informal municipal policy, the STER programme, through cooperation between the Municipal Department of Education and the four schools providing reception education. The STER programme established the content of the reception policy in terms of curriculum and teaching methodology. In particular, it established that beginners must start by learning Dutch language alone, with other subjects introduced at an advanced stage.

The goal of the ISK reception programme as established by the municipal regulation is «to prepare the pupil, as well as possible and as soon as possible, to be transferred to regular education». Schools are quite free to pursue the goal of educational reception in the way that best suits them, within a rather minimalistic set of policy regulations. National provisions for the educational reception of newcomer students basically consist of regulations for the funding of schools that provide reception. Students who fit the formal definition of “newcomer student” entitle schools to receive specific national funds. In 2008 schools would receive 4,212 euros per student a year, while in 2012 this was considerably reduced. The national regulation defines a newcomer pupil as one who: does not have Dutch nationality, has lived in the country for less than a year, and has legal status. Besides specific funds for reception, newcomer students may also entitle schools to receive funds for ethnic minority students, whether national (CUMI funds for ethnic minority students, later replaced with the Leerplusarrangement VO) or municipal (Equal opportunities educational policy).

Moreover, Rotterdam’s local authority also stipulates its objectives for educational reception in municipal regulations valid for an academic course. Local policies generally follow the sparse national policy framework, and the periodic national regulations that stipulate how funds for reception are allocated. However, some aspects of the national scheme have been modified, for in-
stance the target group, which in Rotterdam includes Antillean and Aruban pupils. Since 2004-2005 Rotterdam’s authorities have subsidized Antillean/Aruban newcomers, who are excluded from the target group at national level because they have the Dutch passport. This served to institutionalize the de facto inclusion of these students by schools in Rotterdam in reception programmes. Schools justify this by saying that the Dutch language level of Antilleans is usually very weak. Municipal funding plays an essential role in reformulating national policy to meet local needs, which has often been the result of a bottom-up initiative by schools.

Currently four schools in the city offer full-time reception courses, with a common curriculum and textbooks. Enrolment and distribution of students among the schools is managed by the local authority. An office within the municipal Education Department is in charge of registering all newcomer students arriving in the city and assigning them to a school. The main criterion used for the distribution of newcomer pupils into schools is the type of education (lower or higher tracks) to which they are expected to transfer later, and only when possible is the proximity to the family’s residence considered. The four schools providing reception encompass higher (Rembrandt school) as well as lower tracks of secondary education (Vermeer, Escher, and Van Gogh schools) and public and semi-private schools (within the Protestant group of schools, LMC). To support schools in reception issues, the municipality created a department for education consulting, the CED (which has now been privatized).

**School practices of reception** Reception-programme professionals in Rotterdam have reached favourable working conditions in many aspects. The inflow of newcomer youngsters is limited, particularly during the period 2004-2008, and student/teacher ratios remain reasonably low. Not only do reception programmes
receive relatively generous funding in a context of decreasing demand, but they also obtain funding in the form of cash benefits, which lends schools considerable flexibility. Also, the centralized reception programme which keeps newcomer students spatially concentrated across the city has also meant organizational advantages for schools. Schools have used their broad autonomy in reception issues to organize independent reception departments with their own team of teachers and budget, which has guaranteed that reception goals are protected alongside other priorities within the school’s agenda. Schools can also cluster students by age and time of arrival, and provide training much better suited to their levels of knowledge. Curriculum and content can be adapted at convenience, and the reception trajectory can be longer and more intensive, introducing many other subjects besides language.

In this context of well-resourced and well-organized reception programmes, practitioners deviate little from policies and rules, and when they do, they are less often motivated by the need to cope with difficult working conditions. Moreover, school practitioners function in an atmosphere which is not fraught with politicization and tend to internalize the common goals nurtured by the bottom-up origin of the reception programme. In addition, as has already been mentioned, the municipality has played a crucial role in correcting imbalances and skews that could be a source of tension for practitioners. Nevertheless, schools in Rotterdam discretionally adapt the official policy in at least three aspects: reducing the number of subjects in reception training, extending the target population, and making discretional decisions on the transfer of pupils to regular education. Although adequate working conditions have prevented schools from adapting policies much, since 2006-2007 public funding for reception has diminished considerably and as a response, schools’ boards of governors are pressing their reception departments to cut back expenses and make reception training
more efficient. Some reception departments are responding to cut-backs by reducing the number of teachers and the subjects taught in their reception training. Such pragmatic adaptations of policy, aimed at coping with difficult work conditions, lack of resources or organizational constraints, are known as "coping practices". Other reception departments are reacting to pressures in creative ways, attempting to both cope with the financial restrictions (and comply with the directions from their boards) and at the same time achieve ambitious reception goals, since they believe that reception training consisting of diverse subjects can better foster socioeconomic integration. An illustration of this is the "Learning in New Contexts" strategy developed by one of the reception schools, in order to continue teaching diverse subjects by using self-learning methodologies. While the majority of school hours are used to teach Dutch, students receive all other subjects in a free-choice study period twice a week, when students work on their own and a teacher is present to answer questions; this also allows the school to reduce the number of teachers employed.

This indicates that coping strategies in Rotterdam schools are simultaneously practices responding to professional ethics, as policy is discretionally adapted to improve educational opportunities for students according to the principles of professional ethics. In spite of the relatively favourable working situation, practitioners in Rotterdam frequently face dilemmas of action in which they are trapped between contradictory goals (preparing newcomer students for regular education vs. providing cheaper reception training), inadequate resources or organizational constraints. Consequently, practitioners must apply coping strategies which are sometimes quite contradictory; for example, enrolling undocumented students in their schools while not being able to declare them part of their reception programme and thus not receiving subsidies for them. Yet, when schools include in the policy target other categories
of students excluded by the official reception policy, they are motivated partly by altruistic intentions and partly by pragmatic considerations, as they consider unprepared newcomer students – who have not yet passed their reception course – as a hindrance to mainstream classes.\textsuperscript{13}

In Rotterdam, schools’ adaptations of policy often set out to improve students’ opportunities for socioeconomic integration. For instance, schools apply a compensatory style of reception, broader in goals and instruments – including other subjects besides language in the training – while complying with the official model of parallel reception. In fact, Rotterdam schools’ discretionary practices tend to consolidate the emphasis on socioeconomic integration as established in the 1980s policy goals, and the meritocratic values typical of the Dutch educational system mediate the way in which practitioners interpret the equal-opportunities goal. This is illustrated by the initiatives undertaken by schools to extend the reception trajectories of highly-skilled pupils. Practitioners in Rotterdam consider that highly-talented newcomer students need (and deserve) more support than less skilled peers, and several schools use their own means to fund an extra year of reception education for such students.\textsuperscript{14} According to this meritocratic ideology, a child can only effectively unfold his/her talents if he or she is placed in the “right place” (education track) and gets an adequate education for his/her abilities. This is remarkable if we acknowledge that in Rotterdam, challenging the formal norms entails a financial penalty: schools deciding to extend the reception trajectory beyond a year must fall back on their own resources. This is true for the average two-year duration of the training that a majority of schools offer newcomer students (beyond the period subsidized by public funds), but even more so for the still-longer reception trajectory provided to highly-skilled students in two of the schools.
Barcelona

The making of educational reception programmes In Catalonia, the so-called *nouvinguts* (newcomers) are estimated to form 4.9% of the total student body and 19.5% of all foreign students for the year 2010. Two major public policies have offered educational reception to newly arrived foreign students to Catalonia: the TAE (Taller d’Adaptació Escolar i d’Aprentatges Instrumentals Bàsics) programme (1996-2003), and the LIC (Llengua i Cohesió Social) programme (from 2004 on). Both respond to the notion that the main barrier for the adaptation of immigrant students to the host educational system is linguistic. In addition, both take as a point of departure the idea that immigration challenges the Catalan language, representing a threat for the educational system and for Catalan society too. Accordingly, Catalan is the language taught in both reception schemes, following the linguistic normalization law which establishes it as the language used in education at all levels. In fact, TAE and LIC reception programmes are an extension of the 1980s Catalan policy of linguistic immersion, which included schools in an effort to compensate for the Catalan language’s historical disadvantage vis-à-vis Castilian. This way of framing issues is characteristic of Catalonian bilingual society, where language is a distinctive trait of social class and status, and thus a relevant gauge of social inequality and of political struggle. As the upper classes speak Catalan, Catalan language plays an important role in upwards social mobility. But this perception of the problem can also be linked to the dominant role played by the department for “language normalization” (Servei d’Ensenyament del Català, SEDEC) in the question of immigrant pupils during the period 1996-2003. At the same time, the two programmes present crucial dissimilarities. The TAE reception programme was more prescriptive in character, while its successor LIC devolved decisions in re-
ception matters to schools to a considerable extent. Moreover, while both programmes are examples of mixed reception, the TAE provided a segregated version (newcomer students were taught separately for the whole morning at a different location) which was substituted by LIC’s integrated version (students attend reception classes at various points throughout the school day). In the TAE programme, newcomer children from different high schools were grouped in area-based reception units.17 Starting in 2004, the area-based system (TAE) was substituted by school-based reception units (LIC) located in every school with a minimum number of newcomer students (10 students). In this way policymakers attempted to respond to criticisms about «segregating newcomer pupils» and «making a ghetto set apart from ordinary schools».

In Catalonia, educational reception programmes have been elaborated in a technocratic fashion by high-ranking civil servants in the Regional Department of Education, with the support of relevant experts. Both the TAE and the LIC (and less significant initiatives such as the PAANE programme, Pla d’Actuació per a l’Alumnat de Nationalitat Estrangera) are the product of a top-down process. Reception measures in secondary schools took on a reactive and defensive character following the explosive increase in newcomer students from the mid-1990s on. Policymakers from the department responsible for the normalization (mainstreaming) of the Catalan language (SEDEC) took the lead in coordinating reception efforts, since the massive arrival of immigrant pupils was perceived as a threat to the Catalan language and culture. Later on, political shifts brought about a reshuffle of the main players and their relative forces within the Department of Education, allowing the issue to be framed in terms of social equality for immigrant students, in addition to the goal of defending the Catalan language and culture (LIC). However, the elaboration of policies also received some bottom-up feedback. During the TAE period a few schools were given
carte blanche to experiment within certain limits; some of these pilot experiences inspired policymakers to formulate the LIC programme. Nevertheless, schools have been allowed scant participation in decision-making, due to the strongly centralized top-down pattern of policymaking that prevailed until 2003.

**School practices of reception** Schools in Barcelona face much tougher working conditions than their colleagues in Rotterdam. Reception practitioners in Barcelona have to work against a background of massive and rapidly increasing demand, with students arriving continuously throughout the school year. The fast growth in the number of arrivals implies an added uncertainty for schools but also for policymakers, making it difficult to assess the resources required. Both TAE and LIC programmes provided insufficient resources relative to demand. The TAE programme was poorly funded as its student/teacher ratio demonstrates: 18 far too high for intensive language training, and increasing with each year. TAE mentors complained about the scarcity of teaching material, computers and audio-visual teaching support, as well as funds for teacher training. The LIC programme received considerably more funding, but established a rigid system of allocation that created large supply-demand mismatch. 19 Since newcomer students are dispersed throughout the city, LIC funds need to translate into more personnel than if students were concentrated in fewer schools and an economy of scale could be applied. 20 Also, the spatial dispersion of reception students throughout the city’s schools means that each reception classroom is completely varied in terms of the students’ ages, levels and situations, making teaching more complicated. Moreover, the increase in schools’ decision-making power under the LIC programme was not accompanied by schools’ budgetary autonomy or power to decide on the distribution of resources.

Even in spite of the relative increase in school autonomy within the LIC programme, reception professionals are still quite pow-
erless. Schools have to be seen as spaces of struggle among diverse and often conflicting interests, and decisions are the result of a negotiation process between departments and teachers with unequal levels of power. Within this power structure, the support that reception issues obtain within each school is a matter of negotiations and coalitions. In most cases reception teachers in Barcelona occupy a rather weak, isolated position within the school. The personal attitude of the principal or the management team seems to have a crucial influence; if the management team plays a neutral role or is not pro-actively “pro-immigrant”, then the reception teacher has little influence against the powerful interests of the larger school departments. Therefore, when schools are granted more autonomy but are given scant resources for reception, as in the LIC case in Barcelona, they tend to use these means to improve regular teachers’ working conditions, often to the detriment of reception goals.

It seems evident that in Barcelona, coping is the main motivation for discretionary decisions. LIC schools adapt the rules in more aspects than in Rotterdam, above all, discretionally handling the entry and exit of newcomer pupils to the programme, diminishing the duration of the reception period, applying (semi-) parallel reception, and challenging the exclusive use of Catalan in reception. Discretionary practices in Barcelona are associated with imbalances between means and demand and with the powerlessness of reception teachers faced with a massive influx of immigrant students. In addition, reception practitioners have to work in a socio-cultural context of bilingualism, which further complicates matters. The weak position of reception bureaucrats within the LIC school structure produces a pragmatic reception style: doing whatever is possible with the available resources and within the given constraints. Teachers of reception classes apply individual coping practices as they are left alone with most reception tasks; but regular teachers, when newcomers attend their classes, also resort to coping strategies. Teachers are fre-
quently confronted with dilemmas of action; for example they have to choose between keeping reception classrooms overcrowded or transferring students who are not yet fully prepared for regular education. Consequently, they must make compromises between different goals and regulations or reduce ambitious policy goals to match the meagre means available.

Among the various school practices that deviate from the reception programme, those concerning enrolment and transfer of pupils are endorsed by a majority of schools. One of the most difficult problems that schools face in reception matters is the constant arrival of newcomer students throughout the school year, which often leads to overcrowding of reception classrooms. In this situation schools are very much left with their own human resources as the Education Department does not assign additional reception teachers during the school year. To solve the reception classroom’s overcrowding, practitioners at Barcelona’s schools apply two coping strategies. On the one hand, when regular classes are full, new pupils are dismissed and sent back to the municipal registration commission (external strategy). On the other, when dismissal is not possible, reception teachers apply an internal distribution strategy which consists of transferring some pupils to regular classes sooner. Latin American students are often transferred sooner than speakers of non-Romance languages while older students are kept longer than younger ones. The school’s flexible tracking policy allows teachers to incorporate newcomer pupils earlier into mainstream classes, because if they need support they can get it in the lower tracks of Catalan language, which become a sort of prolongation of the reception classroom. Practitioners justify these practices citing the “educational needs” and “skills” of pupils. Regardless of the accuracy of this professional judgment, differential treatment in transfer serves as a strategy for coping with the overcrowding of reception classrooms.
Ostensibly, with the LIC programme semi-integrated structures of reception are the norm in Barcelona, as newcomer students spend most of their week in classes together with their native peers. However, if we observe actual practices we see that schools increasingly tend to offer separate reception, just like in Rotterdam. By incorporating the reception unit within each school with newcomer students, policymakers intended to maximize the integration of immigrant children with their native peers. Regular teachers, however, are very resistant to these ideas because, as one informant said, «How can newcomers possibly integrate when they cannot even communicate with the pupil sitting next to them?». According to our survey of reception schools in Barcelona, if we count the schools which use tracking structures, in fact parallel reception still prevails. Although students in Barcelona are normally not tracked by level for all their subjects, schools very often use so-called “flexible groupings”, or clusters of students for certain subjects only (typically for teaching languages and mathematics). Flexible groupings imply a form of “parallel structure in the shadows” as immigrant children are normally streamed into the lowest tracks and in fact continue to spend a substantial part of their school day in a segregated group.

Barcelona schools challenge the LIC programme’s reception goals for socioeconomic equality and multiculturalism. Within the TAE programme, Catalan was seen as an instrument to enhance both newcomers’ socioeconomic opportunities and acculturation; Catalan language became a policy goal in itself since it signals the cultural adaptation of newcomers to the Catalonian culture and facilitates social mobility. Nowadays, the LIC programme combines multiculturalism and equal opportunities as its main goals. In practice, cultural assimilation still prevails. Reception practices in Barcelona focus nowadays on Catalan language teaching (with varying degrees of curriculum adaptation for newcomers), although multiculturalist discourse is wide-
spread among practitioners as being politically correct. Equal op-
opportunities are pursued as a secondary goal, compensating for
newcomers’ linguistic disadvantages in Catalan. The narrowing
down of the reception curriculum means the Catalan language
has become the main instrument to social mobility, instead of
boosting newcomers’ socioeconomic mobility through recep-
tion schemes with a variety of subjects.

Conclusions and recommendations

In both cities there is a gap between practices in schools and poli-
cies, but the characteristics of these breaches vary among the
cities in terms of their frequency, the type of discretion used, and
the resulting style of school reception. Schools and practitioners
in Rotterdam generally comply almost to the letter with formal
and informal regulations. Divergence in Rotterdam is less fre-
quent than in Barcelona, but the few school practices which chal-
lenge policy are more consolidated, significant (some even contra
legem) and are found in a majority of (reception) schools. Also,
discretionary practices in the two local cases differ with regard to
the main motivation behind discretion: coping (if practitioners
adapt policy in order to cope with material or organizational con-
straints) or ethical (if practitioners perceive that the policies lack
social justice and adapt them in order to enhance the educational
opportunities of newcomer students).

It is quite obvious why practitioners in Barcelona resort to cop-
ping practices, given the substantial influx of immigrant students,
imbalances between means and demand, and powerlessness
of reception professionals. It appears less plain why practices of
ethical discretion appear more frequently in Rotterdam than in
Barcelona, where the fieldwork reveals that school professionals
are often driven by altruistic professional-ethical motivations.
The answer is that other features of Barcelona’s local context
(such as the weak position of reception teachers within schools)
influence the pragmatic choice for coping practices. In other words, in each case-study the policy-practice gap is shaped differently by the local reception context. Such context consists of a set of political actors engaged in the school reception of immigrant students in a given local space, forming what we call the “local field of educational reception”. These actors are engaged in an ongoing struggle for control over a specific kind of capital, and at the same time, they share a particular way of framing the issues at stake and a common purpose. Each local field presents a specific configuration of elements, which will trigger discretion inasmuch as they constitute conflictual dimensions for the implementation of reception policies.

In particular, seven specific aspects of the local fields of Rotterdam and Barcelona entail potential conflicts for the implementation of reception policies:

a) policy demand: characteristics of the flow of immigrant students, such as number, profile of the children (age, level of schooling, language and cultural background), pace of arrival (fast/slow), or pattern of arrival (concentrated in the enrolment period/gradual and spread throughout the school year);
b) resources: relative adequacy of the material and organizational means allocated to reach the proposed (policy) goals;
c) enforcement and monitoring: degree and forms of verification of policy execution, particularly the mechanisms available to control students’ access to the programme and their transfer to mainstream education;
d) degree of autonomy of reception professionals: capacity for decision-making granted to reception professionals, which depends not only on the general provisions of the educational system or the reception programme, but also on the micro-power dynamics at school level;
e) educational ideology: set of values and beliefs which frames the political attitude and actions of agents of the educational system in a nation-state at a given point in time;
f) degree of consolidation of the reception programme: relative recentness or maturity of policy, and different strength of policy legacies;
g) type of policymaking dynamic: the bottom-up or top-down initiative followed in the initial elaboration of the reception programme.

Various combinations of these seven elements generate different degrees of conflict, and help explain differences in discretion between local cases. For example, the allocation of material resources to meet demand seems to be an indisputable source of confrontation in both cases. The room to manoeuvre (or lack thereof) that reception-programme staff have in order to carry out their job can also cause them much distress. Also the degree of ideological incoherence between different institutional levels and sectors is another source of conflict, as for example in the competing meanings given to the principle of “equality” in the educational systems and in reception programmes. Reception programmes’ lack of internal consistency also generates conflict for practitioners, as can be seen in the tenuous balance in Barcelona’s policy between goals of socioeconomic integration and acculturation.

The local field of reception shapes the gap differently in each case-study, and favours one or the other modalities of discretion. Each field’s specific configuration of elements pushes agents to take on coping strategies or else opens the way for them to make ethical choices. In short, the concentration and constant arrival of newcomers, the shortage of means, and the weak position of reception teachers within schools explain in part why schools in Barcelona resort fundamentally to coping strategies. What is more, discretion practices are more likely to appear in a less consolidated field such as Barcelona, where a lot of trial and error is still taking place, and constant substitution of programmes and norms feeds confusion and ambiguity among practitioners. On the other hand, the selective educational ideology; the stability of the influx of newcomers;
the availability of generous public means; the bottom-up origin of policy, and the independence of reception departments all account for the presence of stable ethical practices in Rotterdam. This configuration also helps us to understand why practitioners apply policy more accurately, particularly as bottom-up policies tend to enact the concerns of those closer to practice. Rotterdam also proves that closer follow-up of practices concerning access to and exit from the programme ensures better compliance, particularly if financial penalties are applied for deviations, although enforcement alone is not enough.

What can policymakers do with this information? Policymakers need to focus on making reception policies more implementable, and this simultaneously means reducing certain sources of discretion. To put it bluntly, there are two types of discretion sources, avoidable and unavoidable. On the one hand, discretion is to a large extent intrinsic to the policy process. Intrinsic discretion has to do with the politics of structural choice involved in the formulation of most policies: policymakers must frequently make compromises with different agents, and the resulting measures are full of ambiguities, open to interpretation by the agents of implementation. Moreover, regardless of ambiguity, policies and laws are general rules, and their execution implies the application of general principles to particular situations, which necessarily require the practitioners’ interpretation. On the other hand, other sources of discretion are avoidable. Some elements that cause much distress for practitioners, stimulating coping responses, are susceptible to be influenced. Improving the enforcement of rules, providing sufficient resources for envisaged policies and involving low-level practitioners in policy design are three possible ways of reducing the policy-practice gap. Policymakers can easily work on these aspects to better implement reception policies.

A first recommendation that stems from our research is that, by distinguishing inevitable and avoidable sources of discretion,
policymakers can focus their efforts on those aspects of a policy which are top-down improvable. Implementation research can provide policymakers with insights about which aspects of policies are the most difficult to implement, or generate more opposition among practitioners. Practitioners gain critical distance from rules when they perceive a “problematic situation”. Hence, problematic situations need to be tackled in order to facilitate the practitioners’ jobs and working conditions as far as possible, which in turn allows goals to be achieved more effectively.

A second recommendation would be to enable and support bottom-up initiatives to set up new, creative strategies for achieving the policy goals set. Concrete alternatives generated by practitioners on the ground serve in some cases to improve the effectiveness of existing policies. Paradoxical as it may sound, this research indicates that contexts which entail more conflicts and challenges stimulate the use of the imagination and inventiveness. Precisely those schools with the highest percentage of immigrant students and the most difficult situations have proven to be the best laboratories for reception policies. Even the practices designed to cope with working constraints can lead in some exceptional cases to reinforcing the educational opportunities of immigrant students in ways that policymakers had not imagined. As a general rule, we must keep in mind that policy gaps and discretion are not an evil per se that must be defeated. As our research proves, discrentional practices can have either beneficial or detrimental consequences for the policy beneficiaries. What policymakers can do to foster positive outcomes is to provide adequate resources and working conditions so that practitioners do not need to choose between “surviving” in their work and really working for the empowerment of immigrant students.
NOTES


5 Municipality of Rotterdam, Rotterdamse Onderwijsmonitor. Primair en voortgezet onderwijs in Rotterdam 2004, Dienst Stedelijk Onderwijs, Gemeente Rotterdam, Rotterdam 2004. The success of the reception programme in reaching its target group is moderate, as only 61% of potential students in fact attended a reception class (Municipality of Rotterdam, Rotterdamse Onderwijsmonitor, 2002-2003).

Staatscourant No. 7695, 4 May 2011, p. 6, available on www.avs.nl/sites/default/files/Leerplusarrangement%202011.pdf. Undocumented immigrants are one of the points of friction between policymakers and school practitioners. Following the turn towards more restrictive policies, undocumented students are no longer subsidized in their reception trajectories. However, schools keep schooling them and including them in their reception courses, in spite of the financial constraint that this implies for them.


The real names of schools have been changed to keep anonymity.

Since 2008 schools have been receiving growing numbers of Eastern European students, which is reversing the tendency in the period 2000-2008 of decreasing arrival of students.

Reception budget is being constrained in two ways: CUMI funds have been replaced by the Leerplusarrangement VO (which means a 50% decrease in funding according to the informants) and municipal funds for Educational Equal Opportunities have been cut considerably.


Schools in Rotterdam include de facto in their reception courses diverse categories of immigrant students left out of the official policy target, despite the fact that they are not eligible for national reception funding. As mentioned previously, since 2005 the local authority of Rotterdam has supplied additional funds to cover the expenses of Antillean students in reception schools. Undocumented immigrants still remain a contentious issue.

Also, Rotterdam’s municipal regulations for reception introduce different tracks for students according to their skill-levels.


During the TAE period, school-based units were exceptional, only allowed by educational authorities as a sort of political compensa-
tion in few schools with outstandingly high proportions of foreign students.

18 Within the TAE programme the maximum number of students for two teachers was formally established as 26 (in 2004). However, the fieldwork indicates that by the end of the year a two-teacher classroom reached 33 to 36 students.

19 The assignation of LIC reception teachers to schools encounters a one-year time lag. Schools can receive a maximum of two teachers regardless of how many more newcomer students are enrolled in the school.

20 In the school year 2005-2006 there were 41 secondary schools in the city of Barcelona with LIC reception classrooms.

21 For instance, those who have been working as civil servants for more years have the right to express a preference (desiderata) for certain subjects, days, times over those who arrived later, and those without permanent civil servant status (interim faculty) are the least influential in the decision-making process.

22 Practitioners surveyed in the TAE programme adapted policies to a lesser extent, but this situation changed considerably with the LIC programme.

23 Two teachers are the maximum assigned for those reception classrooms with more than 20 newcomers.

24 A municipal commission comprised of civil servants from different levels and agencies distributes immigrant students among schools based on their place of residence, order of arrival, and availability of school places.

This chapter describes how local policies contribute to improving second-generation inclusion. From school to labour market to associative participation, what are the initiatives addressing new generations in order to avoid the risk of reproducing exclusion over generations in a knowledge-based society? How can cities avoid the stabilization of stratification along ethnic lines and prevent negative effects on social cohesion? In an attempt to answer these questions, this chapter analyses and compares policies and projects developed in the cities of Turin and Paris: by reviewing policy documents and research findings, the goal is to identify key policies and outline how at local level it is possible to manage practices designed to foster the inclusion and active citizenship of second (and subsequent) generations.

Introduction

Second generations are part of Europe’s youth population, and at the same time a subgroup with specific characteristics which represent a source of both potential and challenges. While they may challenge society’s values, on the other hand their presence can elicit innovation in education and stimulate intercultural planning skills. Some possess cultural and linguistic skills that virtually enable them to move through different contexts and adapt
rapidly to new environments. However, due to their migratory background they are often marginalized. They face problems at school and upon entering the labour market, and they are often forced to take on adult responsibilities much earlier than many young nationals. This situation may create a gap between them and their local peers: their life paths are conditioned not only by their personal biographies and the knowledge and skills acquired during their education, but also by institutions and policies, above all at local level. Although the field of comparative study of second generations is still in its early days (especially that considering the local level), it is already clear that the segmented-assimilation theory formulated in the US context also fits the European scenario, posing «starkly different possible outcomes for the second generation: upward assimilation, downward assimilation, and a combination of upward mobility with persistent biculturalism». In other words, the personal, educational and professional paths of the children of immigration can lead to cultural references being abandoned in favour of processes which cause them to achieve better or, on the contrary, worse conditions than those attained by their parents. The third alternative is a successful path of integration that reconciles different sociocultural traditions. Yet national observations need to be integrated with attention to the local level. The local dimension plays a significant role when it comes to promoting the integration and well-being of second generations, in view of their key role in shaping the future of the societies they live in. Indeed cities and suburbs all vary in terms of the size of their immigrant populations, the number of co-ethnics the second generation grows up with, and the presence of public services and projects designed for them: in other words, within the same country and even among different neighbourhoods, second generations do not all have the same opportunities in terms of support services and activities, which can tend to be concentrated in certain areas of cities, leaving others without cover. Cities have become the crucial setting
for gaining a better understanding of the life-paths of a growing part of European youth. Of course, immigrant youths’ transition from adolescence to adult life is further complicated by their migration background and integration problems; even more so when the “second generation” label covers not only the children of the first generation born in the immigration country, but also young people born elsewhere and reunited with their parents at some point in their lives, namely those often labelled generations 1.5 and 1.75.

Learning a new language, living up to the expectations of two cultures and juggling the contrasting worlds of their family and the host society are only some of the challenges they face when negotiating their transcultural lives. Yet there is another possible approach that views immigrant youth as not necessarily just a challenge but also a source of potential, talent and new energy for the receiving society. What is happening in European cities? Which policies are addressed to young people with an immigrant background?

This chapter compares policies and projects developed in the cities of Turin and Paris to foster social inclusion and active citizenship for second generations. The main idea is to compare one city (Paris), with long experience in designing and implementing integration measures, with another (Turin), which is a relative latecomer on the scene of foreign immigrants, but is viewed as an innovative case for integration measures directed at young immigrants.

**Identifying the target of second-generation policies**

There are two general definitions employed in the “second-generation” debate. The first, of a statistical-demographic nature, refers to those born to foreign parents in receiving societies. The second, couched in sociopolitical terms, includes not only those born in their parents’ country of immigration but also
those who arrived as children of pre-compulsory schooling age. Some definitions include children up to the age of 10, while others draw the line at the age of entry into the compulsory education system. In the Italian context, studies and policies refer to the latter definition. Indeed, Italy, as is well known, is a relatively recent immigration country and thus any research on foreign youth must necessarily look at those born elsewhere who arrived in Italy at a certain point in their lives: the second generations born in Italy are too young and there are too few of them between the ages of 18 and 24.7 Talking about foreign youth means necessarily referring to a specific set of children of immigration – the so-called “1.5” and “1.25” generations8 or (pre) adolescents. These groups have been the focus of much research nominally devoted to second generations but in fact concerning boys and girls born elsewhere and reunited with one or both parents after the beginning of their school career. The same can be said of policies and initiatives that address young children of immigration. For some years these have been viewed as second-generation policies while they actually concern generations 1.5 and 1.75.

In France, given its longer history as an immigration country, attention is paid to youth with an immigrant background, even though – from a generational point of view – there are already third and fourth generations. This does not, however, mean that their members have attracted the attention of policymakers: as we will see further on, until the 2000s the policies in question addressed specific groups and/or arenas (e.g. school, guidance, entering the world of work). Indeed, as several studies9 underline, in France too academic interest in second-generation integration is relatively recent compared with its long history, with the exception of the pioneering work done by Abdelmalek Sayad since the 1970s.10

For a long time it was thought that the French model would enable immigrants’ children to integrate into society. In particular,
the universalist, lay model that French education is traditionally based on was intended to ensure the ideal socialization and education: in other words, to turn immigrants’ children into French citizens. At the same time, making it easy to acquire citizenship should in theory have facilitated the integration of second generations into society.

Due to this assumption, the problems encountered by second generations at school and in the labour market were long neglected by research and politics: the arrival of second generations on the public scene, through actions ranging from public mobilization to political protest to rioting, has pointed up the profound incongruities within the assimilationist model. We refer, for example, to the suburban clashes which began at the end of the 1970s, and the march of the Beurs (slang for descendants of North-African immigrants) in 1983. These two events began to draw academic attention to these young people; however, significant research results only began to appear in the subsequent decade, fuelled by other events that put the focus on the issue of the social/economic/cultural inclusion of the children of immigration. These include the creation of the Indigènes de la République movement in 2005 and the controversies surrounding the wearing of the Islamic veil in schools (the first in 1989 in Creil, and the last before law no. 228 of 15 March 2004 was passed forbidding religious symbols to be displayed at school).

Events in France in the last thirty years seem to echo the “second-generation rebellion” that Priore referred to, comparing children (with their aspirations of academic success and upward social mobility) with their parents (with their acceptance of subordinate, unskilled work). Children aspire to different social inclusion paths from those of their parents, but can be limited by society. Studies have shown that the “second generations” lack qualifications and are still severely disadvantaged on the labour market: they are overexposed to unemployment and job insecurity and rely heavily on subsidized jobs. Young people
therefore react to the gap they perceive between the rhetoric of French Republican ideals of citizenship and the reality of a labour market which discriminates against them. The “Republican model” of citizenship forbids any differentiation between French and foreign nationals, meaning that affirmative action measures address disadvantaged areas rather than specific national/ethnic groups. This is why city-level policies on integration have long been closely bound up with national policies. In Italy, second generations have now become a key focus of the migration debate. As this category grows in size, Italian cities have been obliged – not always successfully – to design new policies and services to address the needs of both minors and families. Measures directed at young foreigners have been increased, and the focus has shifted from social assistance to leisure time activities, from school support to active citizenship projects. In these initiatives schools have of course played a leading, dynamic role in partnership with a wide network of associations and NGOs. These actors have also been involved in the activities organized by Intercultural Centres (centres set up by local councils to offer information and organize activities to tackle diversity in cities, with the aim of promoting integration and social cohesion). There are increasing activities aimed at fostering inclusion processes and active citizenship. Yet these efforts to foster the integration of second generations into Italian society come up against a nationality law based mainly on the principle of *jus sanguinis*: 2G can only apply for citizenship upon reaching the age of 18. In order to change this law, in 2012 a national campaign, “L’Italia sono anch’io”, was launched, supported by the main associations working on this issue in civil society.

Although the juvenile populations of the two countries appear to differ from a generational point of view, they nevertheless share certain characteristics. In both cases the “second generation” label (in both the strict and extended senses) has become «a dead weight laden with prejudices and rhetoric, rejected first
of all by the very people for whom it was thought up». Secondly, in both countries, the children of immigration tend to concentrate on certain types of education and training and their educational careers tend to be short. Other similarities between France and Italy can be observed in the labour market, with entry problems and the attempt to overcome stereotyping which sees only “immigrant” jobs being given to second generations. However, this is a recent issue in the latter country. The themes of religious identity, membership of associations (both real associations with their own premises, and virtual associations which operate on social networking sites) and involvement in local community life are further common elements in public debate, albeit in different ways and to different extents, reflecting migratory flows, migratory politics, and immigrant policies in the two national – and local – contexts.

Paris: promoting inclusion, combating discrimination

Until recently Paris did not have any specific integration policies targeting immigrants: prior to 2001, integration policy was not viewed as a distinct area of policymaking, but was included in the general social policy of Paris or the national policy for cities. It was only in 2001 that the mayor decided the time had come to develop a city-level integration policy, coining the slogan: “Tous Parisiens, tous Citoyens”. In the course of this political change, Paris designed and implemented a specific integration policy for the first time in its history. Institutionally, this paradigm shift was brought about by establishing the Politique de la ville et de l’intégration department, which is responsible for coordinating integration activities. In addition to this, a town councillor with responsibility for migrant inclusion and integration policy (Adjointe au maire de Paris chargée de l’intégration) was appointed. The integration programme was based on four key points: promoting equal opportunities for all residents in Paris, regardless
of nationality; reinforcing support services for residents with a migratory background; valuing the various cultures and migration heritage; combating all forms of discrimination. Various projects have been implemented since this turning point. A council purely made up of foreign citizens, with no French or European nationals (Conseil de la citoyenneté des Parisiens non communautaire, CCPNC), was established in 2001 to represent migrants’ interests. Although the role of this council is merely an advisory one, many of its proposals have already been implemented. These four main areas have been the focus of various projects directly run and/or funded by associations and organizations working in different areas of the city. In particular, in suburban areas with a high concentration of young people from a migrant background, the integration programme acted in response to objectives of socialization (school, work), cultural aims (valuing ethnic identities in the French cultural setting) and security and public order. Despite being locally-based and community-oriented, and therefore closely connected to the areas in question, these initiatives have failed to solve the main issues facing these jeunes issus l’immigration. The racial discrimination experienced in both employers’ hiring practices and daily life (particularly in dealings with the police) and the social deprivation in suburban districts have increased disillusionment among the young, fuelling their anger at the processes of exclusion and marginalization they feel trapped in, above and beyond “equal opportunities” rhetoric. The reasons for the failure of proposals designed for young people include their lack of continuity, due to funding shortages. The consequent closure of centres for young people, job-seeking support activities and educational guidance initiatives were merely further sources of frustration in areas where feelings of marginalization and the perception of being treated differently had already led to rioting, as in the case of Seine-San Denis (the original flashpoint for the riots in 2005).18
The information provided by many community welfare associations consistently demonstrates that the delayed payment of government funds from March to September 2005 gave rise to a generalized wait-and-see policy and widespread apathy which the associations, in a weakened position since 2002, really did not need.

The suburban riots prompted the city government to continue its commitment to integration and developing initiatives focused on education, followed by activities in the suburban areas where the youths live.

The disturbances also underlined the need to gain a better insight into the characteristics of the population, above all the young people described in the media as *enfants perdus*, with the aim of designing measures that would help fulfil the demand for services, support and guidance and avoid delivering activities irrelevant to the young people concerned. It became clear that it was necessary to act simultaneously on several fronts: working only in schools without addressing the local areas where the young people spend their time when not at school means not having an understanding of the role played by the local area, the area of residence, as the place which young people are anchored to, and where they construct meaningful social relations.

This is why the Politique de la ville et Grand Paris was organized along five lines: four concerning interventions (social cohesion, economic and labour revitalization, urban requalification, mobility) and one concerning research (funding the Observatoire national des zones urbaines sensibles, aimed at gaining better knowledge of the social characteristics of suburban areas and evaluating the efficacy of on-going policies). This new approach to integration views monitoring and analysing the population of foreign origin (and young people in particular) as an integral part of planning: supporting the observatory and providing funding for surveys and research were the tools used to adapt the aims and methods of policies to the needs of their beneficiaries.
The results of these activities continue to highlight how second
generations appear to be penalized in education, in terms of both
the kind of educational career pursued (brief, low-qualified) and
the choice of stream (guidance issues). In order to improve the
educational credentials of children of immigration and increase
their human capital endowment, in 2001 the city of Paris es-
tablished an agreement regarding “Education Prioritaire” with
the prestigious university Sciences Po,\textsuperscript{19} based on positive dis-
crimination for pupils in ZEPs (\textit{zones d’education prioritaires}),
offering selected students accommodation and grants. The pro-
gramme aims to overcome what the university sees as the four
main obstacles facing students from ZEP areas: lack of financial
means, lack of cultural capital or knowledge, the social bias un-
derpinning the traditional entrance process, and the defeatist at-
titudes of the students themselves. In parallel, the sixth “Forum
de la diversité et du premier emploi” was established to match
supply and demand between employers and young people – es-
pecially those of foreign origin trying to overcome discrimina-
tion related to their surnames or national origins. The forum is
expressly reserved for companies which promote diversity, re-
spect equal opportunities and are committed to combating dis-
crimination. During the event the young people can also benefit
from guidance regarding the most suitable training activities ac-
cording to their academic background, and can receive assis-
tance in analysing their personal skills.

As a recent survey concludes, second-generation life paths are
shaped more by prejudice and the experience of discrimina-
tion than by specific individual or collective ethnocultural char-
acteristics.\textsuperscript{20} The invisible boundaries connected to ethnicity
and “race” frame social worlds and predict opportunities and
outcomes. These findings illustrate the importance of anti-
discrimination projects. In this context, policies focused on ed-
ucation are essential. As we mentioned above, the scope for
intervention has broadened, moving from a focus on school
dropout and early school leavers to promoting further education. Moreover, the authorities have acknowledged that the focus on education has to be accompanied by planning activities involving the context, the areas where the young people in question live.

In this sense developments in Paris illustrate how it is possible to establish “large scale” intervention strategies, acting on different fronts to work towards a single aim: in other words, as well as promoting education and helping young people of foreign origin to enter the world of work, there must be measures in place in the areas where these young people reside (e.g. social promotion, urban requalification projects). The factors that account for the success of these initiatives include a careful analysis of the characteristics of the areas where the projects are deployed, and the implementation of structured “large scale” initiatives, not just focused on micro-objectives. For example, support aimed at helping young people make choices in education must necessarily go hand in hand with support for educational attainment and/or the involvement of families. These projects are complex ones which involve various subjects and often bring together different working approaches: the successful outcome of the Paris initiatives illustrates the challenge of working both with the beneficiaries (the young people) and their context (from families to the local area). The efficacy of these projects is at times conditioned by the availability of resources (human and financial), and the fact that the idea of “doing something” can take precedence over specific know-how – that is to say, there is a tendency to increase the number of activities, without always ensuring that the correct professional know-how is deployed. Therefore, the above framework points at a rocky path, due to the lack of a clear definition of policies and the difficulty of taking action in a context in which public resources dedicated to second generations have been steadily declining in recent years.21
Turin, where second generations are on the move

Turin has often been indicated as an interesting case study for policies for integration and the inclusion of second-generation and immigrant minors in Italy. As we said above, these terms are used interchangeably, yet as Molina reminds us, this situation «is destined to vanish very soon, when second generations reach adulthood». Second generations move into adulthood faster than their Italian peers. Young foreigners start work and set up families earlier than their Italian peers, who are increasingly delaying the transition from what is considered “young” to what is considered adult. In this sense, second generations represent a novelty in the Mediterranean pattern for the lengthy transition to adulthood which is typical of Italy. But there is still no general awareness of this phenomenon, even in Turin. Indeed, although the demographic contribution of foreign minors to the city’s population structure was highlighted in various studies, with attention devoted to their integration paths, up until 2007, the policies introduced were initially mainly confined to education, i.e. language courses and school support. In the following years, policies started taking into account the social fabric (e.g. including social workers and civil society) in which foreign minors and their families were involved. In order to promote both school and social integration, one interesting project developed in the 2000s. The so-called “Tappeto volante” (Magic Carpet) project was set up in 1999 to create a social and educational network in which the city, schools and associations could work together, combining their resources and involving all the family units and children living in a specific district with a fast-growing foreign population. In order to achieve this goal, the following initiatives were developed: educational programmes for teaching Italian; neighbourhood-school co-operation to improve the response to students’ educational needs; the creation of a network of associations and neighbourhood schools. The main focus was not just
educational activities, but also connecting and forging relationships with immigrant parents, in order to combat school dropout and failure, rejections and delays. This “large scale” initiative helped minors’ integration by accentuating the link between various socialization agencies working in a neighbourhood; nevertheless, immigrants were merely beneficiaries without an effective leadership and participation in defining the goals.

In 2007 the creation of the Department for Integration heralded a new era in city policies addressed to foreign minors. The main initiative developed by this new Department was “Se non ora, quando?“ (If not now, when?)\textsuperscript{25}, which was designed to support and reinforce the inclusion of foreign citizens in order to facilitate integration. It marked the shift from projects where second generations were beneficiaries to projects in which these young people played an active role. This project involved twenty young foreigners who organized various activities such as Italian courses for students and families, refresher courses and research for teachers. They were accompanied by two mediators and coordinated by the Department for Integration. The aim of the project was to create a civic network among immigrants and to increase their sense of belonging to a local community: in other words it intended to promote active citizenship among young immigrants and to develop the idea (and get people accustomed to the fact) that the children of immigrants are part of the city, not just the beneficiaries of integration projects but also active volunteers.

The project, now in its sixth year, has been imitated by other Italian cities as it has been seen to develop positive intercultural relations.

The project had to face challenging conditions. The problems of the first generation – mothers and fathers who still find it hard to achieve social and economic inclusion – weigh on the second generation. Their negative perception in public opinion\textsuperscript{26} is emphasized by the media, which equates them with the stereotypes
surrounding their parents (poorly educated, only capable of
doing low-skilled jobs, strongly attached to the backward tradi-
tions – both cultural and religious – of their country of origin,
etc.). The media appear to be incapable of (or uninterested in)
picking up on the changes in the foreign population or recog-
nizing the potential contribution of second generations to the
fabric of society.
In keeping with the city’s tradition, the Department for Integra-
tion continued to focus on neighbourhood participation and
school achievement to try to help the second generation tackle
these difficult circumstances. Reinforcing the skills of young im-
migrants is just one side of the coin. The other side is about giv-
ing them the opportunity to become active members of society,
and leaders. There are two main factors at play when young peo-
ples from a migratory background, or whose parents are immi-
gants, take the step of setting up organizations. On the one
hand, the municipal policy implemented in the mid-2000s en-
couraged the participation and active interest of young people
(indirect city funding and involvement in various activities had
a direct impact on the association scenario among second gen-
erations). On the other hand, this period saw the coming of age
of young people who did not identify with the associations led by
their parents, which focused on supporting the first adult im-
migrants (e.g. language courses, bureaucratic services), while
young people were more interested in belonging to associations
(both ethnic and interethnic) that pursued a discourse on inte-
gration, participation and civic involvement.
The result of all these initiatives was that young people became
actively involved as organizers, recreational workers and edu-
cators, working with other foreign minors engaged in integration and growth paths in the city of Turin. These activities also
firmly involved second generations in the life of the city by con-
sidering them active citizens of Turin, even when they were not
Italian by nationality.
The work of the Department was made possible by an agreement reached with a private bank foundation. It issued two calls for proposals for integration initiatives, addressed to ethnic associations, and though the calls were formally launched by the bank foundation Compagnia di San Paolo, the guidelines were established and the evaluation process was carried out together with the City Council’s Department for Integration. These calls for proposals fit into the general framework of municipal policies focused on giving more visibility to and fostering the acceptance of second generations in the public arena. These kinds of projects are not normally financed using municipal and national funds, as happens in the French case, but by European projects and bank foundations. The Turin experience is not a special case in the Italian context: more than 90% of the initiatives in Northern and Central Italy rely on funding that comes above all from private bodies (bank foundations and corporate foundations, such as Vodafone and Telecom), with the close involvement of civil society (associations and NGOs), alongside local authorities and schools. This kind of partnership highlights one of the main characteristics of the scenario in Turin (and the whole of Italy): as compared with a limited number of institutional (i.e. ministerial, regional and communal) initiatives, there is a remarkably dynamic, close-knit fabric of social voluntary associations. Besides their advocacy role in promoting immigrants’ integration, they meet the needs of immigrant children, second generations and foreign students with “just in time” interventions. However, this solution is somewhat fragile: these activities are carried out under annual funding, without either continuity or any final evaluation of the efficacy of the actions. Alongside organizing activities for second generations, the City Council is also actively involved in counterbalancing the very severe Italian nationality law which foresees only the acquisition of nationality at majority by children who were born in Italy and have always resided there. Two significant initiatives can be recalled.
Turin City Council started by passing a decree granting informal civic citizenship to all foreign minors born in Turin. Although civic citizenship does not imply the acquisition of Italian nationality, or grant specific rights or duties, this is a symbolic act of great cultural significance and impact. Turin subsequently endorsed the campaign launched by ANCI (National Association of Italian Municipalities) in October 2011 entitled “18 anni... in Comune” (“18 years... in common/in the municipality”). This campaign urges Italian mayors to inform youths born in Italy to foreign parents of their right to submit a citizenship application the day after their 18th birthday and before they reach the cutoff age of 19.

The Turin experience should be seen as a “best practice” in the arena of second generation policies designed to overcome educational difficulties and reinforce their civic participation. Nevertheless, there are limits which have to be taken into account. One has already been mentioned and regards the city’s lack of financial power when it comes to developing these policies and the strong involvement of bank foundations and civil society: their involvement becomes a limitation when it is restricted to one-off or annual events that are not part of a more organic, long-term commitment to addressing second generations. Then there is the lack of coherent inter-institutional activities on this issue: the Department for Integration should address it in tandem with other city departments (i.e. education, culture, social services) and municipal institutions, but at times this cooperation proves problematic, due to differing perspectives on how to intervene to help second generations. This does not mean that there is a lack of inter-departmental work groups or projects involving different departments and institutions; rather, it highlights the existence of different points of view on the priorities for intervention when it comes to the children of immigration: for example, choosing whether to fund scholastic integration projects for Italian language learning or projects addressing the school-to-work transition.
Conclusions

After a lengthy period during which it emerged that the French “public model” was hard pressed to respond to the everyday issues faced by second generations, first and foremost their lack of integration into the world of work and inclusion in the social fabric of the urban area, as of 2000 there has been a change of direction. In Italy civil society and the second generations themselves now play a crucial role when it comes to proposing initiatives and eliciting institutional involvement on the issue. The situation in Turin emerges as an example of a “private-public model”, where private actors in the social field work alongside bank foundations, which offer significant financial support to, and engagement with, the public administration.

This situation highlights the fact that we need to gain an in-depth understanding of the issues at stake, which includes creating ways of monitoring (by means of observatories, research, and also cooperation between institutions and operators, public bodies and civil society organizations) the consequences of the policies adopted, involving not only the operators and the direct beneficiaries, but adopting a 360-degree approach which also includes schools, associations and other organizations working with young people.

Both the migration history of Paris and the more recent experience of Turin demonstrate that it is a mistake to view the second generation from the same perspective used to conceive and design initiatives for the first. The situation calls for a paradigm shift that takes account of the specific characteristics of the “children of immigration” and their evolution in time.

How can these considerations be used to guide political action? Starting from the experiences of both cities, the following recommendations can be made:

a) policies should be anchored to an on-going observation of the characteristics of second generations, in order to guarantee the
efficacy of initiatives: the presence of observers, research programmes and policy-oriented analyses can give local administrations useful pointers when it comes to policymaking. In this sense stronger policy research nexus and the involvement of NGOs, who work with second generations, allows the municipality to gain more insight into the needs and problems of foreign residents and evaluate the strategies proposed;

b) the involvement of those directly concerned should be encouraged. As the experience of Turin clearly shows, there needs to be a shift from “working for” to “working with”. The recommendation is to involve immigrant youth in developing services for their peers, giving them the opportunity to develop their organizational skills and to be active participants in fostering inclusion and social-cohesion initiatives;

c) the youth field presents numerous needs and challenges, and answers have to involve different policy areas, as in the example of the “Magic Carpet” initiative held in Turin. This is why, considering the challenges involved in the school-to-work transition, more comprehensive services, offering not only language teaching but also remedial tutoring (and peer-tutoring), and courses in self-assessment and workforce skills, would be a more effective response. Moreover, indirect immigrant integration measures (see the initiative of the “Forum de la diversité” in Paris), offered to both native and immigrant youth alike, could prove even more effective in integration processes. Since organizations cannot always provide a “full package” of labour market integration services, networking with other organizations is indispensable. Interdepartmental meetings and projects should focus on this goal: by interfacing with workers from different fields the municipality will get a better insight into the potential strengths and shortcomings of the strategies implemented in various areas of society;

d) improving the *in itinere* monitoring of policies: focusing attention on the actual implementation of strategies and not only on their design/delivery, giving the city council greater insight
into the problems faced by immigrant associations and administrators when defining strategies, interventions and policies in the social arena. Lastly, in the current scenario of limited public finances it is important to develop policies that are effective but also integrated, guaranteeing continuity over time. Interesting but “isolated” experimental initiatives cannot be the norm for institutional intervention.
NOTES


3 A first attempt at overcoming this lack was the TIES project (The Integration of the European Second Generation), a project carried out in fifteen cities situated in eight European countries. The aim of the project was to provide a systematic cross-national comparison of the second generations in Europe. M. Crul, J. Schneider, F. Lelie (eds.), The European Second Generation Compared. Does the Integration Context Matter?, Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam 2012.


9 W. Schiffauer, G. Baumann, R. Kastoryano, S. Vertovec (eds.), Civil Enculturation: Nation-State, School and Ethnic Difference in the...


19 This initiative has been widely criticized.


25 A grant from the Italian Ministry of Social Affairs provided this project with a budget of 400,000 euros.


27 The first, entitled “Immigrants, New Citizens” was launched in 2007. It funded 37 projects (out of 200 proposals) spanning intercultural activities in leisure time and citizenship education courses, from school integration support to language courses. The second call for projects, entitled “Interculture and Training”, followed in 2008, was specifically dedicated to the issue of education and funded 24 projects.

28 A play on words in Italian.
Migration, Housing and Urban Spaces
Maria Lucinda Fonseca · Jorge Malheiros

Re-housing Programmes to Foster Integration in Amsterdam, Avilés and in the Lisbon Metropolitan Area

The housing situation of immigrants and small national ethnic groups in the EU countries has been characterized by higher levels of vulnerability and residential segregation when compared with the autochthonous populations. Taking these contextual elements into consideration, this chapter discusses four socio-urban interventions taking place in “problematic” social housing neighbourhoods where immigrants or Roma are over-represented (in Amsterdam, Avilés and in the Lisbon Metropolitan Area). The regeneration nature of these interventions is discussed from a comparative perspective. The key conditions for the success of these experiences (collaborative planning with “knowledge” dialogue, interaction between bottom-up and top-down strategies or respect for consolidation and negotiation times) are also discussed.

Introduction

The housing situation of immigrants in EU countries is more vulnerable than that of the autochthonous populations, both in terms of access and housing quality.$^1$ Disproportionate numbers

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of immigrants tend to live in over-crowded dwellings and in homes with poorer physical conditions, often paying higher rents than nationals. Reasons for this lie largely in the over-representation of many immigrant groups in low-skilled, low-wage jobs but they are also related to housing discrimination situations, which also involve institutional constraints. These include undocumented immigrants being unable to sign housing contracts, the extra difficulties faced by labour migrants in accessing housing loans and the restrictions that are often imposed on foreigners when applying for public housing.

Although tenure differences between countries are clear, on the whole across Europe immigrants and their offspring tend to be disproportionately represented in the rented sector, in particular in low-cost and poor quality housing segments.

The vast increase in the commodification and liberalization of the housing sector after the 1980s produced a housing offer that in many countries exceeded the affordability levels of the market, mostly due to aggressive banking competition based on commercial loans which generally exceeded families’ spending power. The lack of sustainability of many loans, as well as the transformation of debt packages into stock market products often associated with potentially toxic transactions, were largely responsible for the real estate crash that took place in the late 2000s. This situation has led to a return of the “housing issue” as a social problem, first and foremost, in the peripheral southern European countries of the EU, those worst hit by the economic and social crisis that started in the final years of the first decade of the 21st century.

In Spain, Portugal and Greece, the number of evicted and potentially evicted families is increasing substantially, due to the growing incapacity to pay housing loans and interest even after the extinction of mortgages or foreclosure. This process is leading to an increase in homelessness and over-crowding (many young people are moving back to their parents’ homes, for example). However, the contemporary increase in housing prob-
lems is by no means exclusive to the aforementioned countries. There is now evidence of a growing incapacity to access housing, especially due to an inability to afford market prices, even in major cities in countries where access to housing stock was not a problem in the 1980s and even the 1990s (such as Germany\textsuperscript{7} or France\textsuperscript{8}). Indeed, as Fonseca, McGarrigle and Esteves\textsuperscript{9} point out, the decrease in cheap rented housing, both public and private, in several cities in the EU, is causing additional problems for groups subject to greater economic vulnerability, including low-skilled labour migrants and national ethnic minority groups, such as Roma. The combination of the drop in affordable housing, especially in big cities, due to the liberalization of the housing market and the strategies being implemented by the developers, with unemployment and the wage cuts affecting many families in several EU countries, points to a growing level of housing vulnerability. This is certainly affecting the lower, lower-middle and even middle classes, including many migrants and their offspring occupying these positions on the social scale.

Regarding the residential patterns of immigrants, ethnic segregation has become a growing concern within the European political arena, resulting in the general assumption that it corresponds to a very negative outcome in urban areas (it limits immigrants’ contacts and networks, reducing their job opportunities; it creates parallel societies threatening social cohesion),\textsuperscript{10} which must be fought by urban policies involving spatial redistribution and encouraging a residential mix. This is in spite of the various references to the “pros” of ethnic spatial concentration (help in the initial adaptation process, availability of bonding social capital, development of neighbourhood solidarity).\textsuperscript{11} Despite the fact that the issue of ethnic spatial segregation is the subject of ample and sometimes contradictory debate among European academics, the concentration of immigrants in some large social housing estates where income levels are
low and social privation indices are high merits general concern, both in academia and in policymaking. When the aforementioned negative social indices are combined with processes of constrained choice that have left almost no other alternatives to residents, and the physical indicators are poor (rundown constructions with limited levels of maintenance, poor public space, limited offer of facilities and commerce), we have all the conditions for a bouillon of social exclusion and geographical marginalization. In addition, the stigma associated with these neighbourhoods and propelled by the media helps to further isolate the areas and accentuate the “no-go” dimension. Fighting these negative socio-urban processes in situ, thereby avoiding the destruction of community ties by demolishing buildings and relocating populations, requires complex initiatives of communitarian intervention, ideally with high levels of local participation. The combination of hardware and software measures is often a good principle, and has been supported by EU initiatives such as URBAN I and II as well as by several national programmes implemented in specific urban neighbourhoods. Thus, the main empirical focus of this chapter consists of presenting several socio-urban interventions taking place in some “problematic” EU social housing neighbourhoods, underlining the relevant elements of change or even success. We start with an example from Amsterdam in the Netherlands (“Mi Akoma di Color” in Bijlmer), a country usually considered a benchmark in urban planning and socio-urban intervention in immigrant areas. This is followed by the description of processes happening in neighbourhoods of Spain (“Avilés, por una convivencia intercultural in Asturias”) and Portugal (the K’CIDADE programme in Alta de Lisboa and the socio-territorial intervention in Outurela-Portela, Oeiras, both in the Lisbon Metropolitan Area). Having analysed all these elements, we will conclude with a cross-comparative discussion of the limits and success factors of the experiences described.
Re-housing, regeneration and integration of immigrants and ethnic minorities in “social housing” neighbourhoods. Selected case-studies of European cities

The Netherlands

In the Netherlands, the non-autochthonous population reaches 3.2 million (about 20% of the total), with 1.8 million residents born abroad (11% of total residents) and about 450,000 non-Dutch residents (less than 3% of the resident population) in 2009. Major non-autochthonous groups originating from outside the EU include long-established Turkish and Moroccan labour migrants and their offspring as well as post-colonial migrants from Suriname and the Dutch Antilles and their families. These migrant groups are over-represented in the west of the Netherlands and mainly concentrated in larger cities, where in some cases they account for over one third of the residents.

This large presence in big cities such as Amsterdam, The Hague and Rotterdam is associated with substantial concentrations in specific urban districts, leading to significant levels of ethnic segregation. Because migrants often live in neighbourhoods built in the early post-war period or even earlier, where rents are cheaper and property is largely public, many of these areas have undergone major urban regeneration projects since the late 1980s/early 1990s. The question of how to incorporate the migrants and their offspring in these regeneration projects, is answered by the experience presented below.

“Mi Akoma di Color” in Bijlmer, Amsterdam: regenerating a culturally diverse neighbourhood with residents’ participation Although Bijlmer in Southeast Amsterdam is not a typical post-World War II urban neighbourhood, its regeneration process, which started in 1992, is one of the most emblematic experiences of participative regeneration in a context of
cultural diversity. In the framework of this experience, an innovative participative architecture methodology was implemented, whereby Residents’ Housing Workshops were conducted. This is one of the possible participatory planning and architecture methodologies, having produced satisfactory results in several neighbourhoods. It was specifically developed for neighbourhoods undergoing a regeneration process and comprises a set of workshops of maximum two hours during which groups of residents discuss their housing requirements and identify the problems and potential of their neighbourhood. Together with planners and architects, the group of residents “negotiates” concrete solutions for the neighbourhood, using visual resources such as photographs, sketches and designs. These products developed from the collective work of the residents are presented to official regeneration executives with the purpose of being considered among the formal intervention instruments.17

Built in the late 1960s following Le Corbusier’s principles of modernist architecture, which separated places of work and residential spaces, Bijlmer was a large housing estate composed of high-rise housing blocks divided by green spaces, where pedestrian and cycle paths were kept apart from car traffic. When it was completed in the early 1970s it could accommodate approximately 100,000 inhabitants. Unfortunately, by this time, the social model of a detached house with garden in suburbia had been established.18 This, combined with the effects of the early 1970s crisis which exploded in 1973, made living in Bijlmer, with its relatively high rents, less attractive.19 The result was a devaluation of the neighbourhood that went hand in hand with a drop in rental value. Instead of the anticipated Dutch white middle classes, Bijlmer started to house lower classes and in particular immigrants, especially those arriving from Suriname during the independence process of 1975, who could be housed in the vacant and now relatively cheap social housing dwellings.20
As in other neighbourhoods built within the same concept, Bijlmer became a huge and impersonal neighbourhood, relatively isolated from the city centre (the underground only arrived in 1977), where problems of unemployment, illegal economy and social exclusion grew drastically. The entire picture leads to the classic “no-go area” process, where physical and social disadvantage are combined with a surrounding stigma, which included elements of ethnic discrimination due to the non-white character of the neighbourhood.

This situation led the municipality of Amsterdam and the Housing Associations to initiate a process of housing regeneration beginning in 1992. The importance given to the intervention in Bijlmer neighbourhood justified its candidature to EU PIC URBAN I (1995-1999), which provided 10 million Dutch guilders in addition to the 141 million provided by national authorities, local government and private investors. The whole process, which addressed both the hardware (the built environment) and the software (economic and social issues), included the demolition of several tower blocks and their replacement with detached houses, the rehabilitation of other high-rise buildings, and the regeneration of the surrounding public space. As for socio-economic initiatives, programmes to stimulate local entrepreneurialism and employment were implemented, as well as increasing the availability of free Dutch language classes. Despite some controversy related to the demolition process and the way in which some residents were “forced” to leave their old flats and not given clear housing alternatives, housing conditions and public space have improved in Bijlmer and most residents seem happy with the changes that have taken place over the last 15-20 years, namely the idea of creating a “multicultural community” where the various ethnic groups (Ghanese, Surinamese, Antillean and others) are supposed to express and mix their cultures.

Actually, within this principle of involving everybody in the regeneration process, a very interesting project of participative ar-
chitecture incorporating residents without a Dutch background was developed between 2000 and 2007-2008: the “Mi Akoma di Color” (My Coloured Heart).

This specific participative design project, which began in 2000, was based on the Resident’s Housing Workshop method and involved Bijlmer residents with a non-Dutch ethnic background. In order to implement it, a group of 39 residents of 12 nationalities over the age of 18 was selected from an original set of 400 candidates living in the original high-rise flats, to participate in designing their homes and the inclusive public space. The space for these homes corresponded to the area where the demolished Grunder Tower was formerly located.24

In a first stage, the group of residents worked with local experts but without an architect. Training and in-group knowledge developed during this stage and the housing wishes of the participants become clearer.25 At the end of the first stage, an architect (Manon Pattynama) was selected to elaborate the formal project. In 2002 and 2003, the group of residents worked with the architect in order to identify and materialize their housing wishes and needs. Meanwhile, a residents’ association was set up and began negotiations with the local authorities and the housing corporation responsible for the construction. In November 2003, the architect presented blueprints for «35 one-family houses and 17 apartments (19 owner-occupied and 17 rented)».26 In 2008, the houses started to be delivered to the families. The incorporation of the residents’ views was responsible for the originality of the housing colours (yellow, orange), the large balconies and the neighbourhood garden with its mix of exotic trees and plants.

The key lessons of this process point to the importance of the alliance between “expert” and technical knowledge of local authority workers and architects with the tacit and experienced-based knowledge of the dwellers, in order to produce the best planning and housing solutions. In addition, participation is only meaningful if the residents are involved in every stage of the
process, from identifying problems and needs to the final concept, including identifying specific requirements and intermediate sketching. Finally, only the incorporation of the views of non-European residents can ensure a more fulfilling and less Eurocentric perspective on housing and neighbourhood. Actually, FORUM stresses that the residents involved in the group became progressively more capable of integrating their various personal and cultural preferences.\(^{27}\) Although processes such as “Akoma di Color” take time, imply some additional costs and require complex negotiation efforts, their results in terms of quality of life and sustainability seem to reward the investment. Finally, it is worth mentioning that, despite the promising evidence, some doubts remain about the success of the regeneration process as a whole, which takes in much more than “Akoma di Color”. For instance, some residents experience difficulties in meeting the skills required by new jobs and new businesses. Furthermore, the negative image associated with the neighbourhood is so strong that it is difficult to break it down.\(^{28}\) As in other European neighbourhoods which share several of Bijlmer’s features, beating stigma requires deep-rooted participated interventions, urban marketing and time.

**Portugal**

At the end of 2012, the number of documented immigrants residing in Portugal amounted to 417,042 people, accounting for 3.9\% of the total resident population. The largest groups of foreigners were Brazilians, Ukrainians and Cape Verdeans. Among the EU member states, the Romanians and the British were the largest groups. In addition, Guinea-Bissau, China, Moldova and São Tomé and Príncipe are also included in the top ten nationalities of documented foreign citizens settled in Portugal. The worsening of the nation’s economic and financial situation was reflected in a drop in immigration to Portugal. Thus, be-
tween 2009 and 2012 the stock of immigrants decreased by 7.7%, going against the growth trend observed in the previous twenty years.

The Lisbon Metropolitan Area is still the major residential concentration of immigrants in Portugal, but its relative attractiveness for the most recent immigration waves is not as extreme as it was in the past. Regarding housing conditions, in Portugal, where the social rented sector is small, most immigrants are found in private rented housing. Given that rents are high, immigrants tend to share flats or other types of accommodation. This results in high levels of over-crowding among all non-Western immigrant groups and causes the clustering of people with social disadvantages.29

Immigrants from Portuguese Speaking African countries (PALOP), previously over-represented in shanty housing, were a group that largely benefited from the recent slum clearance and re-housing programme (PER). Nowadays, the number of shacks is relatively limited due to the implementation of the PER programme, but there is still a small number of shanty dwellers requiring re-housing.

The massive re-housing process undertaken in social neighbourhoods has not always been successful. It has improved housing conditions but has not reduced social and economic deprivation. Therefore, the answer to these problems demanded new approaches and more integrated strategies in social, economic and urban environment domains.30 Below we present two examples of area-based socio-urban interventions in social housing multi-ethnic neighbourhoods: one located in the city of Lisbon and the other in the first suburban ring.

**Lisbon: Regeneration Intervention in Alto Lumiar** The area of the Alto do Lumiar Urbanization Plan (PUAL) is located in the northern periphery of the city of Lisbon in the parishes of Charneca and Lumiar. By the end of the 1990s it was home to
the largest concentration of shanties and derelict housing in the city. PUAL is a planned community conceived as a new Lisbon neighbourhood, which includes different types of business activities, public facilities, green spaces and socially mixed housing, including housing for the re-accommodation of residents from former shanty towns which existed in the intervention area. In most cases, the re-housing process took place between 2000 and 2001, and was mostly completed by 2005. PUAL set aside at least 15% of the housing to re-house families living in shanties and clandestine dwellings.

In order to promote the social and spatial integration of the disadvantaged population, including immigrants and ethnic minorities, PUAL specified that re-housing buildings should be spread throughout the area under consideration. The vast majority of social housing in the area was constructed within the scope of the Special Re-housing Programme (PER).

The re-housed population includes more than 10,000 inhabitants, many with low levels of income and education, high unemployment and a history of some illegal and informal economic activities. The neighbourhood is an area of social conflict, due to the presence of different ethnic minorities and many situations of social and family disruption. Aside from the socio-economic problems, there is a territorial issue due to the poor quality of urban space production, lack of services, transport and economic activities.

Foreigners make up almost 8% of the resident population and people with dual citizenship 2.2%. Of the ten foreign nationalities represented in the neighbourhood, 92.5% are from Angola, Cape Verde and São Tomé. Among the Portuguese population, 13.2% were born outside Portugal, mainly in the same African countries as most of the foreigners, and the Roma population makes up 2.2% of the re-housed population. More than half of the immigrant population belong to households who live beneath the poverty line.
The dispersion of communities who were internally cohesive prior to the re-housing process has led to a breakdown of relational networks. People were re-housed in newly constructed buildings before some basic infrastructures and facilities were built. Therefore, in some cases, moving to a new home meant increasing isolation and decreased access to goods and services due to the disappearance of some shops, often of an informal nature, which existed in their previous neighbourhood. This has negatively impacted residents’ satisfaction with the neighbourhood and their real or perceived sense of safety.

The urban community development programme K’CIDADE in Alta de Lisboa A study on poverty and social exclusion in the Lisbon, Porto and Algarve regions, promoted by the Aga Khan Foundation, identified the PUAL intervention area as a pilot programme for intervention in the community development programme K’CIDADE. This programme, again promoted by the Aga Khan Foundation, in partnership with the Lisbon Holy House of Mercy (Santa Casa da Misericórdia de Lisboa), Central Business and Child Association, began in 2004. The project has also received financial support from the Ministry of Labour and Solidarity, the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, the Municipality of Lisbon and the EQUAL EU Initiative. K’CIDADE’s main goals were to promote the social cohesion of the neighbourhood by working with the target population to identify solutions to the community problems using available resources, with the attitude that all interventions should increase the autonomy and capacity of persons, groups and communities involved. K’CIDADE also focused on obtaining a general qualification of social environment and community in three areas: reducing levels of unemployment and vacancy; promoting success at school and higher education for the population; and developing community action initiatives to improve access to services,
resolve social conflicts and continue the social and urban qualification of the intervention areas.

This K'CIDADE project has an integrated and multidimensional approach, a solid budget, long-term goals and a large institutional partnership. The strategy of intervention was based on a baseline analysis and an ex-ante evaluation of the situation conducted by the Geographical Studies Centre of the University of Lisbon, with the support of Sheffield University. The project methodologies and analysis sought to utilize the scientific knowledge of urban development and social planning and the target community knowledge and participation to identify and discuss problems, resources and solutions, resulting in a productive comparison between technical approaches and the sense and experiences of the inhabitants.

A hallmark of the project management process was the collaborative methodology used in the process. The promotion of autonomy through active participation of the beneficiaries is also a key attribute of the project that distinguishes it from the usual community development interventions in Portugal.

The attributes of K'CIDADE make it a very visible and relevant project due to the positive results it has already achieved and the fact that it has mobilized a broad network of partners including various public bodies, both central and local, private companies, associations and other NGOs. However, the implementation of the project also faced some difficulties in the initial phase, namely: a certain level of inertia and scepticism present in the target population due to the high levels of disadvantage in the area, and the strong sense of despair and powerlessness; most of the existing social organizations which intervened in the area simply mitigated poverty, rather than promoting real emancipation; finally, despite the fact that the institutional density of the project is a positive factor per se, it also represents a challenge due to the large number of staff involved, the different institutional cultures present and the need
to create an integrated approach through learning and mutual interaction, namely by establishing intervention teams. Ultimately, this process led to some delays in the start and progress of the project.

**Oeiras: Vale de Algés, Outurela/Portela** The Vale de Algés is an intervention zone of the URBAN EU initiative in the area of Outurela/Portela. It is located just outside Lisbon, in the parish of Carnaxide, Oeiras municipality. It has a population of 7,000 inhabitants, many of whom are poor and belong to the ethnic minorities from Portuguese-speaking African countries, mainly Cape Verde. This area and adjacent territories house about 85% of the total 12,175 inhabitants covered by the PER programme in the Oeiras municipality.33

Social scientists conducted a research study of the area from 1995 to 1999. The study examined the results of re-housing policies in derelict neighbourhoods located in the URBAN programme intervention area, developed at the request of Oeiras local authorities.34 It focused on the new social demands and the factors which led to dissatisfaction emerging after solving the housing problem. These results defined the specific goals of URBAN programme for this area and showed that the improvement of housing conditions caused the following social changes:

a) enlargement and diversification of social ties and local social networks to areas outside the family and the neighbourhood, opening new channels for them to establish relationships with other social groups. Through the contacts established in school, younger children were more likely to expand their social contacts in terms of number and geography;

b) cultural origins and racial differences were accentuated by the new, cold and undifferentiated physical housing space planned by the local authorities without the participation of the re-housed citizens;
c) an increase of dissatisfaction levels based on new needs, namely employment opportunities and income level, which were considered insufficient to meet the increasing expenditures induced by the new type of housing and the wider consumption of goods and services identified as signs of social differentiation.

Considering the nature of the problems and the views of both the local residents and the residents of the surrounding neighbourhoods on these issues, local authorities chose an intervention strategy to integrate the URBAN programme. This intervention was developed between 1995 and 1999 and attempted to establish partnerships between the municipality and other public and private entities, and to enhance the development of integrated actions in the domains of social, economic and urban environment.

Three kinds of measures were defined (training for ethnic minorities to promote employment and entrepreneurial initiatives; support for residents’ social and cultural integration; and requalification of urban and environmental landscape) and made visible through the following actions: upgrading the area through new housing developments; projects to promote academic success among children attending elementary and secondary school, and to diversify their personal and professional interests; setting up a hosting centre for children living in difficult situations; establishment of facilities such as youth clubs, sports clubs, advice centres and a community centre; ESF supported training and re-skilling; refurbishment of a derelict farm-house as a new small enterprise centre (Quinta do Sales); improvement of lighting and enhancement of public spaces (pedestrian areas, green areas and play areas).

Despite the budgetary limitations of the URBAN programme, the initiatives succeeded in mobilizing the local residents to participate in EU projects. Simultaneously the municipality of Oeiras made major investments in urban and environment en-
hancement and also in building equipment and structures to support the population. In June 1998, an urban park with sports and leisure equipment was inaugurated on the site of an old, derelict farm. The manor house was renovated and adapted to accommodate a small business and craft park in order to give economic strength to the region and to create new job opportunities. Moreover, there was an improvement in public lighting and in the security of pedestrian areas. A multi-sports building and a swimming pool were also built.

In 2002, the Oeiras City Council created a working unit of the Division of Social Affairs – Centre for Social Intervention (NIS) for the territory of Outurela/Portela, with the aim of improving the social inclusion of people living in the area, especially the younger groups and their families, through activities that promote autonomy and empowerment for life in society. The NIS chose children and young people as a priority group, organizing actions focused on preventing school failure, school dropout and crime, along with actions targeting youth unemployment. It also developed initiatives with families in order to provide them with better skills to perform their parenting functions.

These actions were dynamic, diverse and articulated, involving a network of local actors, especially those most directly related to the target groups: parents, schools, immigrant cultural and sports associations, public health system, social security, vocational training entity and protection of children and youth.

The involvement of various local agents, young people themselves and their families, enables a sustained process of shared responsibility. Both informal and institutional partnerships exist to intervene in an alternative way which is more focused on individual youngsters and on their self-esteem, through the investment in their ability to learn and in skills such as personal responsibility and cooperation.

The importance given by the municipality to this type of intervention, with its philosophy of empowerment, has been trans-
lated to the annual action plan but still requires adjustments to the level of the allocation of human resources in order to ensure its sustainability.

**Spain**

Spain’s transition to the condition of an immigration country dates from the early 1990s but only became consolidated ten years later. Indeed, between 2000 and 2005, the number of foreigners in Spain increased from 1.37 million to 4.14 million, stabilizing at around 5.7 million after 2009 when the economic and social crisis worsened. In the middle of the first decade of the 21st century, Spain was receiving the largest inflows of foreigners of all EU member states, particularly from Latin American countries (Ecuador, Colombia, Bolivia and others), although the two largest immigrant groups are Romanians and the long-established Moroccans. Although more than one third of these foreigners live in the larger metropolitan regions of Madrid and Barcelona, their presence is substantial in several other regions and cities.

This fast and significant growth of the foreign population settled in Spain put an extra strain on the housing market. Although almost 40% of the immigrant families settled in Spain were homeowners in 2009, this value was clearly below the national average, which was above 80%. Private market renting was the tenure option for approximately 37% of the immigrants, a percentage higher than the national average value. This concentration in the private market, particularly relevant for those in the earlier migration stages, was caused by factors such as the very limited offer of social rented dwellings.

Concerning housing conditions, reports for Spain mention above-average levels of overcrowding and an over-representation in old buildings and in flats lacking basic amenities. Even more than foreigners, Roma experience a very high degree of housing hardship. The gypsy population in Spain is es-
estimated at 600,000 people, with more than a third living in Andalusia. As far as housing location is concerned, approximately 30% of Roma live in peripheral neighbourhoods or in isolated quarters in which this ethnic group often make up the majority of residents. This situation points to important levels of area segregation. Since the early 1990s, some indicators show an improvement in the housing situation of the Spanish Roma population: a reduction of the isolated areas from 9 to 6% between 1991 and 2001; an increase in the number of families living in dwellings scattered around established urban areas; growth in the number of flats and homes with water and electricity, reaching values of over 95%. These facts are associated with the implementation of re-housing programmes targeting shanties where gypsies used to live. This explains why a larger proportion of Spanish Roma, when compared with the situation of foreigners, lives in subsidized public housing, both in housing estates and in dwellings distributed through the urban fabric, a solution that follows the principles of residential mix and was implemented in the late 1990s.

Avilés, por una convivencia intercultural. Municipal plan to eradicate shanties, re-housing and social integration of the population Avilés is a coastal municipality of Northern Asturias with a population of approximately 83,000 inhabitants (Padron Municipal, 2013), including 3,500 immigrants and more than 500 Roma. Although the Roma population in the Autonomous Community of Asturias is relatively small (only 2% of the total Romani population settled in Spain) and recent in comparison to the situation of other regions such as Andalucía, País Valenciano or Madrid, the former self-governing region hosts almost 7% of the Roma settlements, which hints at some dispersal of this population group. In the late 1980s, Avilés had six shanty settlements with more than 500 residents, most of them Roma. To respond simultane-
ously to the poorer residential conditions of the residents in shanties and to the need to improve the relations between Payos (non-travellers) and Roma, the 1st Plan to Eradicate Shanties started in 1989 and lasted until 1999, involving the construction of Ciudad Promocional, a temporary segregated public housing quarter where 36 Roma families were concentrated. Despite the re-housing that took place between 1989 and 1999, several Roma families remained in shacks and even those living in Ciudad Promocional experienced a negative situation due to isolation, non-acceptance by the established local residents and lack of appropriate infrastructures. Aware of this situation, local authorities decided to help set up a working group integrating members of the political parties and NGOs as well as representatives of the Roma organization to prepare an action plan to deal with the problems of the ethnic minorities living in Avilés. This led to a change in the intervention strategy with the goal of definitively ending shanties through a scattered re-housing that spread the Roma families through the consolidated urban fabric. In addition, the decision was taken to demolish Ciudad Promocional and to integrate the residents in the global re-housing process. However, housing was just one the four pillars addressed in the 2nd Municipal Plan to Eradicate Shanties, Re-housing and Social Integration of the Population (2000-2004), which also included measures in the fields of education, health and employment promotion.

As a result, all shanties had been demolished by 2004 and in 2007 the last fifteen families of Ciudad Promocional were re-housed, in the context of a process which aimed to encourage a residential mix, with Romani families housed in scattered public dwellings. In fact, after 2005 an experimental programme aiming to support the access of Roma families to the private rental market was set in motion. Apparently, during the process the irruption of social conflicts between gypsies and non-gypsies was very limited and there was an increase in interaction.
processes between Roma and Payos. In addition, Roma associations developed in the period, some of them involving women and young people.

If the integrated nature of the project, addressing hardware and software issues, is a condition for success, alongside the intensification of the networks involving public authorities and NGOs, the involvement of Roma and their associations in the process seems to be one of the most relevant achievements, contributing to the empowerment of this community. If the refusal to build special public housing quarters for Roma, which would soon become stigmatized, is a strong point of this process, we lack post-2008 elements to evaluate whether the residential mix strategy was a real success. Nevertheless, this Plan was rewarded twice (in 2002 and 2006) as a good practice in the international context “Cities for a Sustainable Future”, organized by the UN within the framework of the World Conference Habitat II, proof of its high quality and international recognition.

Conclusions

In a context where qualitative housing shortages outweigh quantitative ones and market malfunctioning is creating homelessness, the role of public housing and of state action in the sector is under question. As far as migrants are concerned, the existence of an urban rental market with an offer adjusted to low and average wages is essential. In addition, proactive public intervention is needed to ensure that homelessness does not increase dramatically and that housing injustice is not widespread. Within the framework of this intervention, subsidized housing and public or cooperative housing are crucial, but the strategy must be strong and ambitious. First, urban land control processes and investment in regeneration (in many cases, such as several Portuguese or Spanish metropolises, shortage of affordable housing goes hand in hand with a significant num-
ber of empty buildings which require renovation), both in city centres and in suburbia, must be key policy points. Second, a social housing policy is not limited to housing itself, as it involves interventions in the public space and also in the neighbourhood’s software – that is in education, employment or business development support. Third, in cases where ethnic diversity is a hallmark of the city or of the neighbourhood, the policies must incorporate the principle of the intercultural city. Therefore, integrated and participative policies within the spirit of interculturality represent the best approach to intervention both in urban areas in general and in specific neighbourhoods in particular.

The four examples provided featured interventions in areas with a large proportion of public housing. The intention is to illustrate, in their diversity, the principles of integrated action, residents’ participation and an intercultural perspective.

A set of relevant conclusions can be drawn from an analysis of the four interventions. First, encouraging a residential social mix seems to be overstated by politicians and technical staff as a solution to the problems of the so-called “critical neighbourhoods”. The examples of Amsterdam, Alta de Lisboa in Lisbon and possibly Avilès show that a social and ethnic mix may contribute to stimulating inter-social and inter-ethnic contact, but that this requires well-designed and demanding community integrated intervention. Otherwise, low-income families living in residential mix neighbourhoods will experience a rupture in the pre-existing solidarity networks and perceive a greater level of isolation. Living in social housing blocks dotted around expensive gated communities is not a solution that will increase contacts and help poor people to move up the social ladder.

Second, several public housing estates display many physical and social problems and require regeneration measures. From the examples provided, demolition and dispersal may be solutions in some cases (e.g. in the transitional Ciudad Promocional
of Avilés), but are not the only solution or the “best” solution for all neighbourhoods. Integrated physical and social approaches involving the residents, with major investments in public space and if necessary some surgical or specific demolitions, seem to be the most positive approaches. Solutions of the “one-size-fits-all” variety are actually more likely to fail.

Finally, the lessons drawn from these cases suggest that achieving the desired results depends on:

a) cooperation between the target community and experts, by establishing dialogues between different perspectives. This requires the use of participatory methods which ensure that all groups are involved, particularly those whose voices are heard least – such as some non-EU migrants and Roma – from the project conception until the final implementation and evaluation. Respect for cultural diversity and assurance that the proposed ideas are taken into consideration are fundamental to the success of participatory methods;

b) managing the planning process by converging top-down planning (technical perspective) and bottom-up development (social participation and empowerment). Institutional networking and trust are crucial issues here;

c) incorporating methodologies that respect the rhythms and times required for the decisions to be negotiated and consolidated.
NOTES


5 On this issue see, for instance, Plataforma de Afectados por la Hipoteca, PAH (affectadosporlahipoteca.com) and A. Colau, A. Alemany, *Sí se puede! Crónica de una pequeña gran victoria*, Destino, Barcelona 2013, for Spain, or the evidence gathered by Colectivo Habita for the case of Portugal (www.habita.info).

6 In the cases of Spain and Portugal, former homeowners are often required to pay the remaining loan instalments even after they lose their homes to the banks. In Spain, a Royal Decree of March 2012 introduced some measures to protect the “house indebted” which liberate the former owners of their loans and interests in certain circumstances such as the unemployment of all family members or the absence of additional assets. However, the release of the debt depends on bank agreements, both in Portugal and Spain.
7 In the recent German Bundestag elections, the “housing shortage” was an important campaign topic. See, for instance, G. Kleinhubbert, *Is Germany Apartment Shortage a Myth?*, in “Spiegel Online International”, 28 June 2013, available on www.spiegel.de/international/germany/alleged-apartment-shortage-in-germany-is-limited-to-trendy-areas-a-908459.html.

8 On the reduction in affordable housing available in French metropolises such as Paris, see J.-C. Driant, *Pourquoi manque-t-il des logements en France?*, 23 November 2011, available on www.metropolitiques.eu/Pourquoi-manque-t-il-des-logements.html.


12 According to the Dutch formal definition, “non-autochthonous” are people born abroad and people who have one parent born abroad.


16 The owners are largely housing associations. R. Sohilait, *op. cit.*

17 FORUM, *op. cit.*


22 C. Quispel, *op. cit.*

23 B. Sterk, S. Zahirovic, *op. cit.*


26 FORUM, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

27 *Ivi.*

28 C. Quispel, *op. cit.*

29 J. Malheiros, M. L. Fonseca (eds.), *op. cit.*


135


38 Ibid.


41 A. Walliser, V. Bartolomé, *op. cit.*

42 Ibid.


Local Political Strategies for Housing Refugees in Bradford and Sheffield

This chapter explains how Bradford and Sheffield developed local strategies to integrate refugees in local community life. Both cities participated in two national programmes to provide housing for refugees: the asylum seekers regional dispersal programme and the Gateway Protection Programme for refugees. Although the elected Councils used very different political strategies and had very different starting conditions, both created local service delivery networks which supported refugee community organizations. The service delivery networks then provided a focus for building extensive networks involving a wide range of civil society organizations, which popularized a commitment to diversity within both cities.

This chapter explores political aspects of integrating immigrants in their new country of residence. It focuses on asylum seekers and refugees because these two groups face greater problems in entering a new society than other migrant groups. Thus, it emphasizes the process of “welcoming migrants”, that is, the circumstances of their arrival and initial settlement.

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Two cities in northern England are examined, Bradford and Sheffield. They are similar in size and urban structure, but have very different industrial histories. Both cities were large manufacturing centres in the 19th century and lost their major industry in the last quarter of the 20th century. Their physical structure reflects this history: both have an old industrial core city with several small, self-contained villages in the surrounding countryside. The core areas contain some areas of late 19th century workers’ housing, which is in very poor condition, much of it privately rented and cheaply accessible to newcomers.

Bradford’s industrial history rests on how its textile factory owners, from the 1960s onwards, used cheap labour migrants from Pakistan to break the power of white English mill workers, leaving a legacy of deep hostility between their white English and Pakistani workers. The steel industry in Sheffield used Somali and Yemeni migrants as stokers from the 1930s onwards. The highly solidaristic trade unions in the steel industry easily absorbed these small groups of migrants. In both cities, the hegemonic political ideas reflect how industrial histories become entwined with local political processes. In Bradford, the approach is neoliberal: the role of local government is not to provide services, but to ensure that services are provided. Sheffield is characterized by municipal socialism: local government provides all services for everyone.

Both cities participate in two national programmes, the Asylum Seekers Dispersal Programme, and the Gateway Protection Programme for refugees. The two cities deliver much the same services to migrants, but in very different ways, reflecting both their political orientation and the nature of their approach to race relations prior to the arrival of migrants. Thus, discussing how the national programmes are delivered locally provides a useful way to explore different political strategies for integrating migrants.
The Asylum Seekers Dispersal Programme and the Gateway Protection Programme

UK immigration law provides that any person who has the legal “right to reside” in the UK has access to all the legal rights and benefits available to UK citizens. Asylum seekers have no right to reside. They are admitted on a temporary basis, to allow further investigations before a decision is made about whether they qualify as refugees under the international conventions. Once a decision is made, they either become refugees or refused asylum seekers awaiting exit from the UK. The timing of the decisions is unpredictable, and their stay can be extended if they appeal against a negative decision. Refugees have the right to reside in the UK for five years, after which they must either apply to become citizens or to extend their right to reside.

The Asylum Seekers Dispersal Programme

Before 1999, 80% of asylum seekers were living in London and the South East. The regional dispersal programme, begun in 2000, was the government’s response to a rapid rise in the number of people applying for asylum in the UK. The programme responded to two political problems: firstly, pressure from local authorities around the ports of entry in southern England, and secondly, the increase in vacant housing in the northern regions due to the migration of their population towards the South East.

Providing accommodation and subsistence enforces dispersal since asylum seekers are given no choice about where they are sent to live. A large proportion of asylum seekers are destitute when they arrive. They are eligible for accommodation and 36.62 pounds per week subsistence payment from the central government until a decision is made on their application. Housing costs are paid directly by the central government to the landlords who provide the houses. Beyond this limited help, asylum seekers have no recourse to public funds. They are not eligible
for any of the state benefits available to those with a right to reside and they are not allowed to engage in paid work. Since 2008, they have been barred from living in social housing, whether owned by local authorities or by housing associations. Initiating the programme to disperse asylum seekers required building regional and local administrative infrastructures capable of receiving asylum seekers. At the time, all the expertise in dealing with the complex needs of asylum seekers was concentrated in London and the South East. In response, the government funded two large London-based voluntary organizations dealing with refugees to support the development of regional networks focused on asylum seekers. These networks brought together local authorities and voluntary organizations in each region. The role of the networks has changed over time, firstly, to adapt to the needs of those asylum seekers who gain refugee status, and secondly, to support the Gateway Protection Programme when it was introduced in 2004.

In 2000, 9 local authorities in Yorkshire and Humberside, including Bradford and Sheffield, set up a regional consortium to oversee the dispersal. The government funded the London-based Refugee Council to assist both the regional consortium and individual local authorities. Today, the successor to the consortium, Migration Yorkshire, describes itself as a local authority led partnership bringing together central government and local authorities with the voluntary, community and private sectors. It is funded by the Border Agency, the European Integration Fund and the EU Fundamental Rights and Citizenship Programme.

Initially, the central government contracted directly with local authorities to organize housing for dispersed asylum seekers. The first contracts were for five years. 40% of asylum seekers were found housing in the social sector, and the remaining 60% in the private rented sector. Operationally, the contractor pays rents directly to the landlords, whether public or private sector.
When the National Audit Office reviewed the contracts in 2005, it found that the government was paying the costs of vacant housing. In addition, rents in the social sector were higher than normal because many of the lettings needed to be made minimally habitable and all had to be furnished. Private rents were higher than the market rate, partly due to local authorities only using dwellings which met national minimum quality standards and partly due to the sudden increase in demand for a fixed supply. In 2006, the government renewed the contracts at lower rents and shifted the cost of vacant housing onto the local contractors. In 2010, a separate housing policy change barred asylum seekers from access to social housing. In 2012, the government ended its contracts with local authorities and current contracts are with private companies for the provision of housing and support across the whole of a region. The overall contract for the Yorkshire and Humberside region has been given to G4S, a private security firm which specializes in running prisons and the secure transport of prisoners. The price at which G4S bid was low, and this has led to further downward pressure on the rents to individual landlords and on housing quality standards in the accommodation which it uses.

The Border Agency is not a housing organization. Its role in organizing housing for asylum seekers is a consequence of the strategic immigration decision to disperse asylum seekers from London and the South East. Aside from its own detention centres, it has minimal expertise in housing provision. Management of some of the detention centres has been contracted out to G4S for some years.

One of the biggest problems in the dispersal programme is what happens when asylum seekers receive a positive decision and are granted refugee status. They have 28 days to vacate the housing provided by the Border Agency, find a new place to live and a source of income. Except for those who are destitute plus, they have had no access to the general services which support people
who are unemployed and are homeless. Once granted refugee status, they are eligible to access the full welfare support system. However, the process of claiming benefits and other forms of support is complex, so some former asylum seekers become destitute and homeless at this point. This is especially the case for those who do not speak English or who are suffering complex psychological and personal problems arising from their experiences in their country of origin. The voluntary and community sectors (especially places of worship) have been crucial in providing temporary shelter and food for these destitute refugees.

The Gateway Protection Programme

The Gateway Programme started in 2004. It results from an agreement between the United Nations High Commission for Refugees and the UK government. Gateway refugees are resettled directly from UNHCR refugee camps. They are granted full refugee status before they enter the UK, with the right to work, to become citizens, to apply for immediate family members to join them, to claim welfare benefits, and to use the full range of local authority and central government services. Local authority participation in the programme is voluntary, and they determine how many Gateway refugees will be settled in their area each year. Initially, 15 authorities participated in the programme. Funding is from the Home Office and the European Refugee Fund and covers a full package of personalized support for 12 months after the refugees arrive. Money for settling groups of refugees was supplemented by two additional funding streams. The Migration Impact Fund (2009-2010) supported projects to mitigate the impact of migration on the resident population and the Refugee Employment and Integration Service (2008-2011) helped refugees find work appropriate to their previous qualifications and educational opportunities.

In 2010, the Home Office reorganized the Gateway programme. Four cities, Bradford, Sheffield, Hull and Manchester, won the
contract through competitive tendering. The national Programme is small, 750 people per year. Bradford takes 100 refugees per year, Sheffield and Hull together receive 180, and Manchester welcomes 470. Refugees arrive in groups of ten to twenty at a time, and any one city may receive refugees from four or five different countries each year.

The full Gateway Programme for a specific group of refugees starts when the Home Office notifies the contractor of the household sizes and any specific health or other needs among the group to be resettled. Prior to their arrival, the contractor researches the cultural background of the group and finds interpreters who speak their language. After this, the Programme has two main elements. Firstly, the contractor must find appropriate housing for families and single people within the group. Once housing has been located, then local schools and medical practices must be approached, as well as the public employment service. Specific service providers are briefed on the culture of the refugees, their needs and history. In this way, a focused local network is set up. Secondly, once the refugees arrive and have been welcomed at the airport, given a meal, some cash and a food parcel and shown to their homes, caseworkers provide intensive support to individual refugees: showing them to their houses and explaining how the facilities work, orienting them to the neighbourhood and the city and its public transport system, introducing them and their children to the schools and local medical practices. Caseworkers follow up this initial work by providing advice on budget management, help in finding appropriate vocational training, language classes, claiming housing and income support benefits, and finding other personal and social support services which an individual refugee may need. Thus, the caseworkers provide the linkages between specific refugees and the network of agencies and services within the city. The aim is that all the refugees will be self-sufficient at the end of the year.
Two aspects of the Gateway Programme require long-term attention from contractors. The first is organizing and accessing language services. This was also a problem within the dispersal programme, but there was no way to address it systematically. However, the Yorkshire Police service used the Migration Impact Fund to train a large cohort of interpreters chosen from migrants living within the region and who are now available to all service providers. Access to English language courses for migrants has also been a problem. There is the issue of availability, including special courses for women where this is culturally appropriate as well as presenting courses in community centres, rather than just in colleges. More recently, student fees have been increased for all but those refugees requiring English for employment. A creative solution to these problems within the region has been the work of a migrant social enterprise, which presents cheap and accessible English language tuition subsidized by providing culturally based training courses to service providers. The second long term aspect of the Gateway Programme is community development. The main strategy is to encourage informal associations among specific groups of refugees, and then to support their becoming more formal migrant community organizations if and when this is appropriate. An important part of the strategy is helping new groups make contact with pre-existing groups where these exist, and, wherever possible, to help pre-existing groups to support newly forming groups. In this way, the long-term aim is to sponsor the emergence of a self-confident migrant community organization sector, able to meet the needs and interests of their members, to speak for itself in a variety of public forums, and to provide support for newly arriving asylum seekers and refugees.

**Asylum seekers and refugees in two cities**

Both Bradford and Sheffield joined the Asylum Seekers Dispersal Programme in 2000. Both cities subsequently joined the
Gateway Protection Programme, and both have now institutionalized the welcome of migrants. However, the local political strategies associated with implementing the national programmes developed differently in Bradford and Sheffield. Both strategies had three key elements. The first was assessing the state of race relations in the cities at the beginning of the programme and how this might change over time. Between 1945 and 1975, the United Kingdom absorbed large flows of migrants from its former colonies. The majority of the population whose families originated in former colonies are now UK citizens. People from the former colonies primarily settled in London and six other metropolitan areas. Since the 1970s, achieving race equality has been closely linked with limiting immigration in national policy. In 2000, Bradford had a relatively large minority ethnic population, dominated by people of Pakistani origin. Sheffield had a relatively small minority ethnic population, with significant groups of Somali and Yemeni origin, who came from the beginning of the 20th century onwards. The second element of the local political strategies associated with housing asylum seekers and refugees was whether administrative responsibility for implementing them was located within the local authority or in the voluntary sector. The third element has been building localized networks of welcome, comprising both service delivery networks and networks of popular support within civil society.

The next section sets out the chronology of events in the two cities. In 2012, the reorganization of the dispersal programme affected both cities in the same way, so the current situation is described separately at the end.

**Asylum seekers and refugees in Bradford**

Bradford Metropolitan District Council was dominated by the Conservative Party until 1980, when the Labour Party took con-
control for fourteen of the next twenty years. Since 2000, there has been no overall party control of the elected Council. The hegemonic political view reflects the historical dominance of textile factory owners: the role of government is not to provide services, but to ensure that the (minimum necessary) services are provided.

In early 2000, Bradford agreed to receive 1,600 asylum seekers per year, although publicly it announced it would be taking ten per week. The decision was taken by a Labour-led City Council. Reflecting national politics, local Conservative councillors expressed the view that asylum seekers should be kept in detention camps, rather than having “a red carpet rolled out for them”.

In the first week of February 2000, 80 asylum seekers arrived and were temporarily accommodated in Shipley, one of the outlying villages in the district. Their welcome resembled a moth-eaten rug rather than a red carpet. Bradford District Council had undertaken to provide furnished housing, an initial food package, and access to medical services. For councillors, an important aspect of the contract was that asylum seekers could be accommodated in housing owned by the local authority and the government would pay for refurbishing these dwellings to the national minimum habitable standard. Because they had been substandard, the Council had been legally obliged to keep them empty.

The first group of asylum seekers were dispersed throughout the district in very small numbers, wherever housing was immediately available. Although they met a warm welcome from some of their neighbours, at least half were also subject to verbal and physical violence in their new temporary homes. Racial harassment came from both white English and Pakistani citizens in Bradford. Where the abuse was reported, the local authority moved quickly and publicly, either moving asylum seekers in the private rented sector to another location and/or
evicting its own tenants if they could be shown to be the perpetrators. Nevertheless, many asylum seekers were reluctant to report abuse because their position in the UK was uncertain and/or they brought with them a fear of the police. Where asylum seekers were housed on council owned estates, neighbouring tenants were often deeply resentful because asylum seekers were living in formerly empty houses while their sons and daughters had been waiting years to gain access to a council house.

The City faced a steep learning curve. Firstly, the timing of an asylum seeker’s stay depended on the timing of a decision by the Border Agency, and this was unpredictable. Yet, an efficient programme of local provision depended on a steady throughput of asylum seekers. The Border Agency promised, but could not guarantee, a steady throughput. Secondly, a network of local voluntary and statutory organizations focused on meeting the needs of dispersed asylum seekers needed to be created.\(^{14}\) Thirdly, the problem with the 28 day transition period quickly became obvious, but a solution depended on the existence of a local network. Fourthly, interpretation and translation services in a wide and unpredictable variety of languages had to be found from somewhere. Twenty people appearing one day on a bus from an immigration induction centre at a port of entry may speak twenty different languages, none of which are English.

Bradford’s immediate response was to mend-and-make-do. It sponsored a group of individual volunteers to “buddy” specific asylum seekers. In response to racist behaviour towards asylum seekers, a mainly white English group offering advice to asylum seekers came together. The regional consortium began to identify relevant expertise in the voluntary and statutory sector, develop training programmes, and find existing migrant community organizations.

Bradford’s political strategy for welcoming asylum seekers was strongly shaped by the state of race relations in the city. In July
2001, there was a major riot in the city. It began as a confrontation between the English Defence League\textsuperscript{15} and a local white English anti-racism group. It ended as a large scale confrontation between the police and Pakistani youth. Both the local and the national investigations into the riot shared a vision of Bradford as a highly divided city which had made little effort to bring its white English and Pakistani populations together.\textsuperscript{16} The racial tensions had deep roots in allegations, by both groups, of unfairness in the distribution of public sector resources. Consequently, Bradford councillors could not be seen to be diverting public resources from either group to new groups arriving in the city. To resolve this dilemma, responsibility for managing the dispersal programme was left to the voluntary sector and there was a widely shared, unspoken assumption that this work would not be brought into the open political arena. Two specific projects in Bradford, initiated within its voluntary sector and funded by a national charity, created a local network of service agencies. In 2004, a black and minority ethnic housing association drew together the handful of voluntary and community groups serving asylum seekers: a refugee community organization; two voluntary sector advice agencies; the housing association to which the local authority had transferred ownership of its housing; a housing services association; a hostel for the homeless; and a few key workers within the local authority. The outcomes were a housing advice service specifically for asylum seekers and better terms of access to social housing for those who had received a positive decision on their applications for refugee status. The project also created a local refugee forum. The second project, in 2006, brought together three housing associations which focused on starting a Gateway Protection Programme scheme in Bradford. The key element in this project was convincing local politicians that the District Council would benefit from joining the scheme. The Council’s agreement depended on two housing associations jointly becoming
the contractor for the Programme. Both projects also showed the difficulty of engaging with migrant and refugee community organizations, who were unused to British political culture and procedures.

Bradford District Council, Conservative-led at the time, agreed to join the Gateway Programme in early 2008. In December, the first families arrived. By August 2009, the families had established their own refugee community organization. In common with most refugee community organizations, its objectives combine helping new arrivals to settle in the UK and helping those still living in their country of origin. Also in 2008, a wide grouping of voluntary, faith and community organizations came together to start a City of Sanctuary movement, thus mobilizing support for refugees in Bradford’s wider civil society.

In 2010, a Labour-led Council was finally able to create an open cross-party agreement to continue with the programme. Between May 2010 and November 2011, no Gateway refugees arrived in Bradford as the government retendered the contracts. Since 2011, small groups have been arriving from disparate refugee camps. The gap in the programme and the smaller groups have created operational problems for the housing services association, which is now the main contractor, in terms of assembling specialist resources for each of the groups.

To conclude, in thirteen years, Bradford has gone from being a divided city to being a diverse city. The overall political strategy has been to let the voluntary and community sectors take the lead. Much of the early movement in this direction can be attributed to a handful of key voluntary sector organizations. The most important element in the overall political strategy, given the delicacy of the situation at the time of the riots, has been building civil society networks: task-based networks, group-based networks, overlapping networks, linked networks, local, regional and, now, national networks. Once these networks became sufficiently strong, elected members could show more
open leadership. Thus, key early political decisions were about enabling these networks to “emerge naturally” by freeing local authority housing from day-to-day political control, by quiet and behind the scenes support from the Council, and by forging a bi-partisan approach rooted in a managerialist view of the role of elected members. At the same time, geographical dispersion processes within the Pakistani community have created, in the areas they are leaving, spatial milieux characterized by “safety in diversity”. A sign of the political maturity of Bradford's politics is that, although the issue of immigration usually pops into discourse around the time of elections, the range of views expressed span all ethnic groups.

**Asylum seekers and refugees in Sheffield**

Between 1923 and 1999, Sheffield City Council was controlled by the Labour Party. In 1999, the Liberal Democrats took political control of the elected Council and since then, control has alternated between the Labour Party and the Liberal Democratic Party. Consequently, the hegemonic political view reflects a solidaristic municipal socialism: all services should be provided by the local authority and to all who live in Sheffield.

Between 1980 and 1984, the whole of the steel industry in Sheffield collapsed. A quarter of the working population lost their jobs. The sheer speed of deindustrialization had important effects on housing in the city. Between 1981 and 2001, Sheffield lost population. This led to a significant increase in the amount of vacant housing, both in the local authority sector and in the private sector. People living in very poor quality private sector housing were able to move up market, leaving the worst housing vacant. These changes throughout the 1990s provide the background against which Sheffield City Council decided to participate in the Asylum Seekers Dispersal Programme.
Solidaristic municipal socialism meant that Sheffield had a long history of attending to issues of racial discrimination, starting with an early review of its policies mandated by the Race Relations Act in 1976. Throughout the 1980s, it used money from the central government to support a variety of groups. In 1986 it funded the renovation of premises for the Sheffield and District Afro-Caribbean Community Association, an organization which was set up in 1953. In 1989, the City Council donated premises to the Pakistan Muslim Centre. Both these organizations are still active today. In 1991, the Black Community Forum was set up to provide an umbrella for all non-white civil society organizations. Its research in 2004 provoked Sheffield to set up a Black and Minority Ethnic Group specifically to monitor its first BME Housing Strategy, as well as the Strategy’s linkages with other areas of local authority policy. Although the Forum was disbanded in 2006, the Sheffield BME Network replaced it in 2009. The BME Network is more widely based than the Forum. It spans voluntary, community and faith sector groups and includes relevant workers in the statutory sector as associate members. Between 2002 and 2010, Sheffield also used a separate central government funding programme to set up a wide variety of community based and voluntary groups in Burngreave, an area which has emerged as the most cosmopolitan part of the city.

Thus, Sheffield City Council already had experience of engaging with its diverse minority ethnic population when it joined the Asylum Seekers Dispersal Programme in 2000. The Council formed a partnership with two generalist housing associations. The two associations, in turn, jointly created a new association, Safe Haven, to manage dispersal in the housing association-owned stock. Safe Haven co-managed the housing with two community organizations, one Somali and one Yemeni. It also mentored their development from informal groups to more formal organizations meeting British standards of governance and
accountability. Asylum seekers gained immense benefits from this, as they were able to participate more fully in service delivery, and, thus, it led to creative ways of meeting their needs. The Somali organization received funding from a national charity in 2004 to create a network focused on the mental health needs of Somali and other refugees. It soon focused on the needs of destitute-plus asylum seekers. Safe Haven’s original contract was for five years and was extended for another eighteen months. In 2006, it withdrew from the dispersal programme and the City Council took over as the main contractor. Fluctuations in the number of asylum seekers being dispersed, coupled with the terms of the new contracts which no longer covered the costs of vacant housing, meant that Safe Haven was no longer financially viable.

Since 2000, Sheffield has taken asylum seekers from 14 countries. Somali, Iraqi and Iranian asylum seekers have had the most positive experience because they joined larger, longer established groups in Sheffield. As asylum seekers become refugees and settle, some groups have clustered within Burngreave because they feel safer in this more diverse area.

In 2004, the City Council was among the first group of local authorities to participate in the Gateway Protection Programme. The decision was taken by a cross-party group of local politicians who were responsible for overseeing refugee issues. Gateway refugees have come from 9 different countries. Sheffield built on the expertise gained from working with its pre-existing minority groups, as well as with destitute-plus asylum seekers, across a variety of service areas (children’s and adult social services, education, health and housing). It also mobilized the network of voluntary organizations created since it began to participate in the dispersal programme.

Between 2004 and 2010, the City Council maintained political oversight of the Gateway programme, while the British Refugee Council led operational delivery. In 2010, Sheffield City Coun-
cil assumed direct responsibility for organizing housing within the Gateway programme. Within this framework, the Refugee Council continued to deliver specialist integration support to refugees, including finding and training interpreters, finding English language classes and providing employment advice, while the local authority organized and managed housing. In 2011, Sheffield City Council took over operational management of the programme in Sheffield and Hull. In 2012, the Refugee Council withdrew from all its work in the regions outside London.

In 2004, the Sheffield City Council also began work on its first Refugee Integration Strategy, covering the period 2005-2008. A second and third strategy followed. Through work on the strategies, the Council has provided direct leadership in creating local networks. The strategies provide a way for all the relevant organizations to identify key barriers to integration, coordinate individual and joint actions and resources, and monitor outcomes for refugees. In the third strategy, the Council has set up Integration Advisory Panels, whose members are refugees living in Sheffield. The panels contribute to determining priorities within the strategy, and monitor progress every six months.

In 2005, the national City of Sanctuary movement began in Sheffield. In 2007, with the full support of the City Council and over 70 local community organizations, Sheffield became the UK’s first official City of Sanctuary. Today, this civil society network in Sheffield includes 100 organizations, at least 11 of which are refugee community organizations.

To conclude, Sheffield’s minority ethnic population doubled between 2001 and 2011, largely as a consequence of participation in the dispersal and Gateway programmes. In 2001, its minority ethnic population was diverse and long settled. By 2011, it was even more diverse. The City Council’s initial enthusiasm for joining the dispersal programme was stimulated by the housing problems associated with population loss. In contrast to Brad-
ford, the Council felt politically comfortable with ethnic diversity. It had a long history of supporting minority groups. Politically, the groups were fully incorporated within local authority policy planning processes from the late 1990s onwards. Also in contrast to Bradford, the voluntary sector in Sheffield was strongly community based, focused on the specific interests of group members. The city-wide voluntary sector umbrella agency was also weak. At best, elected members saw the sector as irrelevant because the local authority provided all services. At worst, elected members saw it as a political threat. Thus, the problem for Sheffield was in promoting networks involving the voluntary sector. Since 2000, however, the Council has slowly changed its view as the sector can access funding for services which were provided by the local authority but are being cut by central government financial restrictions. The start of the City of Sanctuary movement created a strong civil society network focused on refugees. Within the movement, faith organizations played a key role, providing emergency relief to destitute asylum seekers and moral legitimacy to both programmes.23

Asylum seekers and refugees in Bradford and Sheffield

The last part of the narrative belongs to both cities. In 2012, the central government redrew the geographical boundaries of the contracts for the Asylum Seekers Dispersal Programme. The new contract covers the entire Yorkshire and Humberside region. Local authorities in the region did not bid for the contract since the maximum price the government would pay was too low to cover their costs. The regional contract was let to a private security company, G4S. G4S, in turn, has subcontracted the housing component to private lettings agents. The private lettings agencies have little experience in housing management and subcontract to small landlords. Such extreme subcontracting creates problems. G4S agreed to find homes in the private rented sector
for 1,300 asylum seekers who were still in social sector housing from previous contracts. There are not enough vacant private rented properties to accommodate them. In addition, G4S’s lack of general housing management expertise means that, in some cases, it is using substandard housing or failing to pay rents to private landlords, who then seek to regain possession of their property by evicting the asylum seekers. Other housing management activities are also inadequate, e.g. cleaning of communal areas, repairs and managing the times between tenancies. Relocating tenants has been particularly difficult as G4S and its housing subcontractors lack the expertise to assess the specific needs of asylum seekers and match these with the location of housing. There is also an operational gap between the housing and support components in their work, despite G4S formally partnering with an experienced support agency. G4S has not established linkages with the existing local authority based support networks in the region. As a consequence, it is difficult to establish where local political accountability lies for G4S and its subcontractors.

The position of asylum seekers who have gained refugee status illustrates these gaps. At the end of 28 days, migrants are no longer of concern to G4S. Responsibility for them passes to the local authority. Coordinating this transition has been a problem since the beginning of the dispersal programme, but the need for coordination is not even envisaged within the private contract. There is a clear division of political labour between Sheffield and Bradford on this issue. Bradford City Council has pursued the technical arguments in a written submission to the current Parliamentary Inquiry into Asylum. It argues that the current immigration rules for asylum seekers severely restrict the support which local authorities can provide to prevent destitution. Sheffield, in contrast, is home to a number of regional voluntary agencies which campaign vigorously on behalf of asylum seekers and have been tireless in publicizing problems arising from the G4S contract.
The G4S contract has put local authorities and voluntary organizations throughout the region in a difficult position. At first, they sought to help G4S design better systems, but these efforts had little effect. Mediating the gaps in the local situation has fallen to the array of voluntary and community groups within the two cities. Some local authorities have become more proactive about regulating conditions in the private rented sector. In some local authorities, G4S's ineptness is beginning to reinforce political resistance to accepting asylum seekers.

In conclusion, both Bradford and Sheffield have institutionalized the process of welcoming refugees since 2000. Both cities have built a social and political consensus around providing a full welcome for asylum seekers and refugees. This consensus rests on three elements: political leadership, creating networks which include migrant groups, and the popularization of diversity. These elements work differently in the two cities, but the result is the same. The forms of political leadership differ between the two authorities. Sheffield's politicians are outspoken, deeply involved in promoting sanctuary, and committed to direct delivery by the authority. They consult with the voluntary and community sectors to improve local authority services, and have involved refugee community organizations in overseeing the local authority's work. In Bradford, politicians provide quiet support for a variety of activities and are now happy to make symbolic appearances which give political legitimacy to welcoming refugees. Bradford's politicians leave most of the operational work to voluntary organizations and focus on ensuring a smooth interface between local authority workers and the voluntary sector. At the same time, the pattern of voluntary organizations is different in the two cities. Both cities have the same number of organizations serving minority ethnic groups, including refugee community organizations. However, a larger proportion are ethnically specific in Sheffield while Bradford has a larger proportion of more generalist organizations. In both cities, the City of
Sanctuary movement has united a wide range of civil society and popular groups. The movement aims to build a culture of hospitality for people seeking sanctuary in the UK and to ensure they are fully included in the life of their communities. It is important that the movement includes organizations which are normally considered as outside the political arena, such as faith groups. It also provides the army of volunteers who provide an everyday welcome in the two cities. The movement originated in Sheffield’s dispersed voluntary sector in 2004, where it now has 100 members. Bradford joined the initiative in 2008, only after basic service provision networks and political support had been forged. With 150 members, the size of the movement in Bradford reflects the city’s reliance on a much larger and more active voluntary sector.

Conclusions, reflections, lessons

What lessons can be learned from the experience of these two cities? The general answer is that national programmes can be implemented very differently depending on the political approaches of local authorities. However, the common element in all approaches is the multiplication of agencies and the fragmentation of tasks which are the reality of integrating refugees. The governance of integration is about drawing together agencies and tasks to welcome asylum seekers and refugees. Two models of governance are simultaneously relevant: vertical/hierarchical and horizontal/networked. Horizontal networks are at the heart of service delivery, and vertical hierarchies concern the political management of delivery. The two models intersect in a variety of ways.

National politics and policy affect the cities in two ways. Firstly, there is a disjunction between national and local politics of immigration. The immigration issue splits the national political parties, and its salience in opinion polls has nudge the parties to
compete with each other to reduce immigration, each taking the position that the other party is not “tough enough”. However, sustaining a welcome for refugees requires some form of cross-party support at the local level. Sheffield’s municipal socialism, already at ease with race equality politics, supported an open cross-party alliance from the beginning of the dispersal programme. Neoliberalism in Bradford, set within a political paralysis induced by deep racial hostilities, meant that for most of the period, support came from each of the parties separately and only became an open cross-party alliance ten years after the dispersal programme began. Secondly, constant change in how the central government has organized the immigration service and contracts with local providers has created problems for the cities. The uncertainty created by the contracting process has particularly affected smaller, more focused voluntary agencies providing housing or housing services. Local housing provision contractors also had to negotiate a deep division in central government between two ministries, the Home Office/Border Agency and the ministry responsible for housing. In Sheffield, these problems led to the local authority taking increasing responsibility for delivering the Gateway programme and changing its approach to the dispersal programme from delivering housing to proactively regulating housing conditions in the private rented sector. In contrast, Bradford City Council has relied more and more on an increasingly sophisticated voluntary and community sector to deliver housing.

Two lessons can be drawn from these observations. Firstly, cross-party support at the local level is important to sustain long run involvement but can be achieved in different ways. Secondly, central government policies and procedures can change rapidly. Therefore, it is important to build resilience into arrangements for local service delivery.
The elected Councils in Bradford and Sheffield are both politically marginal. Marginality usually reinforces a long run shift towards a managerialist approach and mitigates against large changes and thinking outside the box. However, both Councils made a key strategic decision early in the 2000s to outsource the day-to-day management of their own housing stock. Bradford transferred ownership permanently to a specially set up housing association while Sheffield transferred day-to-day housing management to an independent organization but retained ownership. Direct day-to-day management of housing by elected politicians tends to derail strategic thinking about housing problems as elected councillors focus on the detailed problems of their constituents. Removing housing from detailed political control allowed both cities to adapt to the housing needs of both minority ethnic and refugee groups. Within the dispersal programme, the housing role of local authorities has significantly altered over time, from managing housing provision to regulating private sector landlords and intervening when destitute asylum seekers become homeless. This role is fundamentally different from the positive provision of a full welcome for Gateway refugees. Different resources and coordinating mechanisms are required, but it is still too early to see how these tensions will be resolved.

**The third lesson is that defining the local authority’s role in how asylum seekers and refugees access housing is a key strategic decision, because it determines the nature and organization of the resources required to welcome them.**

Historically, Sheffield had a proactive approach to incorporating its minority ethnic groups into local politics and carried this forward when refugees began to arrive. Since it was already set on this path, including new arrivals was simply another step in the same direction. Solidaristic municipal socialism allowed elected politicians to incorporate new groups into internal policy planning...
processes, giving voice to refugees in the public political forum. In contrast, Bradford’s political strategy recognized that both its Pakistani and white English population felt threatened by the new arrivals. Thus, it effectively outsourced political leadership to two housing associations. Once strong, stable inter-agency and inter-organizational networks had been created, linking local authority workers with specialist voluntary and refugee community organizations, then the work of welcoming asylum seekers and refugees could be brought into the civil society arena, but is still relatively peripheral in the open political arena.

The networks which welcome refugees include different types of organizations and agencies, and each type has its own independent set of linkages beyond the refugee based network. Local government is linked to central government, neighbouring and regional local authorities, political parties. Voluntary organizations are linked to their client groups, community based organizations and associations, similar organizations elsewhere, regulatory agencies in central and local government, charities and other organizations who might fund their activities, etc. Community based organizations link local groups informally, and in the case of refugee organizations, may be linked to other groups and organizations elsewhere in the country or in the country of origin, to non-state organizations such as places of worship, extended kinship networks, and so on.

Two strategic elements run through all day-to-day work of welcoming migrants. The first is providing services in a culturally specific way. Language is important, but there are also culturally specific etiquettes for conducting meetings and other forms of public business. The second element is the process of making contact with members of the refugee group itself, recognizing informal associations among its members, and supporting the emergence of more formal groups who can speak and act “for the community” in the social and political space between the host society and those seeking to enter it.
The fourth lesson is that sensitivity to culturally specific etiquettes is essential to support and develop refugee community organizations and their ability to enter the public political arena and local civil society.

A horizontal network is an intricate construction bound together by contractual relationships. Contracts can be formal and legal, as with the contracts between the Border Agency and local housing providers. These contracts are expressed in the currency of monetary payments for the delivery of specific services. Or contracts can be informal, as in the stable relationships within both cities which bring together people from a variety of agencies and refugee groups to share information, identify common problems, and informally coordinate their actions. These contracts are expressed in the currency of political trust. The important thing about this currency is that it is created through the process of acting together and that it depends on interpersonal relationships.

Horizontal networks can organize resources flexibly to meet specific needs and respond to wider changes. But they also have weak points. The formal contracts within them are located within top-down central government programmes. Contracts can be lost as well as won. The central government has steadily driven prices down in both programmes. In Sheffield, Safe Haven was no longer financially viable in 2006 and the local authority stepped in to become main contractor for all housing in the dispersal programme. In 2011, none of the local authorities in the region could run the programme at the price at which G4S bid and the local authorities are now bearing the costs associated with increasing numbers of destitute-plus asylum seekers.

The formal contracts treat refugees as objects to whom specified services are provided. Within the informal contracts, the aim is to facilitate refugees becoming active subjects within local polit-
ical and civil society. However, refugees bring with them a mistrust of state institutions. The voluntary and community based interface is important because the state, central and local, starts with a deficit of trust and must build its credibility. Because the City of Sanctuary movement is embedded in civil society, it provides trusted linkages outside the state sector and supports the emergence of refugee community organizations. Nevertheless, the way in which refugee organizations enter the political arena follows the broader political logic within each of the cities. Sheffield is eager to incorporate refugee organizations into its own internal policy processes while, in Bradford, refugee organizations cluster within the voluntary sector.

The fifth lesson is that informal linkages within the horizontal network are central to welcoming refugees. They provide a rich array of opportunities for entering community life, encompass a wide and flexible range of resources, and, once built, are resilient in the face of wider changes.

Over the last ten years, the social boundaries between asylum seekers, refugees and minority ethnic groups have become blurred as asylum seekers become refugees, and as refugees settle and become local minority ethnic groups. More recently, economic austerity in the public sector means funding has been cut for many of the local authority services needed to help refugees enter English community life. Service provision depends more and more on both refugee and English volunteers, and the extent to which the local authority can prioritize refugees within its own services. There is a growing tendency to access charitable and European funding for projects which benefit a range of vulnerable groups. For example, specialist projects to help homeless people will serve both destitute refugees and English people and projects addressing violence against women benefit a wide range of groups.
In summary, three points stand out from examining how Bradford and Sheffield have welcomed dispersed asylum seekers and Gateway refugees. Firstly, the same services can be provided in very different local political environments. Secondly, providing a warm welcome depends on creating complex and resilient local networks. Thirdly, politics – in its broadest sense – infuses all aspects of welcoming refugees.
NOTES

1 In 2011, there were 522,000 residents in Bradford (of which 33% were non-white). In Sheffield, there were 553,000 residents (of which 16% were non-white). Source: www.ethnicity.ac.uk/index.html.
2 Except for the right to vote and to serve on juries in the courts.
3 From 4,000 in 1990 to almost 70,000 in 1999. Subsequently, the number of applications for asylum decreased. In 2012, there were 22,000 applications.
4 There may also have been a financial argument about incurring further public sector borrowing to build detention centres.
5 Current rate for single persons. The comparable rate for a UK citizen is 71.70 pounds.
6 From either central or local government, including: all national welfare benefits, housing and council tax benefit, access to central government employment agencies, access to English language classes, access to local authority social services. However, local authorities have an overriding statutory duty to provide social services for asylum seekers who are deemed “destitute plus”: those who have been detained under mental health legislation, pregnant and nursing mothers, vulnerable children and elders, women subject to domestic violence. The cost of provision for the destitute plus is borne by the local authorities and is not reimbursed by central government. National Health acute services are free to all who are within the UK irrespective of nationality.
7 Local authorities and housing associations were holding the property vacant, pending the arrival of more asylum seekers. Given the downward trend in the number of applications for asylum, these flows did not always materialize.
8 If the decision is negative, the asylum seeker may leave the country or simply melt into the general population staying on as an illegal immigrant.
9 Approximately 3.5% of all asylum applications in 2012.
10 Currently, Sheffield City Council is the contractor for refugees being sent to both Sheffield and Hull. In Manchester, the City Council is the contractor. In Bradford, Horton Housing Association is the contractor. Horton is a housing services association: it provides specialist
services to tenants of other associations, but, until recently, owned no housing property itself.

11 Both cities have a population slightly over 500,000, have the same competences, are 19th century industrial cities surrounded by self-contained outlying villages.

12 Bradford City Council is so finely balanced between the political parties that control usually depends on the mayor’s casting vote.

13 Bradford Red Cross provided the food parcels.

14 “Voluntary sector” usually refers to non-state, non-profit formal organizations, regulated by the Charities Commission and/or government agencies. “Community sector” usually refers to informal associations of friends pursuing a common interest without any formal funding.

15 A small, virulently racist national group with support in some white English working-class districts in Bradford.

16 Pakistanis were 15% of Bradford’s population and 67% of the non-white population.

17 There are no Conservative councillors in Sheffield.

18 Municipal socialism meant there was relatively little housing association provision in the city.

19 The New Deal for Communities.

20 Somalis and Iraqis have come to Sheffield through both programmes.

21 A large London-based voluntary organization, which worked in Yorkshire and Humberside since the beginning of the dispersal programme in 2000.

22 A city in East Yorkshire.

23 It has been said that “In Sheffield, socialism owes more to Methodism than Marxism”.

24 The reasons for the decisions to outsource housing were much broader, but the effect for asylum seekers and refugees is significant.
Conclusions
What Can We Take Away with Us from This Book?

Giovanna Zincone

Following the perspective illustrated in the introduction, we will now draw some lessons from the cases covered in the previous chapters. The focus will not be so much on the content of the policies, on the policy-products, but on the decision-making processes, on the policy strategies. Indeed, the analyses made by the various authors of this book point to some recurring strategic elements of success or failure, regardless of the policy sector in question (i.e. education, housing, urban policies, etc.) and of the target (i.e. young immigrants, Roma, asylum seekers, etc.).

A first recurring element for success or failure is whether or not the recipients of the policy-making processes are involved. Attributing values, needs, demands and behaviours to those recipients, based on unfounded prejudices, however well-meaning they may be, can easily generate undesired effects. An example of this is the intercultural gardens in the Langwasser neighbourhood in Nuremberg, studied by Heckmann and Köhler which, instead of encouraging integration, triggered conflicts in the short term. This is because, in transferring this “best practice”, there was no consideration of what the residents’ expectations and perception of this project might be. Similarly, the question of the Roma people’s access to housing, described by Picker, was dealt with in Florence and in Cluj based on unrealistic visions of this minority, which people continue to think of

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as nomadic and as incapable of a “normal” way of life. Segregation and marginality were reinforced as a result. Conversely, Fonseca e Malheiros underline the successful results, from an aesthetic point of view too, of involving residents in planning the regeneration and redeveloping of an Amsterdam neighbourhood, Bijlmer. Ricucci’s chapter shows two alternative, but both satisfactory ways of gathering empirical information on the needs and characteristics of the recipients: cooperation and assiduous contact with immigrant associations in Turin, monitoring and fieldwork research in Paris. The “classic” method, used in Turin, was the one which we encountered most frequently in our case studies. However, it was often a solution adopted after the event, to repair damage caused by an initial lack of knowledge of the policy recipients’ attitudes. In Florence it was carried out through a consultation to define laws and projects on the Roma minority, following the failed experimentations of the camps; in Avilés (Northern Asturia) after having consulted the recipients, the previous concentration of Roma in a single settlement was superseded by a scattered, diversified, more appreciated and viable reallocation; in the two neighbourhoods in Nuremberg better results were achieved through meetings promoted by the district coordinators; and in the English cities of Bradford and Sheffield, by involving migrant and refugee community organizations in building networks for asylum seekers’ dispersal programmes.

However, getting the recipients involved in the decision-making processes implies also some complications. Firstly, it requires an investment of work, time and often money: assessing needs and turning them into effectual, sustainable systems in line with the overall set-up of the policy in question is not a quick, mechanical operation, and implies creating specific decision-making mechanisms.

To further add to the complication, the recipients are not a cohesive, uniform group: they are often people with conflicting in-
terests and opposing visions of the issue in question. Therefore, involving them also requires experience and a capacity for conflict-solving. In the Langwasser neighbourhood, for example, the recipients comprised both the Aussiedler minority (ethnic German immigrants), which the gardens were aimed at helping to integrate into local society, as well as native residents concerned about the disturbance (noise, traffic, rubbish, etc.) which the gardens might cause. In Werderau, the recipients were both the long-established residents, former employees of the MAN factory, who wished to regain control over the housing stock; and the newly arrived residents, who on the other hand appreciated the greater chances of having access to those houses. In Bradford and Sheffield, the recipients were obviously not just the asylum seekers involved in the dispersal programmes, but also the inhabitants of the local societies in which they settled who, in the case of Bradford, perceived them as competitors in terms of access to council owned estates.

In many cases, the recipients are voiceless, as they are not organized. This often happens to minorities, who demonstrate, in comparison to natives, less interest in getting involved. They are from countries in which active citizenship is not a widespread practice; they are still unfamiliar with the participation mechanisms available in their host societies; they are committed to long working hours which leave them with little free time. In such cases, demands can be mediated by others, such as the organizations which work with the Roma in Tuscany, the NGOs working with asylum seekers in Sheffield and Bradford, and the Parisian associations which work with young people in the banlieues. Even the far-right organizations active in Werderau and Langwasser presented themselves as being representatives of the residents, and perhaps to some extent they actually were, given the sizeable number of votes they obtained in the elections. It is more difficult to involve the local recipients if they are already influenced and even recruited by organizations ideologically...
logically hostile to the project. This does not imply that it is impossible to make them eventually change their opinions as happened, for instance, in Oeiras. The complex dynamics of representation pose considerable problems for policymakers. When does a non-elected organization truly represent a certain social group? How far are the various demands of the recipients adequately reflected by those proposing to defend them, and can they make themselves heard? Though these dilemmas are difficult to solve, we can assume that rigid decision-making processes which form barriers to access and exclude significant voices, are likely to be forced to change path or face failure.

Taking into consideration the opinions of the recipients and widening the number of actors included in the decision-making process increases internal costs; on the other hand, it decreases the risks of the measure adopted subsequently being rejected. The pros usually outweigh the cons but it depends on the specific situation. A similar consideration applies to the decision to adopt integrated measures, which implies the involvement of different kind of actors and agencies. Successfully reallocating Roma groups to different neighbourhoods is not just a question of new housing facilities to build or recover, but of arranging means of transport connecting the new settlements to schools, hospitals, supermarkets and other necessary services. Integrated projects can sometimes prove even too ambitious, as in the case of “Mi Akoma di Color” in Amsterdam where the new employment opportunities were overqualified for the potential pool of mainly low-skilled workers. Integrated projects face more than others the problem of acquiring the needed resources.

Acquiring and managing resources is another aspect which emerged as central to many of the cases covered in this book. Not only are resources never bottomless, but in recent years of economic and fiscal crisis they have often been cut, as we have observed in Barcelona and Rotterdam, Paris and Turin. The analyses in this book tell us that resources are not just eco-
onomic. “Financial capital” can be supplemented with social assets, such as trust and cooperation; as well as organizational, knowledge-based, regulatory or symbolic assets. Furthermore, other entities in addition to local authorities can play a key role, such as private foundations in Turin and Lisbon, which give significant economic and organizational support to the city’s integration policies; or the European Commission through the various funds allocated to the integration of minorities or to other sorts of measures which may have positive knock-on effects on integration, as Picker suggests in his chapter. A good example of the potential of mobilizing different agencies is given by the community development programme K’CIDADE in the Metropolitan Area of Lisbon. The project, promoted by the Aga Khan Foundation, was able to acquire the technical support of the University and to involve many private, charitable and public contributors, including the European Commission. Projects financed, supported and sponsored by many agents are usually integrated programmes and have the many pros and the few cons already illustrated.

A project’s chances of success do not just depend on the volume of available resources, but on their continuity, as it is shown by the Parisian case studied by Ricucci. Here, uncertainty as to the flow of funding made youth associations very cautious, hindering the development of mid-term strategies. Similarly, in the English cities analysed by Allen and Rosenfeld, changes in the contracts between central government and local providers led to negative consequences on local NGOs. Uncertainty about the resources that may be available in the near future impedes planning, and hence strategic thinking, blocking the work of actors in the here and now. It also feeds a vision of higher levels of government, where the resources often come from, as being adverse or hostile, rather than parts of an integrated system of governance.

The adequacy of resources can also be uncertain in the face of variable, hard-to-predict demands and needs. Bruquetas’ chap-
ter, for example, illustrates how in Barcelona, the rapid growth of foreign-born pupils and the fact that they join the school at different points throughout the year make it difficult to estimate the resources required in advance. The result is that they are often insufficient or poorly distributed. In addition to this, even where resources are significant overall, as with the TAE (Taller de Adaptació Escolar, Workshops for Educational Adaptation) integration programme, they risk being insufficient in some schools due to a rigid system of allocation. This does not allow the number of support teachers to be modified in the course of the school year, to adapt it to the flow of students arriving from abroad, and in any case their number is limited to a maximum of two per school, regardless of the amount of newcomers (nou-viguts), generating a mismatch between supply and demand.

On the other hand, paradoxically, a lack of resources may become a stimulus for innovation. Obviously this is not a highly probable result; it requires various favourable conditions in order to occur, not just flexible, creative and dedicated workers. In many European cities, the hard work and commitment of individual education workers have made up for shortages and fuelled innovation. However, the cases of Barcelona and Rotterdam analysed by Bruquetas indicate that a commitment to integration is not a variable that refers only to individuals, but also depends on the organizational environment. In Barcelona, schools are places in which teachers tasked with implementing programmes for newly arrived foreign pupils are often in a position of weakness and isolation, and find themselves having to compete with colleagues or other school departments in order to obtain resources. In Rotterdam there are independent reception departments with their own team of teachers and their own budget; considerable economic flexibility, decision-making autonomy and a reasonably low student-teacher ratio allow teachers to invest their energy in pursuing shared goals, instead of fighting to get hold of limited financial resources.
As far as organizational resources are concerned, let us not forget the low-cost contribution of aid from civil society organizations. This took place in the English cities studied, to cope with the needs and the difficulties in allocating asylum seekers and to support the development of an increasingly diverse society; in Turin, helping second generations and their families to integrate; and in Florence, articulating and organizing the Roma minority’s need for housing and integration. A friendly civil society is an important asset for decision-makers and they should attempt to build or reshape useful relations with key social groups.

Other obvious relevant players in the local political game are the media, which can both obstruct or smooth the process. The City of Nuremberg successfully used them to change the ways of approaching the frames through which the residents of Langwasser viewed the intercultural gardens. Managing to be heard by the media rather than influenced by them is a hard task for local administrations, and requires a strongly cohesive policy community, as shown by the results of recent research coordinated by FIERI on five European cities, on which the Nuremberg case analysed in this book was based. While such cohesion is certainly difficult to transfer, as it is part of a certain context in a certain set of circumstances, we can however seek to transfer the idea of paying due attention to frames. The ways in which issues are conceptualized can become crucial cognitive resources or disadvantages in policymaking processes. Frames are not produced only through processes taking place elsewhere, at national and international level, out of the control of the local policy community; the latter can and must play a role in redefining them. On the other hand, relying solely on frames, on perceptions and images based on media and on political rhetoric, is not advisable: facts are needed. In the two German areas, the City Council succeeded in communicating with local media, but it also worked on practical aspects, dealing with material interests. In Langwasser, the Intercultural Gardens Committee prepared a set of rules to
prevent possible causes of disturbance to the local neighbourhood; it defined opening hours, rules for hygiene and waste management, organizing events, parking and so on. As a result, residents felt reassured. In Werderau, the event which changed things was the creation of a non-profit city company, WBG, which was obliged to follow a socially responsible housing policy. WBG purchased part of the housing stock being fought over which was the source of interethnic tension.

Frames are not just led by the media and opinion makers; they are not always transitory or based on vested interests. The case of the Rotterdam schools shows how strategies adopted by teachers, even when discretionary, fulfilled a solid shared professional attitude, rooted in the institutional context, which consisted of mediating the socioeconomic integration of the disadvantaged pupils and meritocratic logic.

Social capital, here taken to mean relationships of mutual trust, cooperation, shared rules and regulations, and common identities, is another relevant variable of the context in which policies operate. As we know, this is a fabric of relations which simultaneously includes, and excludes. In the German neighbourhood of Werderau, it served to include Turkish immigrants who settled during the economic boom, but excluded the latecomers accused of threatening the social order. Social capital tends to be exclusive rather than inclusive, when there is a perceived threat to material vested interests. In policymaking terms, this might also be good news. Since social capital is difficult to build from scratch, and impossible to transfer, if material interests play an important role in reinforcing or loosening its threads, policymakers can act on rebalancing those interests, thus influencing the social capital and increasing the likelihood of achieving the desired outcomes.

It is however extremely difficult to act on a divided social capital consisting of “us and them”. The accusation of spending public money on “Others”, on “Foreigners”, by natives, can prevent
local policymakers from intervening. Policymakers themselves might think that, if forced to choose, they should give priority to native citizens, the bulk of the electorate. Much of the choice depends on how far these policies are considered strategic to social cohesion in society as a whole, with the potential to prevent potentially disruptive ethnic conflicts which could damage political consensus even more than pro-immigrant measures. The Turin local authorities consider active citizenship strategic for the social cohesion and development of the entire city and they adapted immigrant policies to the needs of the second generations, which are radically different from those of their parents. Similarly, the City of Sheffield, considering the settlement of asylum seekers and refugees in the area as a possible remedy for the housing problems caused by a decline in population, welcomed nationwide dispersal programmes with open arms and took direct responsibility for them at local level. In Bradford, where the main challenge for cohesion in local society was the interethnic riots of 2001, the City Council adopted more low-profile solutions: it outsourced the management of these schemes to the voluntary sector, thus keeping the issue outside the political arena. In some cases, giving a policy a low profile and narrow visibility can prove a useful strategy.

Time is a variable often underestimated by policy studies. Reluctant or hostile recipients may become more satisfied once they get accustomed to the novelties brought by the project and are able to properly appreciate the advantages. As in the case of the Pual project in Lisbon, time counts also because there is an inevitable gap between destruction and reconstruction. And when refurbishing a neighbourhood, what gets destroyed is also that which time, in terms of relations and customs, had previously built. Decision-makers should proceed with caution when they are required to intervene in these kinds of contests. And more obviously decision-makers are often faced by the alternative between immediately cashing in on results, or merely an-
nouncing appealing measures, versus long-term potentially positive outcomes of measures which are initially more difficult to digest.

To sum up, different but equally effective solutions can be used to tackle similar problems. The actual choice depends not just on context, on some of the different factors illustrated so far, but on politics, on the balances of power between political parties and within parties, on their ideological leanings, and on their electoral and coalition strategies. And on these variables, policy studies have little to suggest. They can only offer some knowledge tools. In this book, through the cases analysed, we have tried to single out the potential advantages and disadvantages of various policy strategies. All of them, even the most embedded in their context, have some capacity to travel.
NOTES


2 Concordia Discors is an interdisciplinary, comparative and participatory research project on integration among groups of different origins, in European neighbourhoods. It is funded by the European Commission through the European Integration Fund. The project partners are FIERI, efms of the University of Bamberg, Migration Research Group of Autonomous University of Barcelona, COMPAS of the University of Oxford and TARKI. See F. Pastore, I. Ponzo (eds.), Concordia Discors, Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam (forthcoming), www.concordiadiscors.eu.
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